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United States Energy Security
Gawdat Bahgat

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Book Reviews

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Crime as Destiny
A Study of Criminal Twins

Professor Dr. J. Lange

Departmental Director, Kaiser Wilhelm Institute

Translated by Charlotte Haldane

Foreword by J. B. S. Haldane

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This is a reprint of the original 1931 translation by Charlotte Haldane of the pioneer 1928 study conducted by J. Lange of the criminal records of a number of monozygotic and dizygotic twins. It is a classic work of outstanding interest to all students of criminology, heredity or twin studies.

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Roger Pearson
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Associate Editor

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Erratum: The article entitled "The Future of European Missile Defense Systems" published in Volume 26 Number 2 was contributed by E. Fox and S. Orman and not solely by S. Orman as stated in that issue.

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United States Energy Security

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Shortly after taking office, President George W. Bush established the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), headed by Vice President Dick Cheney, to examine the "energy crisis" the United States faces. On May 17th, the President presented the recommendations of the NEPDG, a main theme of which is the need to diversify the fuel sources and geographic sources of energy. This study examines the history and outlook of fossil fuels, and analyzes various energy strategies to enhance U.S. energy security. For the foreseeable future oil will continue to play a significant role in the energy mix and the Persian Gulf will retain its strategic importance for U.S. energy security.

Key Words: Energy, Fossil Fuels, Oil, Coal, Natural Gas, Nuclear Energy, OPEC, National Energy Development Group, Persian Gulf

Perhaps more than any other issue, the question of energy security has topped the agenda of Bush administration. Both the president and vice-president had connections with the oil industry before they were elected to office. In 1977, George W. Bush founded Arbusto Energy Inc., which was merged into Harken Energy Corp in 1986. Richard Cheney was the CEO and chairman of Halliburton company before joining the Bush ticket and administration. Given their backgrounds and the perception of energy crisis, which has persisted since the late 1990s, President Bush decided to address the question of the nation's energy needs shortly after taking office. In his second week in office, the President established the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG) directing it to develop a national energy policy. The group was headed by the Vice-President and included the secretaries of state, treasury, interior, agriculture, commerce, transportation and energy as well as the heads of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Environmental Protection agency and other top officials.

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In May 2001, the NEPDG presented its assessment of the "energy crisis" in the United States and a long list of recommendations to avert the crisis and enhance the nation's energy security. The findings and recommendations of the NEPDG have incited an intense debate between policy-makers, professionals in the energy industry, journalists, academicians and others on the current status and the future of the country's energy policy.

Putting the rhetoric aside on whom to blame for the current shortage of energy supplies, a consensus on the main characters of the United States energy policy over the last several decades has emerged. These are:

1. The nation has not had a comprehensive integrated strategic energy policy for decades. Both democratic and republican administrations had failed to articulate such a policy. Instead, different administrations provided short-term solutions to evolving crises, which proved inadequate to address the long-term imbalance between supply and demand.
2. Since the late 1940s, every American recession has been preceded by spikes in energy prices. The economic slow-down of the early 2000s is not an exception.
3. The demand for energy has skyrocketed since the early 1990s. This can be explained by the fact that the rise in energy consumption usually occurs during periods of relatively low or stable prices and during periods of healthy economic growth.
4. This rising demand, however, was not matched by an expansion in supply. There was severe under-investment in energy infrastructure due, partly, to low industry profits through much of the 1990s (as a result of low and stable energy prices). This under-investment was exacerbated by tightened environmental restrictions.
5. Finally, liberalization of energy policy has facilitated efficiency and the smooth allocation of resources. But rapid deregulations of the oil, natural gas and power sectors have also reduced the incentives for specific businesses to invest in large inventories or excess capacity that can help smooth markets during times of

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disruption or unexpected volatility in demand growth.[2]

In addition to this general diagnosis of energy problems facing the United States in the early 2000s, different, and competing, solutions have been proposed to form a workable energy policy. These include:

1. The fundamental imbalance between supply and demand, if allowed to continue, will inevitably undermine the nation's economic growth, standard of living and national security. These two sides of the energy equation (supply and demand) need to be addressed simultaneously.
2. The reversing of the decline in interest in energy efficiency and conservation at home is an important component of a future energy policy. However, even with improved energy efficiency, the United States will need more energy supply.
3. These needed energy supplies should be diversified in two senses: the mix of energy sources and the geographical origin of that energy.
4. The demand for energy will most likely continue to outpace domestic production. As a result, the United States will increasingly rely on import from producers across the globe. A reassessment of the role of energy in American foreign policy is needed.

To sum up, a long-term energy policy would include a broad combination of measures that would stimulate domestic production, provide incentives for conservation, promote clean technologies and eliminate political barriers to world markets. These issues will be examined in details in this study. The analysis suggests that in spite of the need to diversify the fuel mix, (i.e., oil, natural gas, coal, nuclear power, hydroelectricity and other renewable resources) oil will continue to play a significant role in the nation's energy sector. Furthermore, the growing trade in energy with a variety of suppliers (North America, West Africa, the Caspian Basin) is important to enhance American energy security, but the Persian Gulf region[3] will continue to occupy

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[2] Edward L. Morse and Amy Myers Jaffe, *Strategic Energy Policy Challenges for the 21st Century*, Houston: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University, 2001, p.13.

[3] The Persian Gulf region contains eight countries: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

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the driver's seat in the global energy market. In short, securing oil supplies from the Persian Gulf region will continue to be a fundamental goal of American foreign policy in the foreseeable future.

Diversification of Fuel Mix

The United States' appetite for energy as it industrialized was prodigious. Coal played a major role in the structural change of the American economy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Coal ended the long dominance of fuel-wood about 1885, only itself to be surpassed in 1951 by petroleum and then by natural gas a few years later. Hydroelectric power and nuclear electric power appeared about 1890 and 1957, respectively.[4] Solar photovoltaic, advanced solar thermal and geothermal technologies also represent recent developments in energy sources. In spite of these diverse resources, at the beginning of the twenty-first century energy in the United States, like the rest of the industrialized world, comes mostly from fossil fuels (crude oil, natural gas and coal). Indeed, in the early 2000s, oil accounts for around 38% of total U.S primary energy requirements, while natural gas accounts for 24% and coal 23%.[5] Put differently, these three sources of energy provide approximately 85% of U.S. energy needs. America's heavy reliance on fossil fuels is projected to continue well into the twenty-first century, but the make-up of energy sector will slightly change due to the variation in the growth rate of each source as the following table I shows.

Three conclusions can be drawn from table I. First, in the early 2000s, the United States continues to be a major consumer of the three fossil fuels. Second, natural gas is the fastest growing fuel. This can be attributed to environmental considerations. Third, America's energy security is enhanced by this diversity in the fuel mix. A close examination of the main characters and the outlook of each fuel is in order.

1) Coal: Coal is in a unique position as a major source of energy in the United States. On one side, coal is America's most abundant fuel

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[4] Energy Information Administration (EIA). *Energy in the United States: A Brief History and Current Trends*, Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office (USGPO), October 2000, p.2.

[5] EIA, *Country Profile: The United States of America*, April 2001, on line at www.eia.doe.gov.

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Table I

United States fossil fuels consumption 1990-2020

Fuel	1990	1999	2005	2010	2015	2020	Average annual percentage change 1999-2020
Oil	17.0	19.5	21.2	22.7	24.3	25.8	1.3
Natural gas	18.7	21.7	25.2	28.0	31.6	34.7	2.3
Coal	895	1,045	1,183	1,235	1,261	1,297	1.0

* Oil is measured in million barrels per day.
* Natural gas is measured in trillion cubic feet.
* Coal is measured in million short tons.
Sources: EIA, International Energy Outlook, Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2001, pp.179, 180 and 181.

source. The United States has the largest coal proven reserves in the world and has enough of it to last for another 250 years at the current level of consumption. On the other side, coal is one of the dirtiest sources of energy and consequently the least favored by policy-makers and the general public. Coal combustion produces several types of emissions that adversely affect the environment that has made it subject to attacks by environmentalists. The combination of these two characteristics has influenced the production, uses, pricing and outlook of coal. Since 1950, the United States has produced more coal than it has consumed. This excess production has allowed the nation to become a significant exporter of coal to the rest of the world.[6] The uses of coal have changed dramatically over the years. Half a century ago, most coal was consumed in the industrial sector, heated homes and transportation. Currently, most of the coal consumption is concentrated in generating electricity.[7] During the same time span, coal prices have generally fallen. Indeed, coal is the least expensive of the major fossil fuels in the United States and around the world. Finally, the future of

[6] The United States is the third largest coal exporter in the world, behind Australia and South Africa.

[7] In 2000, coal-fired units accounted for 51% of US electricity generation.

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coal in America's energy sector will depend, to a large extent, on the continuing efforts to create the so-called "clean coal". For the last several years, substantial funding from different sources has been allocated to support technological improvements to make coal more environmentally-friendly fuel.

2) Natural Gas Unlike coal, natural gas is a relatively clean fuel. When burned, gas produces only one-third carbon dioxide for each unit of energy as coal and two-thirds as much as oil. Nor surprisingly, natural gas has become the unqualified favorite fuel in the United States, and around the world, in the last several years. Indeed, recently natural gas has become the fuel of choice for nearly all of the new electric-power generating capacity in the United States. Under existing policy, natural gas generating capacity is expected to constitute about 90% of the projected increase in electricity generation between 2000 and 2020.[8] This should be seen as a part of significant change in gas consumption. For decades, the industrial sector of the economy has been the heaviest user of natural gas. In 2000, industrial entities accounted for nearly half of all natural gas consumption, followed by residential sector, which used another fifth of the total.[9] In recent years, very small amounts of natural gas have been reported for use in vehicles.

This skyrocketing current and projected demand raises two questions concerning the adequacy of supplies and the share of imported gas in consumption. In other words, will the current production levels and proven reserves be able to meet the growing demand? And if not, how will this increasingly widening gap between domestic production and consumption be filled? The United States holds an estimated 3.2% of proven world reserves – the 6th largest in the world.[10] From the early 1980s until the mid-1990s, yearly production of natural gas exceeded reserve additions and the nation's proven reserves were declining. The downward trend was reversed in 1994. The relatively high levels of annual reserve additions reflect increased exploratory and developmental drilling as a result of higher

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[8] National Energy Policy Development Group, (NEPDG) *National Energy Policy*, Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 2001, p.1-7.

[9] EIA, *U.S. Natural Gas Markets: Recent Trends and Prospects for the Future*, Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 2001, p.4.

[10] EIA, *Country Profile: The United States of America*, April 2001, on line at www.eia.doe.gov.

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prices and expected strong growth in demand, as well as productivity gains from technological improvements.[11] These reserve additions, however, are not projected to provide enough supplies to meet the growing demand. The United States was essentially self-sufficient in natural gas until the late 1980s, when consumption began to significantly outpace production. The import share of consumption rose from 5% in 1987 to 15% in 2000.[12]

The outlook for natural gas looks promising. In the beginning of the 2000s, natural gas is seen as clean and reliable resource that is expected to fuel an increasing share of the United States energy consumption well into the twenty-first century. This rose prospect, however, faces three important challenges – location of new discoveries, the need to import increasing supplies and the necessity to upgrade and establish modern pipelines to distribute natural gas.

First, most of the domestic production from traditional sites is declining. Increasingly, the nation will have to rely on natural gas from unconventional resources, such as tight sands, deep formations, deep water and gas hydrates. The full utilization of resources in such locations requires substantial investments, sophisticated technology and will take several years. Second, for the foreseeable future net natural gas imports are expected to grow. Most of the rise in demand will be increasingly met by supplies from Canada, which has very large gas resource base and easy pipeline access to the lower 48 states. Furthermore, liquefied natural gas (LNG) is projected to provide a growing percentage of natural gas imports.[13] Finally, natural gas distribution is hindered by an aging and inadequate network of pipelines. Matching supply and demand will require the construction of thousands miles of new gas pipelines. This will necessitate the investment of approximately $1.5 trillion over the next several years.[14]

3) Oil: The United States is the world's largest oil consumer, importer, second largest producer (after Saudi Arabia) and ranks eleventh world-

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[11] EIA, *Annual Energy Outlook*, Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 2001, p.32.

[12] NEPDG, *National Energy Policy*, Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 2001, p.1-7.

[13] Algeria was once the only source of LNG supply for the United States but in recent years cargos have come from different producers including Trinidad and Tobago, Qatar, Nigeria, Australia, Oman, Indonesia and the United Arab Emirates.

[14] EIA, *Country Profile: The United States of America*, April 2001, on line at www.eia.doe.gov.

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Table III

Imports from the Persian Gulf Region as % of Net Oil Imports (1983-2000)

Year	US	W. Europe	Japan
1983	8.8%	41%	60%
1984	9.3%	39%	61%
1985	6.1%	35%	59%
1986	14.7%	45%	58%
1987	16.1%	43%	60%
1988	20.8%	44%	58%
1989	23.1%	47%	63%
1990	24.5%	48%	65%

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1991	24.2%	43%	64%
1992	22.5%	43%	66%
1993	20.7%	50%	68%
1994	19.2%	48%	68%
1995	17.8%	47%	70%
1996	16.9%	43%	70%
1997	17.3%	47%	74%
1998	19.9%	50%	76%
1999	23.0%	50%	74%
2000	22.1%	45%	75%

Source: Energy Information Administration, Persian Gulf Oil and Gas Exports Fact Sheet, February 2001, on line at www.eia.doe.gov.

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wide in proven reserves.[15] No wonder, oil is the nation's largest source of primary energy, providing 38% of energy needs. For the foreseeable future, oil is projected to maintain its share of U.S. energy consumption in spite of declining reserves. The United States growing dependency on imported oil can be explained by a two-fold development, which has been in place for most of the last three decades – declining production and rising demand. The figures in table II illustrate these two trends.

The figures show that after the United States oil production reached its peak in 1970 it started a slow but steady decline. One reason for this slow shortfall in domestic production was the surge in Alaskan North Slope oil production beginning in the late 1970s. Production from Alaska, however, peaked in late 1980s and gradually fell to a modest level by the late 1990s and early 2000s. For the foreseeable future, U.S. oil production is projected to continue this trend of falling. Advances in exploration and production technologies do not offset declining oil resources.

On the other side, a close examination of the trend in U.S. oil consumption suggests a clear sensitivity to prices and economic performance. Following the 1973 price hikes, initiated by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), U.S. consumption of petroleum declined for two years. Then, with relatively speaking, falling and stable prices, U.S. consumption started to climb up again. The jump in oil prices in late 1970s and early 1980s, caused by the Iranian revolution and the break out of the Iran-Iraq war, resulted in a marked decline in consumption. Since the mid 1980s, two factors have contributed to a steady increase in U.S. petroleum consumption: stable prices at a relatively low level and substantial economic growth in the United States.

This rise in oil consumption has been driven most notably by transportation sector. Generally, energy is consumed in three broad end-use sectors: the residential and commercial sector, the industrial sector and the transportation sector. While other sectors have shown some ability to substitute other energy sources for oil over the past few decades, transportation has not. Indeed, the transportation sector accounts for approximately two-thirds of U.S. petroleum use. Trucks and automobiles account for most of the sector's petroleum use. The slow change in the automobiles' use of gasoline over the last three

[15] BP-Amoco, *Statistical Review of World Energy*, London, 2001, pp.4, 7, 10 and 18.

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decades reflects the sensitivity to both price-jumps and strong economic performance. The average efficiency of the vehicle fleet, as measured by miles per gallon (mpg), improved from 13.4 mpg in 1973 to 21.2 mpg in 1991.[16] This improved efficiency was partly in response to the enforcement of the Automobile Efficiency Standards since the mid-1970s. In recent years, relatively low fuel prices and higher personal income have resulted in consumer demand for larger and more powerful vehicles. Thus, the growing share of small trucks and sport utility vehicles in the transportation sector began to slowly pull the mpg back to the low level. Future fleet fuel efficiency improvements will depend upon the rate of replacement of older, less-efficient vehicles along with trends in consumer preferences. Finally, it is important to point out that technological advances such as gasoline fuel cells, direct fuel injection and electric hybrids for both gasoline and diesel engines are not likely to reduce petroleum consumption. The high rate of U.S. per capita motorization (car ownership) will keep gasoline use at a high level. In short, transportation sector will continue its upward pressure on the United States energy consumption, particularly petroleum.

This projected fall in oil production in conjunction with expected rise in consumption will result in increased dependency on imported oil. Until the 1950s, the United States produced nearly all the petroleum it needed. But by the end of the decade the gap between production and consumption began to widen and imported petroleum became a major component of the U.S. energy needs. During the 1960s, consumption slightly outpaced domestic production and by the early 1970s a more significant gap had developed. Since the mid-1970s the United States has grown more dependent on imported oil than ever. Between 1973 and 2000, U.S. dependence on foreign oil rose from about 35% to more than 52% of domestic consumption. This has significant negative implications for the nation's economic performance.[17] Without a drastic change in current policy, the share of U.S. oil demand met by imports is projected to increase to 64% in 2020.[18] Put differently, by 2020, the oil for nearly two of every three

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[16] Robert J. Beck, "U.S. Drilling to Slump in 1999 Despite Oil, Gas Demand Gains", *Oil and Gas Journal*, Vol.97, No.4, January 25, 1999, p.60.

[17] In 2000 the U.S. energy trade deficit was about $120 billion, most of which was spent on oil imports.

[18] NEPDG, *National Energy Policy*, Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 2001, p.1-13.

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gallons of U.S. gasoline and heating oil could come from foreign countries.[19]

To sum up, in spite of efforts to diversify the United States' mix of energy, the nation still is deeply dependent on oil as the major source of energy. The share of natural gas is projected to expand, but petroleum will continue to play a major role in meeting the growing American demand for energy, most notably in the transportation sector. Given the lack of domestic oil resources, the United States will remain dependent on foreign supplies. This dependency has raised concerns regarding the nation's energy security. The question of how to achieve a state of "energy independence" or reduce America's dependence on foreign supplies has been raised by policy-makers for a long time. Before addressing this question, two important caveats should be taken into consideration. First, a distinction should be made between "dependency" and "vulnerability". Oil dependency does not necessarily mean that the U.S. is vulnerable to an oil disruption. If the world oil supplies come from many producers and one of them suddenly stopped exporting oil, this would have little impact on the U.S. and world economies, even at a high rate of U.S. dependency. Concentration on few suppliers, not dependency, would lead to vulnerability. Second, the globalization of oil markets has made the question of who sells and buys a particular barrel of oil less and less relevant. The United States oil security depends on sufficient supplies to support both American and global economies. As long as Washington participates in the global oil market, it will feel the impact of supply disruptions wherever they occur. Interdependence, rather then independence, is the cornerstone of contemporary oil security.

America's Quest to Curb Dependence on Oil

Since the 1930s policy-makers in Washington have been considering articulating and implementing a national energy policy. Under President Franklin D. Roosevelt administration, there was a strong belief that the government could not solve the economic problems facing the country without playing a role in oil policy, which was considered a vital factor in the economic recovery. The intention was not to nationalize or make the industry public, but to take control of the coordination of its activities. With U.S. involvement in the

[19] Ibid.

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Second World War, the struggle over the formulation of a governmental oil policy intensified. Despite the heavy drain on its oil supplies during the War, the U.S. still occupied a strong position with respect to petroleum. In 1950, the United States provided 52%[20] of the world's crude oil production.[21] Since then, foreign oil has been imported into the United States in ever-increasing amounts and the notion of "oil independence" was introduced and gradually was accepted by many policy-makers in Washington. Before reviewing the main efforts to achieve this goal – oil independence or reducing U.S. dependence on imported oil – it is important to highlight four of the main characteristics of America's oil policy since the early 1950s.

Fist, generally speaking the United States oil policy can be described as "guided laissez-faire.[22]" Oil companies make their own production and investment decisions based on commercial consideration. At the same time the United States government has occasionally intervened diplomatically, economically and militarily to guarantee these companies access to oil. In other words, there is some kind of coordination between the United States government strategic interests and the commercial interests of American oil companies. In most cases, the two sides supported each other, but in few but significant cases, as will be explained later, they went separate ways. Second, the United States has never articulated and implemented a long-term and comprehensive energy strategy. Major energy initiatives were taken, largely, to address specific crises and did not last for very long. Third, through 1972 Americans had become accustomed to expanding energy consumption with minimal concerns about the constancy of supply or sharp price escalation. A turning point came in the early 1970s when U.S. oil production peaked and the country became seriously dependent and vulnerable to foreign oil supplies. The 1973 prices spikes and Arab boycott aggravated this sense of vulnerability. Since then, the term "energy security" became firmly embedded in the mindset of policy-makers in Washington. Finally, a major component of "energy security" has been to reduce the nation's dependence on imported oil and boost domestic production. The

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[20] EIA, *25th Anniversary of the 1973 Oil Embargo*, Washington, D.C., USGPO, 1998, p.9.

[21] By 2000, that figure had dropped to about 10%.

[22] The term is borrowed from David A. Deese and Joseph S. Nye, *Energy and Security*, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1981, p.7.

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independent American producers[23] have led the way in resisting the so-called "invading oil" based on national security considerations. They have strongly lobbied policy-makers in Washington to convince them of the dangers of oil dependence since the early 1950s.[24]

These independent American producers found receptive ears in Eisenhower administration. President Dwight Eisenhower was convinced that the growing share of imported oil in U.S. energy consumption represented a challenge to the country's national security and its prominent role in world affairs. Eisenhower's energy policy had a two-fold objective. It aimed at reducing the share of foreign oil to a low level of roughly 12% of total consumption and relying more on oil supplies from Canada and Mexico than far away producers. Thus, after two years of voluntary import quotas program, which oil companies did not comply with, the president made it mandatory in 1959. Under this program the exporting countries were divided into separate groups, depending on preferential treatment. Western Hemisphere exporters were favored in comparison with the rest of the world.

The impact of this mandatory import quotas program on U.S. oil policy was mixed. The United States became relatively independent of foreign oil reserves during most of the 1960s, which was seen as a positive development in the country's national security. Meanwhile, exports from Canada to the United States increased sharply and replaced the previously imported oil from the Middle East despite the fact that the consumers had to pay a higher price for the former than they paid for the latter. At the same time, most of the cheap American oil reserves were utilized and thereby exhausted. The program stimulated production levels that eroded domestic reserves rather than creating stockpiles and spare capacity. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, oil companies found that it was more profitable to pay additional import fees than to use domestic oil, since domestic production costs were higher than the total cost of imported oil plus the import fee.[25]

The Nixon and Carter administrations had to deal with some of the most serious oil crises the United States has ever confronted. To

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[23] More than 8,000 independent crude oil and natural gas explorer/producers in the United States founded the Independent Petroleum Association of America, which is dedicated to ensure a strong and viable domestic oil and natural gas industry.

[24] For more details see www.savedomesticoil.com.

[25] Svante Karlsson, *Oil and the World Order: American Foreign Oil Policy*, Totowa: Barnes and Noble Books, 1986, p.168.

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start with, in the early 1970s the American domestic oil production peaked and started its steady declining path. Consequently, the country's dependence on imported oil started to substantially deepen. Under these unfavorable circumstances, the first price shock and Arab oil embargo took place. The United States was ill prepared for both. These two related events underscored America's sense of vulnerability to disruption of foreign supplies. In a symbolic move, President Richard Nixon announced that because of the energy crisis the lights on the national Christmas tree would not be turned on. In addition, he signed the Emergency Highway Conservation Act, setting a speed limit of 55 miles an hour.[26] Most importantly, President Nixon announced a plan called "Project Independence", the aim of which was to develop domestic resources to meet the nation's energy need without depending on foreign suppliers. In other words, the president wanted to achieve a state of self-sufficiency within a decade. The Project proposed measures to stimulate investments in domestic oil production, including de-control of domestic energy prices and subsidizing domestic oil by imposing fees on imported oil. This unrealistic goal of self-sufficiency was never achieved.

Nixon's successor as chief executive President Gerald Ford recommended a comprehensive energy program that among other things featured higher taxes on imported oil and the gradual phasing out of price controls that the government had placed on domestic oil.[27] Ford also came out in favor of a windfall profits tax on domestic petroleum, the decentralization of oil prices, the stockpiling of 1 billion barrels of petroleum and an increased reliance on coal, electricity and nuclear power. Finally, President Ford signed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) that authorized the establishment of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR).

Coming to office in January 1977, the Carter administration judged the energy crisis to be a national emergency and offered a program to deal with it – a program that the president asked the nation to accept as the "moral equivalent of war.[28]" Probably more than his

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[26] Under relative oil abundance, in 1995, Congress repealed the national speed limits and authorized states to set their own.

[27] Edward W. Chester, *United States Oil Policy and Diplomacy*, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983, p.332.

[28] Seth P. Tillman, *The United States in the Middle East*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982, p.77.

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predecessors, President Jimmy Carter focused more on the demand side than the supply side of the energy equation. His program called for reduced overall energy consumption, significantly reduced imports, increased reliance on coal and renewable sources of energy like sunlight, wind and wood, higher gasoline taxes and various tax credits and incentives to encourage more efficient automobiles and home insulation. Also, at the president's request, Congress created a new cabinet-level, Department of Energy in 1977.

To sum up, during most of the 1970s the official objective of U.S. energy policy was to reduce dependence on imported oil. The collapse of oil prices that followed the global oil glut in the mid-1980s undermined the sense of urgency to take drastic action to control and restrain the United States' appetite for more energy. Through the 1980s and 1990s, the centerpiece of U.S. energy policy had been to foster at home and abroad deregulated markets that efficiently allocate capital, provide a maximum of consumer choice and promote low prices through competition. Domestically, several options to address the country's growing needs for energy have been pursued. These include: increase in domestic production by relying more on technological advanced, creating a national strategic stockpile, developing a non-fossil source of energy (i.e., nuclear power), conservation and cooperation with Canada and Mexico (i.e., Hemispheric energy policy). These five strategies are not mutually-exclusive, rather they compliment each other. Their common goal is to curb the United States' dependence on imported oil. The pros and cons of each one of these strategies need to be examined.

1) Using technological advances to increase domestic production: A basic component of President George W. Bush's energy policy is to adopt an aggressive approach to explore and drill for oil in both onshore and offshore areas within the United States. This is in contrast to Clinton administration, which was more reluctant to open public land for oil operations. The federal government owns about one-third of the nation's land. These federal lands and offshore areas are believed by some industry specialists to contain a substantial majority of the nation's undiscovered domestic energy resources.

The clearest contradiction between the Clinton administration and the Bush administration is focused on the opening of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), east of Prudhoe Bay oil field in

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Alaska.[29] For the last several years oil production in Alaska has entered a period of decline, which can be reversed by opening up the ANWR. Such an opening could lead to the development of resources that could make a significant contribution to domestic supply and would also bolster domestic industry and the local and national economies. In response to a Congressional request early in 2000, the Department of Energy issued a report on potential oil reserves and production from the ANWR. The report projected that there are approximately 10.3 billion barrels of oil technically recoverable.[30] The report added that ANWR's peak production rates could range from 1.0 to 1.35 million barrels per day (b/d), with initial ANWR production possibly beginning around 2010, and peak production 20-30 years after that.[31]

In addition to ANWR, production from offshore sources, particularly the Gulf of Mexico is predicted to play an increasingly important role in the future.[32] Recent technological advances have made it possible to economically produce oil from non-conventional sites. Examples of these advanced technologies in oil exploration include 3-D seismic technology that enables geologists to use computer images to determine the location of oil and gas before drilling begins, dramatically improving the exploration success rate; deep-water drilling technology that enables exploration and production of oil and gas at depths over two miles beneath the ocean's surface and highly sophisticated directional drilling that enables wells to be drilled long horizontal distances from the drilling site. These technologies have drastically changed the practices and capabilities of the oil industry particularly in two areas: exploration costs and success rates. A new barrel of oil reserves that cost about $15 to find in the 1970s, costs less than $5 to find today.[33] Similarly, drillers are more successful in locating oil wells than they were three decades ago.

In spite of these significant potentials to increase domestic production by relying on modern and highly-sophisticated technological advances, three restraints should be taken into consideration. First, the

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[29] When he was in office President Clinton strongly urged Congress to resist allowing oil drilling in "one of the last truly wild places on earth."

[30] EIA, *Country Profile: The United States of America*, April 2001, on line at www.eia.doe.gov.

[31] Ibid.

[32] The first offshore well was drilled in 1938 one mile from the Louisiana coastline.

[33] EIA, *25th Anniversary of the 1973 Oil Embargo*, Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1998, p.11.

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unpredictable ups and downs of world oil prices would play an important role in the speed and magnitude of oil exploration in ANWR, the Gulf of Mexico and other geologically complex reservoirs. In spite of substantial cost-reduction, it still is cheaper to produce in foreign countries (particularly the Persian Gulf) than in the United States. Thus, high oil prices will make it cost-effective to explore for oil in the U.S. and low prices are likely to slow down domestic production. Second, despite the drastic changes in American oil industry, technological advances have not led to any significant change in the production decline that has been under way since the early 1970s. Technology cannot make up for declining resources. Finally, most of these untapped oil reservoirs are located in environmentally sensitive areas. The strong opposition to drilling by environment activists should not be underestimated. This opposition might completely prevent or slow down oil exploration in different sites, particularly in ANWR. The Bush administration's assertion that sophisticated technology can guarantee energy production without harming the environment has not been accepted by all participants in the energy debate.

2) Conservation: The United States economy has become more efficient in its overall use of energy over the past three decades. Energy efficiency is the ability to use less energy to produce the same amount of lighting, heating, transportation and other energy services. One measure of energy efficiency is energy intensity – the amount of energy it takes to produce a dollar of gross domestic product (GDP). Since the early 1970s the United States economy has grown by 126% while energy use has increased by only 26%.[34] In other words, the American economy has grown nearly five times faster than energy use.[35] Three factors contributed to this improvement in energy efficiency. First, the price spikes of the 1970s forced many people to either consume less oil products or shift to other forms of energy (i.e., natural gas and nuclear power.) This was particularly evident in the industrial and residential sectors and to a less degree in the transportation sector. Second, the growing concern in the United States and around the world in reducing pollution and protecting the environment has provided another incentive to consume less oil products. Third, over the last thirty years

[34] NEPDG, *National Energy Policy*, USGPO, 2001, p.4-1.
[35] Europe and Japan made even bigger gains in efficiency.

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there has been a fundamental change in the structure of the American economy. The shift from manufacturing to services has contributed significantly to the reduction in energy consumption and improved efficiency.

Since the mid-1980s the decline in energy intensity has moderated. The reason for this less-efficient use of energy is two-fold. On one side the strong economic performance has led to expansion in consumption. This includes larger homes, bigger and sporty cars and more air travels. On the other side, the stability of oil prices at a relatively low level has encouraged more fuel consumption. Thus, between 1970 and 1986, energy intensity declined at an average annual rate of 2.3%, while from 1986 to 2000 it declined by only 1.3%.[36] In spite of this improvement in energy efficiency, it is important to emphasize that conservation alone is not the answer to the energy difficulties the United States faces. Rather, conservation should be integrated in a comprehensive and long-term energy strategy. The increasing reliance on a non-fossil energy source – nuclear power – is another component of this strategy.

3) Nuclear Power: Nuclear energy is used exclusively to generate electricity, providing the second largest source of energy of U.S. electricity generation.[37] Environmental concerns are the reasons for relying on nuclear power. Unlike fossil fuels, nuclear power produces no emissions (i.e., nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, mercury and carbon dioxide.) Given these features as well as the growing awareness of U.S. dependency on imported oil, there was a strong enthusiasm for nuclear power in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Accordingly, many nuclear plants were constructed, licensed and connected to the electricity grid. Most of these nuclear power plants received 40-year operating licenses and are scheduled to retire around 2015. However, this wave of enthusiasm for nuclear power was broken by the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979, which reinforced safety concerns.[38] Since the late

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[36] EIA, *Annual Energy Outlook*, Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 2001, p.5.

[37] In 2000 coal provided 52% of electricity generation, while nuclear energy provided 20%, followed by natural gas 16%. The rest was provided by hydropower, oil and renewable sources.

[38] In late March 1979 a reactor at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant suffered a partial meltdown. Within weeks attorneys filed a class action suit against Metropolitan Edison Company (a subsidiary of General Public Utilities) on behalf of all businesses and residents within 25 miles of the plant. Over the next 15 years, the case went to the Supreme Court and back, and through various district and appeals courts. Finally, in June 1996 the

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1970s, there have been no new reactor orders and none are currently planned. As operable nuclear power plants have aged, some have become expensive to operate and were closed. The joint effect of shutdowns and lack of new units coming on line is that the number of operable nuclear plants has fallen drastically in the last several years.

Despite these grim prospects for future of nuclear energy, it is important to point out to the improved performance of nuclear energy plants since the early 1980s. These plants generate more electricity at lower cost. Furthermore, their safety record has improved. The nuclear energy industry is closely regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which provides rigorous oversight of the operation and maintenance of these plants. In 2000, in a positive signal to the U.S. nuclear power industry, the NRC granted the first-ever renewal-operating license to a nuclear power plant.[39]

Due to these favorable conditions – reduced costs and improved safety records – the decline in nuclear energy generation has not been as rapid as was predicted only a few years ago. Nuclear energy is likely to continue providing a share of U.S. energy needs. Still, a significant challenge to the future prospects of nuclear power is how the industry would handle the questions of safety and radioactive waste. More public confidence needs to be gained in nuclear energy.

4) The Strategic Petroleum Reserve: The best insurance against interruptions in petroleum supplies is having a large stock of replacement that the government can release promptly. Thus the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) was created and is seen as the nation's first line of defense in case of an oil crisis. The need for a national oil storage reserve has been recognized for at least five decades. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes advocated the stockpiling of emergency crude oil in 1944. President Truman's Minerals Policy Commission proposed a strategic oil supply in 1952. President Eisenhower suggested an oil reserve after the 1956 Suez crisis. The Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control recommended a similar reserve in 1970.[40] These proposals were finally implemented in the

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lawsuit was dismissed.

[39] EIA, *A Country Profile: The United States of America*, April 2001, on line at www.eia.doe.gov.

[40] United States Department of Energy, *Strategic Petroleum Reserve*, August 2000, on line at www.fe.doe.gov/spr/spr.html.

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aftermath of the 1973-74 oil embargo. The price shock and the embargo aggravated America's sense of vulnerability and created the right conditions to move ahead with the plan to establish a national oil storage. President Ford set the SPR into motion when he signed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) in 1975. The legislation declared it to be U.S. policy to establish a reserve of up to one billion barrels of petroleum. The Gulf of Mexico was chosen for oil storage sites because it is the location of many U.S. refineries and distribution points for tankers, barges and pipelines.

The SPR proved its value in 1991 when President Bush ordered the first-ever emergency drawdown of the SPR. This step contributed to the stability of the world oil markets and prices. Two more public sales of crude oil from the SPR were held in 1996 and 1997. Finally, in 2000 President Clinton authorized another public sale in order to bolster the United States oil supplies and to alleviate possible shortages of heating oil during the upcoming winter.

Despite the fact that the SPR is considered the federal government's major tool for responding to oil supply disruptions, two problems can be identified and should be addressed to ensure the efficiency of this strategy. First, the SPR has declined both as a share of imports and in absolute size since the mid-1990s. The volume of oil stored in the SPR peaked at 592 million barrels in 1994. By 2001, the SPR contained around 541 million barrels of oil.[41] This decline is more dangerous when measured by the number of days of net oil import protection. The SPR has shrunk from 115 days of import replacement in 1985 to around 54 days in 2001.[42] Assuming that the SPR does not expand or contract, coverage will decline to 35 days in 2020 as consumption grows.[43] Second, under the EPCA there is no preset "trigger" for withdrawing oil from the SPR. In 1991 the withdrawal was mainly in response to potential interruption of supplies due to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, while the sale in 2000 was initiated to dampen price hikes. A clear policy for use of the SPR should be established.

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[41] EIA, *Country Profile: The United States of America*, April 2001, on line at www.eia.doe.gov.

[42] NEPDG, *National Energy Policy*, Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 2001, p.1-13.

[43] James M. Kendell, *Measures of Oil Import Dependence*, Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 2000, p.5.

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5) Hemispheric Energy Policy: Establishing strong energy ties between the United States and its neighbors to the north (Canada) and the south (Mexico) has been considered by several administrations as a cornerstone in assuring American's energy security. President George W. Bush has made creating and strengthening a Hemispheric energy policy at the top of his proposals to address the nation's deepening dependence on imported hydrocarbon resources. Indeed, both countries have been major suppliers of oil to the United States for the last several years.[44]

The interdependence between the three North American states is even stronger in natural gas than in oil. Given the high costs of transporting gas, the fuel has always been labeled as a "continental commodity" and is traded mostly within the same region where it is produced rather than cross-continents as oil, which is cheap and easy to transport. Thus, for the last several years Canada, the United States and Mexico have intensified their efforts to create an integrated natural gas market. Cross-border pipeline capacity between the three countries is increasing, export/import activities are growing and prices are converging. The driving force behind the growth in all three countries is the increased consumption of natural gas for electric power generation. The American-Canadian energy relations are different from those with Mexico due to variation in resource base and fiscal policies in each country.

The last few years have witnessed a substantial expansion of pipelines between the United States and Canada. Particularly significant are the Northern Border system through Montana into the Midwest, the Alliance Pipeline through North Dakota into Chicago and the Maritimes and Northeast system to New England markets.[45] Not surprisingly, Canada supplies the great majority of U.S. natural gas imports and is expected to continue to be the major supplier of U.S. gas needs. Canada's vast hydrocarbon resources and relatively easy access to the American market explain this extensive energy trade between the two countries. The construction of new pipelines might slow down due to environmental sensitivities.[46]

Similar to Canada, trade in energy between the United States and

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[44] Other major suppliers include Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and Nigeria.

[45] EIA, *International Energy Outlook*, Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 2001, p.45.

[46] Judith Gurney, "U.S. Faces Natural Gas Price Shock", *Energy Economist*, No.229, November 2000, p.18.

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Mexico has substantially expanded in the last several years. While the United States oil and natural gas exports to Canada are negligible, the U.S. is a net exporter of natural gas and refined petroleum products to Mexico. Two main characters of the Mexican energy industry, particularly the natural gas sector, pose challenges to close cooperation with Washington. First, Mexico's domestic consumption of natural gas is rapidly increasing and its indigenous production is not keeping pace with the demand. Second, Mexico's energy industry is run by a state-monopoly, Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex). In 1938 Mexico became the second country in the world to nationalize its oil industry.[47] Mexican laws prohibit foreign or private ownership in the energy sector, but the country needs to invest billions of dollars to upgrade and modernize its oil and gas infrastructure. Pemex simply does not have this money and there is no substitute to opening the door to private and foreign investments. In 1995, then-President Ernesto Zedillo indicated that private investment was to be encouraged in gas transportation, storage and distribution. Five years later, very little has changed.[48] President Vicente Fox, who took office in December 2000, indicated his desire to and support for economic reform. But first he must persuade Mexico's Congress to allow a mix of public ownership and private and foreign participation in energy production.

Finally, it worth emphasizing that turning to Hemispheric sources of oil to reduce the United States vulnerability to oil crises should not be seen as a guarantee for energy security. America's main trade partners in Europe and Asia still depend heavily on oil supplies from other producers, particularly from the Middle East. Interruptions of supplies to these important trade partners will not only affect their economies, but will have negative impact on the American economy.

U.S. Oil Security and the Diversity of Suppliers

The political instability in the Middle East over the last three decades has convinced the United States and other major oil consuming countries to search for oil resources in other regions. Thus, since the mid-1970s exploration and development operations have accelerated all over the world including the North Sea and the Caspian Basin. Recently, the South Atlantic Region, which combines both the Atlantic

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[47] The first country was the Soviet Union in 1917.

[48] George Baker, "Mexico's New Energy Era: Pemex Development Tracking Fiscal, Technoogical Strategies", *Oil and Gas Journal*, Vol.19, No.9, May 7, 2001, p.58.

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Equatorial Africa and South America, has emerged as a new oil supply flashpoint. African oil tends to be of high quality and low in sulfur, making it suitable for stringent refined product requirements and giving it a growing market share for refining centers on the East Coast of the United States. Similarly, Latin American and Caribbean energy producers such as Venezuela, Brazil and Trinidad and Tobago have increasingly expanded their share of U.S. oil and natural gas market.

Despite the increasing supplies from the North Sea, Latin America, Southern and Western Africa and the projected contribution of the Caspian Basin to global oil security, the Persian Gulf remains the main area that can meet either a substantive increase in demand or an emergency caused by a major disruption of supplies. Specialists in the oil energy industry use a measure called reserve to production (R/P), that is the time reserves are expected to last at current production rates. In 2000 the R/P ratio in Europe was 8.3 years, North America 13.8, Asia Pacific 16.3, Former Soviet Union 24.2, Africa 28.2, South and Latin America 37.7 and the Middle East 87 years.[49] In other words, both at present and in the foreseeable future the Gulf region will continue to occupy the driver's seat in the oil industry. This can be explained by at least four facts. First, the Gulf states hold more hydrocarbon resources than any other producers. In 2000, the Persian Gulf region contained around 672 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, representing approximately 65% of total world oil reserves and 1.8 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas reserves (34% of the world total).[50]Secondly, in 2000 the Gulf region maintained a significant percentage (around 44% or 1.6 million barrels b/d) of the world's excess oil production capacity.[51] This is important because in the event of an oil supply disruption, excess oil production capacity can be brought online to compensate. If such a disruption were to occur in the Persian Gulf, it would leave the world with relatively limited options for making up the lost oil production. Thirdly, oil can be extracted from the ground in the Gulf at a relatively much lower cost than in any other region in the world. Put differently, the marginal costs of production in the Gulf states are usually just a fraction of current prices which means that it is more profitable to produce oil in the Gulf region than anywhere else

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[49] BP/Amoco, *Statistical Review of World Energy*, London, 2000, p.4.

[50] EIA, *Persian Gulf Oil and Gas Exports Fact Sheet*, February 2001, on line at www.eia.doe.gov.

[51] Ibid.

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in the world. Fourthly, oil fields in the Gulf are located close to the international markets and enjoy well-developed transportation routes. The shipments of oil supplies from the region, in the most part, are not restrained by any financial or political barriers. Given all these advantages, all indicators point to increasing reliance by oil importing countries on Gulf producers. Indeed, the United States' and other industrialized countries' dependence on oil supplies from the Persian Gulf region has deepened over the last two decades as illustrated by the figures in table III.

The figures show that the share of Persian Gulf in the net oil imports of industrialized countries has risen since the mid-1980s. This can be explained by the sharp decline of oil prices early in the decade. In other words, after almost a decade of volatile and high oil prices (from mid-1970s to mid-1980s), the oil glut of 1980s, that stabilized prices at relatively low level, has contributed to deepening dependence of American and world economies on oil supplies from the Persian Gulf. For the foreseeable future, this trend is not likely to be reversed. Indeed, all indicators point to an expanding role of the Persian Gulf in global oil market.

Over the last several years, many of the Persian Gulf producers have considered opening their oil industry to foreign investment. This important development might have significant implications on U.S. and world oil security. The Persian Gulf is very rich in hydrocarbon resources. Rather, political factors will play crucial role in determining the scope and magnitude of the necessary production capacity. Critics of American government claim that Washington has made energy goals secondary to other foreign policy objectives, particularly in most of the 1990s. American sanctions policy has slowed down development of plentiful resources in Iran (and Libya), while Iraqi production has been held back by the United Nations sanctions regime. The role of sanctions in constraining investment in several key Middle East producers has meant less diversification of productive capacity and less total capacity. Meanwhile, domestic political and economic considerations in Saudi Arabia have added a sense of uncertainty to the opening of the kingdom's oil industry to foreign investment. By any estimation, Persian Gulf oil producers will remain central to world oil security and the region will continue to be a primary focus of the United States energy policy.

In closing, several of the major findings of this study need to be highlighted. First, for a long time the United States has not had a

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Table II

The United States Oil Production and Demand (1970-2000)

(Thousand Barrels per Day)

Year	Production	Demand
1970	9,637	14,697
1971	9,463	15,213
1972	9,441	16,367
1973	9,208	17,308
1974	8,774	16,653
1975	8,375	16,322
1976	8,132	17,461
1977	8,245	18,431
1978	8,707	18,847
1979	8,552	18,513
1980	8,597	17,056
1981	8,572	16,058
1982	8,649	15,296

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1983	8,688	15,231
1984	8,879	15,726
1985	8,971	15,726
1986	8,680	16,281
1987	8,349	16,665
1988	8,140	17,283
1989	7,613	17,325
1990	7,355	16,988
1991	7,417	16,714
1992	7,171	17,033
1993	6,847	17,237
1994	6,662	17,718
1995	6,560	17,725
1996	6,465	18,309
1997	6,452	18,620
1998	6,252	18,917
1999	5,881	19,519
2000	5,833	19,480

Source: Energy Information Administration, International Petroleum Monthly, Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, June 2001, pp.40 & 45.

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long-term and comprehensive energy policy. The solution to what many analysts perceive as "energy crisis" will take some time. In addressing the energy question, persistence, not urgency, is needed. Second, an integrated and balanced approach should be adopted to the energy problems. This approach should take into consideration both the supply and demand sides. This approach should also be built on diversity of both the fuel mix and the geographic origin of that fuel. Third, in spite of this need for diversification, fossil fuels, particularly oil and natural gas will continue to dominate the United States energy needs. Fourth, oil security of any country does not mean achieving a state of self-sufficiency. Given the declining production, limited reserves and rising demand, the United States will continue to be dependent on oil supplies from abroad. The goal, therefore, is not to engage in a meaningless debate over energy independence, but to find new ways of managing dependence. Fifth, the heavy interdependence between the American economy on one side and those of Europe, Japan and other Asian economies means that U.S. national energy security depends on sufficient supplies not only to the American market but also to those of major U.S. trade partners. Accordingly, it matters little if Gulf oil flows to Asia or to the United States. The global nature of oil trade and pricing means that an oil crisis would affect all. Sixth, achieving a state of stability in oil prices and security of supplies would benefit both producers and consumers. The global energy market has shifted from the confrontational attitude between consumers and producers in the 1970s to one of cooperation in the 2000s. Oil security is seen less in zero-sum terms and more as mutual benefits between consumers and producers.

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Globalization and Economic Goals

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Traditionally, evaluations of the impact of trade liberalization have focussed on measuring social welfare. In this paper we adopt the more pragmatic approach of referring to the goals of efficiency, equilibrium, equity and economic growth. Results from a statistical survey of 70 countries indicate that there is a positive and significant relationship between the goal of equilibrium and the extent of economic integration. However, this latter is only positively correlated with economic growth in the case of developing countries. As to efficiency, the least we can say is the globalization drives a reconfiguration of the industrial landscape, underscoring the legitimacy of policies supporting the competitiveness of firms.

Keywords: Globalization, Equilibrium, Efficiency, Equity, Economic Growth.

1. Globalization and Economic Goals

To understand the impact of globalization we must first agree on the objective functions. This is no simple task. Economic literature frequently draws on a measure of social welfare, comprised of consumer surplus, corporate profits, and government revenues, to demonstrate the virtues of trade liberalization, even when it is unilateral. But this analytical approach, though interesting, remains abstract and relies on very restrictive assumptions. Another approach, doubtlessly useful though often overlooked, focuses on economic goals, namely three much-discussed goals, economic efficiency, economic equilibrium, and "economic equity", to which is added the search for economic growth. What impact does globalization have on these goals?

Despite an abundant literature, the available analytical results are controversial, even contradictory. The object of this paper is to take stock of this literature, be it theoretical or empirical, and to recast the

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main issues in light of the perspective provided by the most recent statistical data. This paper is consequentially structured into two chapters. The first is devoted to examining the criteria of efficiency within the framework of the positive theory of international trade. The second chapter applies the results of previous studies to the remaining goals and includes a regression on cross-section data.

1.1. Efficiency from the Perspective of the Spatial Reconfiguration of Industries

Efficiency is defined as the optimal allocation of resources and technical efficiency, i.e. producing the types of goods and services a society desires with the greatest possible productivity. It is widely accepted, if only because of the failures of the socialist economies of Eastern Europe, that the market economy—and consequently free trade based on the principle of comparative advantage—is the simplest way to achieve this goal. This leads to a hierarchy of economies based on industrial specialization.

In the simplest terms, this means that under conditions of free trade, perfect competition on goods and factor markets, identical technology across countries and, of course, costless transportation, the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem should apply, to wit: *each country will export the good intensive in its abundant factor*. The reader will have noted the inherent weakness of this predictive model. First, verification of the HO model is problematic in a world in which there are numerous goods, inputs, and countries, because it is conditional on the aforementioned very restrictive assumptions. We refer to the following statement by Williamson and Milner (1991, pp. 48–52), "From the highly specific of the HO model, adding to only one of the dimensions of the model in isolation and as currently formulated (i.e. adding a third country to two commodities and two factors, or a third commodity to two factors and countries, etc.) tends in fact to cause difficulties. With an additional country, it is possible to predict the trade patterns of the countries at the extreme of the rank order of relative factor endowments [...] but the trade pattern of the intermediate country is indeterminate. Alternatively, if we add a third commodity by itself, the pattern of production becomes ambiguous, and therefore the detailed pattern of trade cannot be predicted."

Let us briefly look at some recent studies on the subject to fix these notions. Bowen et al. (1998, pp. 259–261) attempt to demonstrate a generalization of the principle of comparative advantage. Their

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DATA FOR THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

Country	Degree of Openness	Per-capita GDP	Growth of Per-capita P GDP	CPI % 1990-98	Unemployment Rate 1994-97	GINI Coefficient
OECD						
Australia	42	20 640	1,7	2,2	8,4	35,2
Austria	85	26 830	2,6	2,6	5,3	23,1
Belgium	141	25 380	2,3	2,1	9,0	25,0
Canada	80	19 170	1,8	1,7	9,2	31,5
Denmark	69	33 040	1,9	2,0	5,4	24,7
Finland	71	24 280	2,4	1,6	14,4	25,6
France	49	24 210	2,1	1,9	12,3	32,7
Germany	52	26 570	---	2,6	9,8	30,0
Greece	40	11 740	2,4	10,7	9,6	32,7
Ireland	142	18 710	3,0	2,2	10,3	35,9
Italy	50	20 090	2,5	4,2	12,5	27,3
Japan	21	32 350	3,5	1,0	3,4	24,9
Korea	85	8 600	6,6	5,6	2,6	31,6
Mexico	64	3 840	1,5	19,9	3,5	53,7
Netherlands	105	24 780	1,9	2,4	5,5	32,6
New-Zealand	57	14 600	0,7	2,0	6,7	43,9
Norway	75	34 310	3,0	2,1	4,1	25,8
Portugal	72	10 670	3,2	5,2	7,5	35,6
Spain	56	14 100	2,3	4,2	20,6	32,5
Sweden	81	25 580	1,4	2,5	7,9	28,0
Switzerland	75	39 980	1,2	2,0	4,1	33,1
United Kingdom	58	21 410	1,9	3,0	7,1	36,1
United States	26	29 240	1,6	2,8	4,9	40,8
Turkey	53	3 160	2,1	82,1	6,4	41,5
Developing countries, South America and Caribean						
Argentina	23	8 030	0,4	12,9	16,3	---
Brazil	18	4 630	2,2	333,7	6,9	60,0
Chile	56	4 990	1,9	10,5	5,3	56,5
Colombia	34	2 470	2,0	22,6	12,	57,1
Costa Rica	100	2 770	1,2	16,9	15,7	47,0
Dominican Rep.	70	1 770	2,3	9,6	15,9	48,7
Haiti	41	410	-0,8	24,8	---	---
Jamaica	112	1 740	-0,4	29,2	16,0	36,4
Nicaragua	111	370	-3,3	62,9	---	50,3
Venezuela	40	3 530	-0,8	53,6	10,3	48,8

Source: World Bank (2000), ***World Development Indicators***, Washington D.C.

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DATA FOR THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

Country	Degree Of Openness	Per-capita GDP	Growth of Per-capita GDP	CPI % 1990-98	Unemployment Rate, 1994-97	Gini Coefficient
AFRICA						
Algeria	47	1 550	1,0	24,8	24,6	35,3
Benin	55	380	0,1	11,6	—	—
Cameroon	51	610	1,3	8,6	—	—
C-A-Rep.	41	300	-1,2	6,7	—	61,3
Chad	51	230	-0,6	9,5	—	—
Côte d'Ivoire	82	700	-0,8	8,5	—	36,7
Egypta	40	1 290	3,5	10,5	11,3	28,9
Gabon	91	4 170	0,4	5,7	—	—
Ghana	63	390	-0,8	30,4	—	32,7
Kenya	57	350	1,3	18,8	—	44,5
Mali	58	250	-0,1	6,3	—	50,5
Mauritania	95	410	-0,1	6,6	—	38,9
Morocco	38	1 240	1,8	4,6	17,8	39,5
Mauritius	130	3 730	3,8	7,0	9,8	—
Niger	40	200	-2,5	7,2	—	50,5
Nigeria	55	300	0,0	40,4	—	50,6
Senegal	71	520	-0,4	6,6	—	41,3
South-Africa	50	3 310	01,	9,6	5,1	59,3
Togo	74	330	-0,6	10,2	—	—
Middle East						
Iran	28	1 650	-1,2	28,1	—	—
Israel	75	16 180	2,4	11,1	7,7	35,5
Kuwait	92	—	-3,0	2,1	—	—
Saudi Arabia	67	6 910	0,5	1,5	—	—
ASIA						
Bangladesh	33	350	1,4	5,4	—	33,6
China	39	750	6,8	11,3	3,0	40,3
Hong Kong	250	23 660	5,5	7,7	2,2	—
India	25	440	2,7	9,7	—	37,8
Indonesia	98	640	4,7	11,2	4,0	36,5
Malaysia	207	3 670	4,1	4,1	2,5	48,5
Nepal	58	210	1,1	9,3	—	36,7
Pakistan	36	470	2,7	10,8	5,4	31,2
Philippines	116	1 050	0,9	8,7	7,4	46,2
Singapore	287	30 170	6,4	2,1	2,4	—
Sri Lanka	78	810	3,0	10,7	11,3	34,4
Thailand	101	2 160	5,0	5,2	0,9	41,4
Vietnam	95	350	—	—	—	36,1

Source: World Bank (2000): *World Development Indicators*, Washington D.

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approach consists of first establishing a general relationship between price and quantity variations derived from the characteristics of the income and expenditure functions in competitive equilibrium. Subsequently, they use these relationships to show that price differences under autarchy are correlated with net exports. This is a remarkable conclusion on the automatic adjustment of the supply of domestic production subsequent to a price variation, as it abstracts entirely from the relevant elasticities. Similarly, the demonstration of the HO model in a multidimensional framework by Bowen et al. (1998, pp. 261–263) relies on the assumption of full employment of resources and perfect competition. Leamer's approach (1987), demonstrating and generalizing the HO model also merits mention. The author establishes the following relationship:

where:

V: matrix of endowments,
A: matrix of the input requirements by unit of output,
X: matrix of outputs.

The generalization proceeds on the assumption that the following characteristics obtain for all countries: the values in the matrix A and preferences are identical (consumption of a fixed proportion of global production), full employment of resources, and A has an inverse. However, in the case of m goods and n factors, such that , the matrix A is not square, and hence cannot have an inverse. Under these conditions the results are indeterminate, in the sense that the direction of trade is unpredictable. Worse, as Williamson and Milner (1991, p. 50) advisedly remind us, in the real world there are more goods than countries , and more countries than factors. We find further difficulties at the level of empirical tests of the HO model. In general, the test procedure is to regress net exports by category of good on several explanatory variables, including: the capital/labor ratio, human capital, and the intensity of research and development. In the wake the Leontief Paradox (1953), numerous empirical studies attempted to validate HO, including Diab (1956), Vanek (1959), Keesing (1967), Baldwin (1971), Weiser and Say (1972), Balassa (1979), Stern and Maskus (1981), and Leamer (1987), to name but a few.

Leamer's empirical analysis (1987) is one of the most exhaustive, as it examines 10 product groups (labor intensive, capital intensive,

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machinery, and chemicals, etc.) and 60 countries. His conclusions indicate that, while resource abundance does a good job of explaining the direction of trade of primary goods, no clear and unequivocal conclusions can be drawn as to the sources of comparative advantage in the manufacturing sector. In one of a series of studies on the predictive strength of the HO model, Leamer (1995) observes that:

> Comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufactures (apparel and footwear)... is very much in turmoil, with a large number of countries shifting from being net importers to being net exporters...," while other categories of goods, notably forest products, machinery and chemicals present a degree of permanence in their comparative advantage.

Thus, we see that it is important to refrain from rigid generalizations of the HO model for all goods and services. Without belaboring the issue of empirical verification, it should be noted that most of these studies are not particularly robust, as they suffer from poor data quality (especially in the measure of capital) and also because of issues surrounding the classification of industries by factor intensity. To begin, determination of a good's factor content involves more than gross measures of capital and skilled or unskilled labor.

Verification of the HO model is further complicated by the inclusion of services, for which the statistical apparatus is insufficiently developed and not comparable across countries. Finally, it must be borne in mind that the HO model fundamentally relies on trade freedom, while the prevailing trade policy is a form of protectionism.

Beyond these observations, which considerably compromise the applicability of the HO model and cast doubt on our ability to fully appreciate the relationship between globalization and the goal of efficiency, some realities may be discerned. Indeed, countries' competitive positions are far from static, but are in constant evolution in tandem with their access to technologies. Structural adjustments thus assume a permanent character rather than being transitory shocks. Held et al. (1999, pp. 185–187) astutely observe that after the second world war many countries in the OECD, confronted with a technological lag vis-à-vis the United States, simply directed their exports elsewhere. Reconstruction of the European and Japanese economies, largely facilitated by the Marshall and Dodge plans respectively, allowed firms in these countries to adopt up-to-date technologies and to expand, i.e.

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to become international. Thus, by the end of the 1960s, the U.S. economy was forced to retool its steel, textile, and clothing factories, as these could no longer compete with foreign competition. Simultaneously, it was being driven by new sectors, such as computers, telecommunications, and electronics. American dominance of high-tech industries was challenged by European and Japanese firms during the 1980s. We see that, as technology spreads, global trade increases and competition becomes fiercer. Furthermore, the rent to technology proves ephemeral. According to Minc (1997, p. 23): "In a world dominated by the flow of information and by the internet, everything becomes accessible: patents are exposed as paper barriers, technological advances prove transient, and rents are forfeit[2]".

By and large, the United States, Japan and the countries of Northern Europe have largely abandoned the production and export of low-tech goods and specialized in those that are intensive in skilled labor. As to the newly industrialized countries of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Hong Kong and Brazil, they focussed on exporting goods intensive in unskilled labor during the first phase of industrialization over the period 1970–1980. However, we now see some of these countries, notably Korea, Mexico and Hong Kong, beginning to excel in exporting products with a high technological content. A glance at Table 1 reveals these significant changes in the structure of exports.

Thus, under the joint influence of globalization and the diffusion of technology, the industrial fabric of every country is in a perpetual state of flux. Is it in the nature of this structural impact of globalization to undermine the interests of nations' citizens? Two principal arguments are usually invoked to justify this claim: i) deindustrialization of the developed world, and ii) branch-plant economies of developing countries. Both of these arguments are fallacious for the following reasons. While it is true that manufacturing tended to decline relative to services in industrialized countries, we see that value added in the manufacturing sector (measured in constant dollars) as a percentage of GDP remained virtually constant between 1970 and 1994.

Rowthorn and Ramaswany (1997, p. 3) explain well that the relative decline of employment in manufacturing in industrialized countries is attributable more to the fact that this sector experienced greater productivity increases than the service sector. Moreover, despite

[2] Translation by the author.

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TABLE 1

EVOLUTION OF THE STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS BY PRODUCT GROUP FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES (IN %)

COUNTRY		Foodstuffs			Minerals And metals	Crude Oil	Petroleum Products	Chemicals	Textiles, fabric and Clothing	Non-electrical machinery	Electrical Machinery	Transportation equipment	Manufactured goods
		All	Raw Materials	Cereals									
Canada	1970	12.2	10.2	5.6	20.4	3.8	0.3	3.4	1.1	7.5	3.3	21.6	50.6
	1995	7.5	9.3	2.2	6.7	3.7	1.1	5.8	1.4	9.5	5.0	24.9	63.0
United Kingdom	1970	6.5	2.3	6.4	5.3	0.1	2.1	3.6	7.6	20.4	7.2	13.4	80.1
	1995	7.5	0.9	3.9	2.7	4.2	1.5	5.5	4.4	19.5	12.6	10.7	81.6
United States	1970	16.0	4.9	6.1	5.2	-	1.1	6.0	3.2	19.7	7.0	15.3	66.7
	1995	10.6	3.9	3.0	2.7	-	1.0	10.4	3.5	19.5	14.7	13.7	77.3
France	1970	15.1	3.1	0.7	4.3	-	1.5	9.2	8.9	12.7	6.2	14.2	73.7
	1995	14.2	1.4	0.7	2.4	-	0.2	12.7	4.9	13.0	9.7	6.7	76.9
Germany	1970	3.5	1.5	0.6	3.0	-	0.9	12.0	6.4	22.3	8.6	15.6	87.5
	1995	5.0	1.1	0.7	2.6	-	0.7	13.2	4.6	18.8	11.3	18.6	84.8
Japan	1970	3.5	1.6	0.9	1.4	-	0.2	6.4	12.5	16.4	12.3	17.8	92.5
	1995	0.5	0.6	0.1	1.1	-	0.5	6.6	2.0	24.1	22.9	20.3	95.2
Italy	1970	8.5	1.6	1.0	1.7	-	4.9	6.9	13.9	18.9	7.6	10.4	82.9
	1995	6.5	0.7	1.1	1.4	-	1.2	7.6	11.8	20.1	7.8	9.5	89.2
India	1970	29.7	5.6	0.5	11.9	-	0.6	2.3	26.7	1.8	1.1	1.8	51.7
	1994	15.5	1.2	1.6	3.5	-	11.6	8.5	29.0	2.8	1.5	2.9	76.2
Republic of Korea	1970	9.6	7.1	0.2	5.7	-	0.6	1.4	41.1	1.0	5.3	1.0	76.5
	1995	2.3	1.3	0.2	1.0	-	1.9	7.3	15.0	9.6	28.9	13.1	93.3
Mexico	1970	39.7	9.1	0.5	15.5	-	2.6	8.1	10.8	4.1	4.5	2.0	32.5
	1995	7.7	1.3	0.3	2.9	9.4	0.6	4.9	5.8	10.9	24.7	15.8	77.7
Senegal	1970	64.8	4.1	1.9	9.3	-	2.6	2.3	6.7	1.4	1.1	1.6	18.8
	1990	53.2	2.7	-	9.3		12.3	14.9	2.5	0.6	0.9	0.9	22.5

Source : CNUCED (1995) : *International Trade and Development Statistics Manual*, United Nations, 1997, New York, table 4.1, p. 112-133.

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TABLE 2

BALANCE OF TRADE OF IC WITH LDC, ALL GOODS (millions of US dollars)

(millions of u.s. dollars)

1980	-85114
1990	-3723
1992	43013
1993	50001
1994	37295
1995	22015

table 2

Source: CNUECD (1995) *International Trade and Development Statistics Manual*, United Nations, 1997, New York, Appendix A, p A-2. 112–133.

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the continued growth of international trade in services, global commerce remains dominated by the exchange of commodities. Indeed, global exports of services (aside from investment income), which were 16.3% of the total in 1985, had only increase to 20.0% by 1998 (WTO, 1998).

Moreover, if developed countries are becoming increasingly specialized in the export of goods and services intensive in skilled labor, this should not be construed as signifying a massive relocation of plants and factories into LDCs. We see that the industrialized countries show a positive balance sheet in their trade with the developing world (cf. Table 2). Naturally, there are differences between the patterns for various developed countries. For example, from a 1995 database, the United States and Canada show trade deficits with the LDCs, while the European Union, and even more Japan, show large surpluses (cf. Table 3). However, the deficit position of the United States and Canada is just as pronounced in their trade with other industrialized countries.

As to the European Union, efforts to liberalize trade within a regional framework, in the works since 1957 (Treaty of Rome), have largely contributed to accelerating trade between branches within the community, notably in chemicals, electronic equipment, automobiles, biotechnology, and aeronautics [Commission des Communautés européennes (1990, p. 43)].

As to the U.S. and Canada, their economies had become highly integrated well before implementation of the FTA and NAFTA. Throughout the history of its industrial development, Canada benefited from direct foreign investment, first British and then American. Among the members of the G-7, Japan's level of intra-industry trade for the entirety of the manufacturing sector is the lowest [OECD (1994).

Japan's high-performance sectors for exports are highly concentrated in electronics and motor vehicles, and it country imports large amounts of primary materials, including foodstuffs and energy. It is of some interest to expand our current discussion to account for the role of the product cycle in the need for industrial restructuring. The economic literature is very clear on this matter. Firms reassign production units in light of their output's factor composition, which progresses from skilled labor when it is originally brought to market to physical capital by the stage of product maturity.

In short, these observations challenge the myth of deindustrialization which developed countries are supposed to be suffering.

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TABLE 3

TRADE BALANCE OF SELECTED COUNTRIES OR COUNTRY-GROUPS, 1995,

Destination / Origin	Canada	United States	EU	Japan	LDC	Africa	Americas	Other Asian Countries
IC	-29556	121590	-53294	-101426	22015	6,151	43237	-34621
Canada	--	30776	-3388	377	-2596	523	708	-4279
United States	--	--	-23497	-68761	-86565	-4468	4886	-90594
EU	--	--	--	-34195	37092	38905	18964	-9141
Japan	--	--	--	--	62848	4423	11707	55472
LDCt	--	--	--	--	--	12392	14811	-31121
Africa	--	--	--	--	--	--	-37225	-9746
Americas	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	-10589

Source : CNUCED (1995), *International Trade and Development Statistics Manual*, United Nations, 1997, New York, Appendix A.

The "Other Asian Countries" sub-set designates developing countries outside of the Middle East, and includes Central Asia.

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And what of the truncated-economy argument, which claims that multinational firms limit the activities of their branches by relegating them to bit-player status? Clearly, virtually all LDCs bemoan the current international division of labor. Their industrial structures, developed under colonialism, earn foreign exchange but less often supply domestic consumers. For example, the cultivation of tea in India, coffee in Côte d'Ivoire and Brazil, and bananas and sugarcane in the Caribbean, all essentially supply the American and European markets.

However, we must also point out that, while these complaints are noteworthy, they are countered by important benefits, including economic integration and the concomitant access to international goods and capital markets, the introduction of a market economy paralleling the subsistence economy with ensuing price adjustment consequences and, of course, the benefits accruing to those segments of the population specialized in the market good. The real challenge to LDCs is to avoid self-pity over this structural dependence and to find ways out of the impasse. This is the attitude taken by the NICs, whose success is the envy of the industrialized world.

In summary, we can agree that, while globalization allows the supply of goods and services to become cheaper and facilitates adoption of new technologies, the industrial structures of both industrialized and developing countries are profoundly affected by it. Forecasts of the direction of trade become scrambled, especially since in this environment even patents offer limited protection. This, then, is the hodgepodge into which trade and industrial policy must be inserted.

When asking how to develop competitive advantage, we note the emphasis placed by UNIDO on government participation (1996, p. 4):

> Greater coordination is required between the private sector and governments in order to enable firms to reap the benefits of their core competencies and to support government efforts to create a competitive environment and to promote sustainable industrial development.

UNIDAD clearly believes that it is governments' ability to back certain high-performance sectors that constitutes the key to «strategic »trade policy. This governmental planning and management role is increasingly focussed on the development of human resources and mastering and adopting new technologies while maintaining the infrastructure.

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TABLE 4

REGRESSION ESTIMATES
OVERALL SAMPLE OF 70 COUNTRIES

	Growth of Per-capita GDP	Per-Capita GDP	Inflation	Unemployment rate	GINI
Constante	73,11* (12,19)	64,11* (8,76)	76,22* (12,52)	107,28* (7,24)	81,21* (4,40)
Coefficient	0,042 (0,10)	0,0009 (1,89)	-0,202 (-1,47)	-3,42** (-2,26)	-0,33 (-0,72)
R^2	0,0001	0,05	0,03	0,10	0,009
F	0,009	3,57	2,16	5,12	0,52
N-obs[1]	68	69	69	47	57

* significance at 1 % level.
** significance at 5 % level.
[1] See list of countries and data

TABLE 5

REGRESSION ESTIMATES
SAMPLE OF 46 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

	Growth of Per-capita GDP	Per-capita GDP	Inflation	Unemployment rate	GINI
Constante	63,38* (7,47)	55,25* (8,21)	79,82* (9,03)	136,39* (5,59)	80,45* (2,46)
Coefficient	9,86 (3,01)	0,006* (6,36)	-0,22 (-1,32)	-5,35* (-2,34)	-0,28 (-0,39)
R^2	0,17	0,48	0,03	0,20	0,004
F	9,06	40,46	1,74	5,48	0,15
N-obs[1]	45	45	45	23	33

* significance at 1 % level.
[1] See list of countries and data
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.

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Other Macroeconomic Goals

This chapter draws equally on economic literature and recent statistical evidence. From the World Bank's *World Development Indicators*, we have compiled data on the degree of openness, the level and growth of GDP per capita, the mean rate of inflation, the unemployment rate, and the Gini coefficient for 70 countries, of which 24 are members of the OECD[3]. Among the remaining 46 developing nations we have taken pains to include some having a high degree of openness (Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, etc.), some which are relatively closed (Brazil, India, Nigeria, Argentina), and also some with low levels of economic growth, in particular with negative growth, such as Nicaragua, Haiti, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Kuwait, Niger and Jamaica (cf. the Appendix). Following is a brief presentation of the analysis.

2.1. Equilibrium: Relationships at Several Levels

The notion of equilibrium relates to the absence of inflation and low levels of unemployment. A cross-section glance at figures 1 and 2 reveals variations between the countries. For example, within the OECD, the most inflationary economies (Turkey, Greece and Mexico) show a relatively low degree of openness. Among developing nations, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Philippines and Indonesia, which are quite open, are also characterized by high inflation. We note in general that inflation is high in the countries of Latin America, regardless of their degree of openness. This is particularly true of Argentina and Brazil.

As to unemployment, we again see differences between members of the OECD. Countries of southern Europe (Spain, Greece, Italy, France, etc.) have higher levels of unemployment than their northern European counterparts, Japan, and the United States. While inflation can be imported, its persistence is indicative of fundamentally flawed, i.e. expansionist monetary and fiscal policy. We now know that, in general, inflation can be attributed to excess demand (demand-pull inflation), to rising factor costs (cost-push inflation)—including the wage price spiral, as explained by the Villain theory—to the tax-price spiral, or simply to a psychological effect.

The sources of unemployment also vary, ranging from the classical

[3] The degree of openness is measured as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP.

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



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and neoclassical explanations to the Keynesian model, including disequilibrium, rational-expectations, and post-Keynesian views, to name but a few. But empirical observations should not be neglected. Here are a few: i) the organization and institutional structure of a society within its demographic framework are key influences; ii) lifestyles and social behavior, the influence of the family, and the process of professional integration of youths are overlooked by statistical agencies; iii) determinants of employment depend on firms' expectations of the markets, both domestic and foreign, and on the profit-wage relationship; iv) the unemployment rate is not necessarily higher in countries showing greater openness—indeed, the opposite is seen in many trading nations (cf. Figure 2).

In conclusion, the sources of inflation and unemployment must be sought elsewhere than in the simple fact of globalization. Clearly, it is feasible to imagine an autarchy producing goods and services with full employment of resources. However, these fantasies will soon be shattered by the realization that the needs of the agents in this economy cannot be satisfied, for the simple reason that there will be disequilibrium on the goods market (shortages of some goods, surpluses of others). Eventually, that country will seek to dispose of its surpluses on the foreign market and, of course, to import those in shortage. History reveals that economic autarchy is not workable in the long term. At the limit, it can only be a transition between two systems: a bracket. For example, after having been closed for a long time, the Japanese domestic market progressively opened during the 1960s and 1970s. This is now also occurring in China, which is intensifying its efforts to join the WTO.

2.2. "Economic Equity": Still an Issue

The quest for equity, including "economic equity," never fails to evoke passions. To opponents of globalization, the problem of equity is very seductive. We learn from them that the "perverse" effects of globalization are found in the polarization of agents between "winners" and "losers." More specifically, that it is in the very nature of economic integration to increase income inequality between the industrialized countries (regarded as the winners) and the LDCs and NICs seen as (the losers). UNIDO (1996, pp. 5–6) estimates that income inequality between rich and poor countries has increased, judging by the Gini

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



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coefficient[4], from a value of 0.44 in 1960, through 0.50 in 1970 and 0.53 in 1980, to 0.55 in 1989. Also, according to UNIDO, the ratio of the per-capita income of the 20 wealthiest nations to that of the 20 poorest nations has increased, from 11.1 in 1960 to 17.1 in 1989. In brief, available statistics confirm the asymmetry of trade relations between North and South.

But can this increasing income inequality be laid at the feet of globalization? Studies of this issue remain controversial. First, let us refer to two famous corollaries of the HO model: the Stolper-Samuelson and the price-equalization theorems. If we accept these two propositions, along with the HO model, then a greater liberalization of markets will have the effect of increasing workers' incomes in countries of the South (exporters of labor-intensive goods) and diminishing incomes in labor-intensive industries in the North. The available data clearly indicates a persistent gap between real wages in the North and the South, irrespective of industry[5]. The reason for this differential can be found in the fact that international trade does not necessarily follow the rules of comparative advantage, as previously elucidated, especially given that some countries enforce protectionist measures.

The example of the textile and clothing industries eloquently illustrates these claims. The United States, Canada and the countries of Western Europe sought to contain exports of textiles and clothing from the South by negotiating the Short-term Cotton Arrangement (STA) in 1961. One year later this became the Long-term Cotton Arrangement (LTA), giving rise to the Multifibre Arrangement in 1974. This treaty was renewed several times until 1994. Moreover, the relocation of this industry from the industrialized to the developing world is constrained by two mutually reinforcing factors. Despite difficulties automating every aspect of production, the textile industry has nonetheless benefited from considerable technological innovation (the use of synthetic fibres, open-ended spinning, shuttleless weaving, electronic monitoring of production), relegating the comparative ad-

[4] The Gini coefficient measures income inequality. Its value can range from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality). This index measures the area of the surface below a 45-degree line (which also represents perfect equality) and above the Lorenz curve.

[5] While the annual unit cost of labor in the manufacturing sector over the period 1995–1999 ranged from $25,000 to $40,000 in the countries of the G-7, it is below $2,000 for many developing countries, even below $100 in certain African nations [World Bank (2000, pp. 58–61)].

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vantage of low wages to a secondary consideration.

The second reason pertains to the implementation of regional agreements, particularly the European Union and NAFTA, whose rules of origin favor regionally produced goods over those from outside[6]. Thus, a partial reversal of factor intensities combined with, and underpinned by, the regional blocks, tends to enhance the importance of the proximity of producers, suppliers and clients, creating a flexible production system and limiting relocations. Moreover, throughout the period from 1960–1980, many developing countries practiced a policy of import substitution. In short, several factors combine to undermine the predictive power of the Stolper-Samuelson and factor-price equalization theorems, including difficulties accessing technology, trade barriers, and rigidity in the industrial structure.

According to Krugman and Venables (1995), when transportation costs drop below some threshold there will initially be a concentration of manufacturing industries within a region, and if that drop continues past some second critical value, income inequalities will increase between North and South. However, in building their explanatory model of the structure of trade between industrialized and developing countries based exclusively on variations in the cost of transportation, the authors warn us: "We are aware that any explanation of such large-scale and long-term economic trends in terms of a single cause must be offered with tongue firmly in cheek... It is highly probable that other factors, such as changing technology of production, have played a more important role than falling transportation costs in driving changes in regional advantage."

Though it is difficult to make unequivocal pronouncements about the impact of opening on the distribution of income, we may nonetheless examine the index of per-capita GDP by country. First, it is of some interest to report that, according to World Bank data (1999, p. 70), among countries whose Gini index exceeds 50%, we find: Sierra Leone (62.9), Central African Republic (61.3), Brazil (60.0), Guinea-Bissau (56.2), Guatemala (56.6), Lesotho (56.0), Mali (50.5) Mexico (53.7) and Paraguay (19.1), all developing countries. Consequently, income inequality within developing countries is quite pronounced.

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[6] For example, NAFTA stipulates the triple transformation rule, requiring that thread, fibre, fabric and clothing all originate in North America.

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The data in the Appendix confirm the per-capita income disparities between North and South. We notice, however, that the patterns vary between regions. Among the members of the OECD, per-capita incomes are quite low in Turkey, Portugal, Spain, Greece and New Zealand—countries whose degree of openness is relatively limited compared to the United States and Japan. The most open countries in the OECD (Ireland, Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland and Austria) enjoy high per-capita incomes.

Before drawing any conclusions, let us look more carefully at the relationship between openness and economic growth.

2.3. Economic Growth: Can it be Restarted?

There is an abundance of literature on the relationship between openness and economic growth, including Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Edwards (1992; 1998), Krugman (1994), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, 1997), and Harberger (1996). In general, this literature reveals a positive correlation between openness (measured as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP) and growth. Clearly, this result – derived from simple cross-country regressions – does not account for the mechanism by which a greater openness influences growth and sheds no light on the causality.

Nonetheless, the explanations provided by Romer (1986), Lucas (1988) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) prove quite revealing in emphasizing that the positive correlation between the two variables demonstrates the ability of open economies to master new technologies much more rapidly than the rest of the world. Other authors have defended more finely nuanced positions. Krugman (1994) and Rodrik (1995) consider that the effect of openness on growth "is at best, very tenuous, and at worst, doubtful." We should emphasize that neither Krugman nor Rodrik reject out of hand the hypothesis of a positive correlation between openness and growth. Moreover, this controversy has inspired studies that specifically examine the impact of trade policy choices on growth, such as Kenen and Voivodas (1972), Glezakos (1973), Brock (1991), Dollar (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995), Edwards (1998) and Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999). These studies have not yielded a consensus, however, owing in large part to variations in the method used to estimate the index of policy choice. Notwithstanding the issue of causality, the following, simple question is worth asking: Do more open countries show higher economic growth rates?

A cross-section view reproduced in the Figures 4 and 5 reveals

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that no systemic relationship exists between economic integration and low growth rates. In reality, economic growth springs from primary characteristics of the "productivity-quality-price" equation—well known in the world of amateur sports—whence the importance of implementing policies focussed on firms' competitiveness. It is, however, quite interesting that the newly-industrialized countries of Asia simultaneously show high rates of economic growth and a high degree of integration.

2.4. Statistical Analysis

In order to verify the aforementioned assertions on the impact of globalization, we conducted a quantitative test consisting of a simple regression of a variable for the degree of integration or openness on variables for the unemployment rate, inflation, the level and rate of growth of per-capita GDP, and the Gini index. Two groups of estimates were computed: one on a sample of 70 countries, including OECD members and developing nations; and one on a sub-sample containing only the 46 developing countries. Tables 4 and 5 present the results of these estimations.

It is of some interest to note that a positive and significant relationship exists between the degree of openness and the goal of equilibrium. The negative correlation between the variables indicates lower levels of both unemployment and inflation in the more open countries. As to economic growth, the results diverge between geographical regions. The results on the full sample of 70 countries (OECD and LDC) reveal no statistically significant relationship between the level of integration and economic growth. Conversely, the coefficient of the economic-growth variable estimated on the LDC sub-sample is positive and very significant.

We should note that the coefficient of per-capita GDP is also positive and statistically significant both for the full sample and for the LDC sub-sample. Finally, the results from our quantitative analysis indicate that there is no statistically significant relationship between the degree of openness and the Gini coefficient.

3. Conclusion

The goal of this paper has been to shed some light on the effects of globalization on popular economic goals. Our results, based on a sample of 70 countries, reveal that a positive and weakly-significant statistical relationship exists between the degree of integration and the

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

Figure 5

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goal of equilibrium (inflation/unemployment). Also, a greater openness to international trade is positively correlated with the goal of economic growth in LDCs. As to efficiency, at the very least, globalization implies a spatial reconfiguration of industrial activity.

The problem of "economic equity" remains in the public eye as much a matter between North and South as within each country. It is thus essential to avoid superficial generalizations that may confuse causes and effects. The challenge presented by globalization is its ability to disrupt a nation's industrial landscape. The need for development, and the concomitant requirement for greater openness, mean that trade-policy liberalization must be accompanied by measures to smooth the transition and reinforce the social fabric.

Let us point out, in conclusion, that this discussion of economic goals does not imply that other concerns, such as environmental and health standards, working conditions, national coherence and the power shift from national and elected governments to international corporations are not valid goals. The trend toward globalization does not have only economic consequences, and globalization, while producing certain identifiable economic benefits, may carry with it a variety of costs, some of which may be of overriding importance to humanity. It is a subject that needs to be studied from many angles, not solely in respect of economic goals.

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Islam in the North Caucasus

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Religious diversity has had a dramatic impact on the development of the North Caucasus region. People do not identify primarily with either a national or international Islamic community, although the fundamentalist Vakhabite community has become a major regional force during the past decade. Numerous official attempts to suppress Vakhabite influence has resulted in the emergence of a clandestine Vakhabite network supported by Islamic radicals from abroad, mostly of Saudi and North African Arab origin. These have joined with the Khattab group to receive military training in terrorist camps in support of the Chechen resistance to Soviet forces.

Following the first Chechen war (1994-1996), differences arose between the Sufi and Vakhabite movements, with Sufi Muslims called for creation of a secular state that would preserve traditional social patterns, while Vakhabites demanded the eradication of local customs which they regard as having tainted Islamic purity.

Key Words: Russia, North Caucasus, Chechnya, Chechen War, Ingushetia, Daghestan, Islam, Muslims, Sufi, Sunni, Vakhabites,

While ethnic animosities have a long history in the North Caucasus, the religious flavor of these conflicts appeared more recently. With time, Islam became a uniting force that helped many people of the North Caucasus assert their struggle against oppression by those whom they viewed as "men without faith." However, while Islam served as a rallying point for disparate groups within the region, Islam itself did not assume a unified organizational model. Local customs and paganism had a profound impact on Islam as it developed throughout the North Caucasus. Almost no expression of faith could be characterized as "pure Islam."

When the religious element emerged as a significant one in this part of the former Soviet Union, it varied greatly whether one encountered it in Daghestan, Inghusetia, Chechnya, North Ossetia,

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Kabardin-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, or Adygeiya. With the appearance of perestroika, religious diversity had a dramatic impact on the traditional Islamic community. It may be that the only common element in the Islamic community was the religious fervor that gripped so many people. New mosques appeared by the score and Daghestan combined with Chechnya produced more pilgrims for the annual hadj than the rest of the USSR combined.

Islamic diversity was driven by a variety of factors. One of those was the influx of foreign money from Middle Eastern Islamic states. The persistence of local traditions was another, but the most important was the increased prominence of the Vakhabite movement within the Islamic community. The central theme of this movement was that Islam in the North Caucasus had been distorted by misunderstandings as well as by the "impure" influences.

Along with some other North Caucasian peoples, the Chechens converted to Islam on the eve of Russian expansion into their ancestral lands in the early nineteenth century. For a variety of reasons they largely adopted the Sufi forms of worship and followed Shamil, the third Imam of Daghestan, in his efforts to impose the Sharia (Islamic Law) on the faithful while defending their homeland from the encroachments of the Russian Empire in early nineteenth century by waging a holy war (Ghazivat). The Chechens suffered severe losses in these wars and then left the Naqshbandiya tradition in droves to follow a later Sufi tradition, the Qadiri, under the leadership of the nonviolent "Chechen Gandhi," Kunta Hadji of Kishiev.

When Kunta Hadji was captured by the Russians and died in captivity, his followers eschewed non-violence and joined with the Naqshbandis in periodic uprisings against the Tsarist regime and its Soviet successor. Each effort to regain some vestige of independence was suppressed. Between 1944 and 1957, the Chechen people were removed from their indigenous lands and deported to central Asia in order to be punished for alleged collaboration with the German Nazi regime. Only the death of Stalin allowed people to return to Chechnya and attempt to rebuild the nation.

The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 allowed independence-minded Chechens to seize the opportunity and declare Chechnya an independent nation. Fearing that other North Caucasian peoples might want to follow the Chechen example, the Russian Federation under President Boris Yeltsin decided to make an example of the Chechens and defeat them utterly as a warning to other

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indigenous peoples from the Black Sea to the Caspian. After two desultory wars the Russians seem in control but the Chechens continue to resist, aided by volunteers from other Islamic lands who want to impose a more militant, fundamentalist Islam on the Muslims of the Caucasus.

Historical Background

In 1877, the people of Chechnya and Daghestan launched a major rebellion against the Russian Tzarist government. Although the rebellion was a failure that served primarily to produce new tactics on the part of the Sufi brotherhoods of the North Caucasus, the victorious Russian authorities responded not with oppression but with tolerance toward the Islamic religion in Chechnya. The religious tolerance of the post-rebellion years of 1877 to 1917 has led Chechens to speak of Tsarist colonialism with nostalgia. One Chechen rebel commander, Shirvani Bassayev, brother of the well-known Chechen guerilla commander Shamil Bassayev, recently noted that had the Romanov dynasty retained power, Russia would have been a very different nation. The key, Bassayev noted, is that men without faith, such as the Communists, "are more dangerous than those who accept God as a higher power."[1]

The spirit of rebellion, coupled with religious fervor, continues to give the politics of the North Caucasus a turbulent, violent flavor. Local people who have cooperated with "men without faith," most significantly the Russian authorities who occupy much of this region, increasingly find themselves the targets of rebels for whom this struggle has assumed a spiritual as well as a political relevance. A typical incident was reported in the summer of 2000 when Ruslan Khamidov, the mayor of Alkhan-Yurt, a small town near Grozny, was approached by "unidentified assailants" at his home early one morning. When he stepped outside his house, Khamidov was shot eleven times, an action generally viewed as another warning for those who cooperated with the "Godless invaders." This killing coincided with an attack on a Russian troop train on the rail line near Grozny. The bombing, which was carried out by remote-controlled mines, was followed by a small arms attack which lasted for forty minutes. The incident left seven Russian

[1] John B. Dunlop, *Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict.* New York, Cambridge University Press, 19982, p.33.

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military casualties and more than a hundred yards of destroyed track.[2]

While outside observers might view such events as little more than another expression of the terrorism that has plagued so much of the former Soviet Union, many participants in this struggle have an entirely different perception. For them, the murder of Ruslan Khamidov was actually another episode in the continuing struggle between "men of faith" and the infidels determined to destroy their way of life.

To better understand the logic of conflicts in the North Caucasus, a brief description of the patterns of the region's religious and social life is necessary. The most important characteristic of this society is its strict division along tribal and religious lines. This is best illustrated in Chechnya. Although the Chechens are a separate ethnic group clearly distinct from their neighbors, they seldom identify themselves with that group. In everyday life, their identity is defined by two most meaningful concepts: *teip* - a union of households tracing their descent from a common ancestor, or clan, and *tuhkum* — a union of teips that do not claim a common ancestor but historically have preserved their military and economic ties and spoken one of the dialects of the Chechen language. Traditional kinship ties are of paramount importance to the Chechens, and their loyalty belongs first and foremost to their clan and then to their tuhkum, which leaves the nation itself the least relevant notion on their list of priorities.

The same pattern, although perhaps not as strongly expressed, can be observed in Chechnya's religious life. Islam not only unites the Chechens but also brings about significant divisions in the society. Again, the Chechens and other people of the North Caucasus identify themselves with smaller religious groups rather than a nationwide Muslim community. They belong to *virds* – autonomous religious sects headed by *ustaz* - religious teachers. Every vird has its specific rules, principles and canons which may differ considerably from dogmas accepted elsewhere. The members of virds – *murids* - pledge allegiance to their sects and are obliged to obey the orders of their religious teachers. Thus, Chechen sects are in essence religious orders or brotherhoods held together by common principles, discipline and subordination. Virds are united into two major religious unions - *tarikats* - each headed by a sheikh: "naqshbandiya" and "qadiriya" (one of the most famous sheiks of the latter was Kunta-Hadji Kishiev). Both

[2] Associated Press, 16 July, 2000.

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of them represent currents of Sufi Islam.

Sufi Islam in the North Caucasus has a number of peculiarities that distinguish it from the Islam accepted in Asia and the Middle East. The traditional kinship values, ancient customs and norms and pagan beliefs that regulated the highlanders' lives for centuries were so deeply entrenched in the mentality of the people of the North Caucaus that Islam had to adapt and transform in order to be accepted. Consequently, the so-called "traditional" Islam that developed here was characterized by a strong influence of local customs and paganism. It is different in many ways from "pure" Islam as it exists in some other countries, and its influence on social life has always been severely limited by values and norms that had formed before the adoption of Islam.

Religion in the North Caucasus

The "men of faith" praised by Bassayev and others had a dramatic impact on the development of the North Caucasus in previous centuries as well as contemporary times. The first of these men were Christians, but by the eighth century Arabs began to convert many of the Caucasians to Islam. We will focus on the role of religion in Daghestan, Ingushetia and Chechnya, and also examine the situation in some of the less frequently studied parts of the North Caucasus.

Daghestan

The Republic of Daghestan spreads over 50 thousand square kilometers and has a population of approximately two million people. The overwhelming majority of them are Muslims - 85%; while 4% are Shiites, primarily Azerbaijanis; and 8.5% are Orthodox Christians. There are also small communities of Catholics and Baptists. Daghestan once had a Jewish community of over 30,000, but most of them moved to Israel. As a result, the Jewish population now numbers only 1,000 people.

Thus, Islam is the overwhelmingly dominant religious group in contemporary Daghestan. Spiritual leadership and governance in Daghestan began to change with the appearance of perestroika and the subsequent social disintegration. Up to that time, there had traditionally been a single dominant Muslim leader for Daghestan. During this disruptive transitional period, numerous independent Muslim leaders appeared and gained local followings and cultivated their own acolytes. Consequently, one may identify the following communities as those

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having independent spiritual governance (muftiyas): Avartses with a population of 600,000; Dargintses with a 320,000 population; Kumyks with 260, 000; Lezghins with 240,000; and Laktsts with 100,000. This diversity reflects the national composition of Daghestan. There are 95,000 Chechens-Akkins in the region, 30,000 Naghaitses, and an assortment of about forty additional national groups. Most of Daghestan's Sunni Muslim population belongs to the *shafiit mazhab* organization. During the last decade, the Sufi brotherhoods, which had lost importance during the Soviet era, have been restored.

Currently there are over 40 Sufi brotherhoods in Daghestan. The major representatives of modern Sufism in Daghestan are theologists Said Chirkeisk and Tadjuin Hasavyurt. Together, these men hold the allegiance of many devout Muslims who are adherents of a strict interpretation of the Koran. Historians will record that in this region of the Northern Caucasus there are other people, individuals such as Maghomed Djeranskyi, who are less concerned about theology and, through their violent actions, bear much responsibility for the violence in the Caucasus. Djeranskyi, of course, is not alone as there are many others who share his militant attitude.

In Daghestan there are approximately 1700 large and as many as 6000 small "district mosques." There are nine Islamic spiritual educational institutes and 600 mosque schools throughout the republic. In addition, a significant number of Daghestani students study in Muslim schools abroad. Of the 17,000 –18,000 Russian citizens participating in annual hadj, no less than 13,000 to 14,000 of them are citizens of Daghestan. It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that the Daghestanis are more active in Muslim affairs than the entire populations of Tatars, Bashkirs, and other Muslim nationalities.

A group that has attracted great attention in recent years is the Vakhabites or Vakhabists. They are referred to as fundamentalists in much of the Western literature on Islam. They first appeared in the North Caucasus in the 1980's and emerged as a serious force in the next decade. Most recently, their main communities were in Mahachkala and Hasav-Yurt.

Today, Vakhabite activity is prohibited in Daghestan. As a result, their schools and organizations operate secretly and they are involved in a variety of clandestine activities. There are three main Vakhab factions in Daghestan. The first faction is led by Ahmed Ahtayev, an activist with a long history of clandestine work. The second faction is led by Baghaudin Muhhamad Daghestani. Because of official pressure

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against his activities, he left Daghestan and is now based in Chechnya. The third faction is based in communities in the Astrakhan region, a stronghold of Vakhabite support, but has no prominent individual leader.

In August 1999, many Daghestani radicals began training in the camps run by a Saudi Arabian calling himself Khattab. Khattab's group had joined Chechen extremists and numerous Arab terrorists who invaded Daghestan. The goal of this union of Islamic radicals is to bring about the secession of Daghestan from the Russian Federation. While this association failed to achieve its immediate goal, it did bring about the introduction of Russian forces into Chechnya, a situation that has greatly increased hardships throughout the region. Many feel that this was probably one of the objectives of those who organized the attacks in Daghestan.

One of the main reasons for the growth of Vakhabism in Daghestan and Chechnya is the difficult social and economic situation in the North Caucasus as well as the generous financing of the Vakhabites from abroad. Thus, it is not surprising that the joint attacks by the Daghestani and Chechen militants coincided with the aggravation of tensions in the Middle East and the renewed international confrontations over oil and gas routes.

Chechnya

Before the military clashes of 1994-1996, Chechnya covered a territory of 17,300 square kilometers with the population of 1,200,000 people. Of this group, 800-850,000 were Chechens, 200-250,000 were Russians, 20,000 were Inghush and about 15,000 Armenian.

As a result of the conflict, Chechnya's population has been reduced to 500,000 people, with a Slavic population of only 10,000 people. The physical destruction of the region is widespread and capital Grozny itself is now gradually being covered by new forests as few people are willing to invest the resources required for rebuilding the devastated city.

The Chechens and the Ingush are Sunni Muslims. Approximately 90% of the Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians of the Chechen Republic belonged to the Christian Orthodox church, while the others belonged to the Evangelical and the Baptist Churches. During the late 1990s, several Christian priests in Chechnya were kidnapped and murdered.

The intensity of religiosity in Chechnya can be measured by two

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important indicators. First, several thousand mosques, both regional and district ones, were built during the last 15 years to serve the spiritual needs of this community. Second, in the Russian Federation, only Daghestan exceeds Chechnya in terms of the number of pilgrims who journey to Mecca. One to two thousand Chechens participate in the hadj each year.

Spiritual governance of Checnhya since the early 1990s was in the hands of a body known as the *Council of Ulems* and of an individual known as the *Muftiya*. The former is a group of theological scholars and the latter is the head of Muslims. From 1995 until early 2000, the *Muftiya* was Ahmad Hadji Kadyrov, who has recently been appointed head of Administration of the Chechen Republic. In the summer of 2000, a new *Muftiya* was elected by the Council of Ulems. That individual is the former Iman of the Shatoi region, Ahmed Adji Shaman.

For several centuries Chechnya's traditional Islam has been represented by two Sufi trends: the *Naqshbandi* and the *Qadiri*. The best known of the naqshbandi are the brotherhoods of Yusup-Hadji and Tashu-Hadji. The most numerous quadiri brotherhood is the Kunta-Hadji Kishiev order. Relations between these two Sufi brotherhoods have traditionally been very positive. Their representatives never engaged in conflicts with each other, and never criticized the shaykhs of the other communities. While there was an element of competition inherent during election of the imam of the village mosque or Quadiri of the community, that competition never evolved into dogmatic disputes.

There is no exact information on the emergence of Vakhabism in Chechnya, nor about their first preachers. Many scholars associate its appearance with the establishment of the Islamic Party in 1991. Yet, Beslan Ghentaimirov, the first head of that party, had nothing to do with Vakhabism. Furthermore, according to reliable accounts, leaders of the Islamic Party have been known to indulge in the excessive use of alcohol. Given the hostility of the Vakhabites toward any use of alcohol, such behavior would indicate that the Islamic Party leadership would not meet the standards for a Vakhabite organization.

Others suggest that the appearance of Vakhabism is more correctly associated with an individual known as Adam Deniev or, by many people, simply as "One-legged Ahmed." Deniev has been a candidate member of the shaykh of Quadiri since 1995.

The first group in Chechnya to be openly associated with the

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Vakhabites and actually to receive money from them consisted of Islam Khalimov, Isa Umarov, and Movladi Udugov. Udugov, who was the Minister of Information in the Dudayev government, arranged for the regular broadcast of the sermons of Vakhabite preachers on Chechen television. This small circle of Vakhabites built an organization based on kinship principles while avoiding any direct challenges to the established Islamic community in Chechnya. In this early period, its operational principles were based on absolute secrecy and the avoidance of open conflicts with the Islamic community.

The first Chechen war radicalized much of the population and eventually resulted in the legalization of fundamentalist youth groups represented by the "Djamaat" battalion. This move was facilitated by foreign involvement in the person of a Chechen-Jordanian, Ipak Fath. He was an elderly man who came from Jordan to assist in the development of fundamentalist groups in Chechnya. Fath had been a participant in the Afghan war, during which he helped organize suicide detachments of idealists motivated by the honor of dying in a holy war against the infidels. Eventually, Ipak Fath succumbed to disease, but not before making a great contribution to the fundamentalist cause in Chechnya. As a result of Fath's influence, Khattab and other veterans of the Afghanistan war were enlisted for combat service in Chechnya.

The Jordanian connection was established approximately a century ago and continues to have an impact on developments in the North Caucasus region. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, thousands of Chechens as well as some Ingush traveled through Turkey into the Middle East where they made their homes in Iraq and Jordan. Two Chechen-Ingush villages still exist in Iraq today. In Jordan, the Chechens founded four towns, one of which evolved into what is now the kingdom's second largest city, Zarqa. As a result of this migration, the Jordanian diplomatic and military community today reflects strong Chechen influences. In fact, during the 1948 war with the Palestine Liberation Army, Jordan's foremost tank officer, Abdul-Latif Benno, was a Chechen and, in 1978, became Jordan's first military attaché in Moscow.

Vakhabite influence increased significantly during the first Chechen war because Dudayev refused to provide alternate financing. In the face of the severe funding crisis, Ipak Fath and his colleagues played a major role in purchasing armaments and providing food and clothing for the Chechen forces. The foreign Vakhabite money was channeled through Maskhadov's organization. Consequently, he was

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forced to make promises to introduce Shariat governance following the war.

As a result of the radicalization of society and the effective use of foreign funds, by 1996 the Vakhabites not only had a military organization in Chechnya, but also their own courts, mullas, and scholars. To take advantage of this environment, Baghaudin Khebedov left Daghestan to join his radical brethren in Chechnya. Other fundamentalists such as Shamsudin from Prigorodnoye established reputations for themselves as Shariat judges, and numerous Chechen preachers who had taken refuge in Jordan were able to return to their homeland.

After the creation of the main state institutions of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria at the beginning of 1997, the Vakhabites were rewarded by being able to legalize some of their military formations and to establish a base for training their military personnel, led by commander Khattab. Their representatives were placed in numerous official government positions, especially those relating to the courts and public security bodies. The growing Vakhabite influence in the Maskhadov government eventually resulted in a very serious political crisis brought about by demand for curbing the Vakhabite influence. The Muftiat headed by Khadyrov demanded that President Maskhadov take decisive steps against those whom he denounced as "enemies of Islam and the Chechen nation."

In June 1998, the crisis led to armed clashes with the Vakhabite detachments near Gudermes. In those battles, a group of government field commanders defeated the Vakhab forces and it was only the intervention of President Maskhadov and Vice President A. Arsanov that saved them from a devastating, final defeat. After these battles, two Vakhabite generals who had demonstrated crass incompetence were reduced to the enlisted ranks. Khattab was ordered to close his training camps and to leave Chechnya.

For the government, the victory was not complete. When the order to disband his camps was published, Khattab ignored it. The Vakhab forces regrouped in the town of Urus-Martan and Khattab formed an alliance with Shamil Bassayev. The financial support from abroad enabled the Vakhabites to function without any financial support from the state bodies of Ichkeria. A fortified outpost was set up in Urus-Martan. At this stage of their evolution, the Vakhabites utilized more mundane tactics, such as theft and kidnapping, various actions against the young Chechen state, and personal attacks against president

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Maskhadov. Several assassination attempts were made against Maskhadov and Khadyrov. Thus, they concentrated on political and criminal activities as a means of opposing the Islamic establishment of Chechnya, while avoiding open, large-scale military clashes.

In the fall of 1999, Bassayev's detachments joined Daghestani Vakhabites and, with the help of Arab mudjahadins, made military strikes against Daghestan authorities. While the attacks were a military failure, they did bring about concessions from Maskhadov. In an effort to appease his opponents, Maskhadov included Bassayev in the State Defense Committee and appointed him as a military commander.

Today Vakhabites are excluded from the religious life of Chechnya, and Khadyrov now prohibits all forms of Vakhabite propaganda. This is part of an effort to restore the prestige of the traditional Muslim faith. During this period, the social role of religion in general has declined; thus, even if the traditional Islamic community regains its lost prestige, Islam will not enjoy the prominent position its once held.

The presence of over 100,000 Russian troops on the territory of the Republic and the endless Russian military activities are a major source of discontent among the population. Many Chechens, however, are stoic in the face of such adversities and regard them as divine punishment for their arrogance and their willingness to admit the Vakhabites, whom they denounce as "servants of Devil" into their country.

At present, Muslim clergy in Chechnya are mullas and imams. Muslim clergy in Chechnya are highly educated people who were trained in Islamic institutions in Chechnya, Daghestan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and Egypt. In addition, Chechnya has its own theological institutions and schools. There are Sunday Arab Koran schools in every village. In other words, the prestige of the Islamic clergy has increased in Chechnya as they have withdrawn from politics. The important point is that Islam is not being politicized as the Vakhabites wished. In this new environment, the Islamic clergy can express themselves freely on major issues without fearing official persecution.

Ingushetia

The small Republic of Ingushetia covers an area of 3600 square kilometers. It has a native population of 300,000 and about as many Chechen refugees. In ethnic and linguistic terms, the Ingush are very close to their Chechen neighbors. Their religious cultures, however, are

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different since the Ingush were converted to Islam later and embraced it with less intensity. Moreover, there has been no tradition of militant Islam in Ingushetia, a factor that has had a major and positive impact on their relations with Russians.[3]

Like most of the Chechens, the Ingush people are Suni Muslims. Currently Ingushetia is experiencing a revival of religiosity and boasts a total of over 400 mosques, most of which were constructed in recent years. Over 1,000 Ingush receive a religious education each year, either in Ingushetia or abroad. Spiritual leadership is directed by the Muftia Albogachiev who maintains good relations with the neighboring republics. But unlike Chechnya, the spiritual leaders of Ingushetia do not claim direct participation in the state governance and have not demanded the introduction of the Shariat law.

For the most part, the Ingush are associated with one of the two traditional orders of Islam. The Naqshbandi order is represented in Ingushetia by the brotherhood of Deni Arsanov, a highly respected figure whose descendants are held in equally high regard. The son of the Shaykh, Ilias Arsanov, left Chechnya in 1996 because of the conflict with Ichkeria authorities and is currently residing in Ingushetia.

The Qadiri order in Ingushetia is primarily associated with Kunta-Hadji Kishiev and has close relations with their coreligionists in Chechnya. In the nineteenth century the brotherhood of Batal-Hadji appeared in the Ingush village of Surhahi. Members of this brotherhood strictly observe their Charter. They are very well disciplined and united under the leadership of the descendants of Batal-Hadji.

Learning from the tragic example of Chechnya, which suffered so much as a result of religious disputes, the Ingush Muslims have managed to resist ideological and dogmatic extremism. In 1998 Vakhabism was formally banned in Ingushetia. Vakhab emissaries were expelled and theological schools allied with them were closed. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ingushetia was given responsibility for the suppression of Vakhabism.

While some of the young Ingush citizens, motivated by a sense of religious obligation, participated in military activities during the first Chechen war, they avoided involvement during the second conflict. Their opposition to the second war was a result of their rejection of

[3] Anatol Lieven, *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 100.

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Vakhabism as well as the slave-trade often associated with it. Many Ingush families suffered as a result of that slave-trade.

Northern Ossetia, Kabardin-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, and Adygeiya are located in the central and northern-west regions of the North Caucasus. The population adheres to the ethical norms of mountaineers, rather than to religious values. Unofficial Sufi brotherhoods never played a significant role in this region. By the 1970s religious traditions such as circumcision, having a mulla's blessing for all marriages, and others had been eliminated.

In the 1990's, new phenomena of spiritual life related to the interest in the Muslim values and "the great past" started to appear in the national republics of the Central and Northern-West Caucasus. Religious governance headed by muftias was introduced throughout the region. Islamic educational institutions, including higher educational facilities, were opened. Most were created with encouragement and funding from abroad. Mosques were restored in practically all communities of Balkaria, Cherkessia, and Ossetia. Eight mosques were opened in Karachayevo-Cherkessia, even though the Muslim population amounts for only half of the population there. The other half of the local population embraces Orthodox Christianity.

The completion of Islamization in these republics has been associated with at least one constant theme. The radical Islamic organizations have worked to fill the vacuum that appeared after the disappearance of the Communist ideology. The "Daavat" groups have popularized Vakhabism and recruited youth from the mountain regions into military groups. During the period from 1996 to 1999 dozens of young people from Balkaria and Karachay were trained in the camps of Khattab near Sejen-Yurt. They were active participants in military activities during the 1st Chechen war.

Traditional Islam is regaining its lost status primarily among the peoples who suffered from deportation during World War II, especially among Balkars and Karachayevos. Many elements of Sufi practice have been restored in the communities populated by those who have returned from internal exile.

The hostility of traditional believers toward the Vakhabites has grown stronger because the Vakhabites, who view only Vakhab traditions as legitimate, do not recognize the customs and traditions of the mountaineers as valid. In Kabardin-Balkaria, the fight against Vakhabism has been especially determined and often bitter. Authorities have eliminated the most ardent armed extremists and have expelled or

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disbanded a number of suspicious organizations financed from abroad.

There are up to 2000 Vakhabites in Karachay, but their ranks often include common Muslim radicals who have not formally embraced the Vakhab faith. One must note that it was the Karachay Vakhabites who were recruited to commit acts of terrorism in Moscow and Volgodonsk.

The heads of both Christian Orthodox and Muslim communities deny that there has been a religious intrusion into the territory of the North Caucasus. That is why the Russian Orthodox Church has not given any special blessing for the war in Chechnya either during the 1st or the 2nd Chechen Wars. It disapproves of the cruel treatment of local civilians by the army but takes no public position on any of these concerns.

Vakhabism and the Chechen Conflict

While the focus of this study has been the North Caucasus region, the impact of religion on the region's conflict has been most dramatic in Chechnya. In contemporary Chechnya, as noted above, traditional Islam is challenged by vakhabism. Originally, this movement emerged in the eighteenth century and was named after its founder Al-Vakhab. He claimed that Islam was distorted and called his followers to "purify" it and return to Islam's fundamentals. Nowadays vakhabism is spread across the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, where it is accepted as an official ideology of the royal family. Vakhabism in Chechnya (as well as Tadjikistan), however, does not relate directly to vakhabism as it is understood by Sunni Muslims in the Middle East countries. Although the main idea is the same — the purification of Islam from both "pagan" and modern influences — Chechen vakhabism has characteristics that distinguish it from religious values and practices in Saudi Arabia.

The Vakhabite movement has deep implications for Chechnya's religious, social and political life. Its call to purify Islam challenges Chechnya's traditional Islam, something that is heavily influenced by the local system of beliefs and norms, as well as an elaborate structure of religious communities and brotherhoods. In fact, Vakhabism attempts to "return" the population to what it views as "original" Islam, rejecting Chechnya's unique historical experience. The key to this transformation is the application of rules, norms and practices accepted among the radicals in the Middle East to the Chechen social and political life. Hence, traditionalists (who constitute the overwhelming majority of the

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population) associate Vakhabism with foreign influence, which poses a threat to their religious customs and identity. For their part, the Vakhabites view the supporters of traditional Islam as backward sectarians who distort Islam. The conflict between fundamentalists and traditionalists, along with less sharp but nevertheless significant divisions among Sufi sects, since the early 1990s has had a profound impact on Chechen politics, including the ongoing Russian military operation in the region.

During the 1994-1996 military operation, the Russian federal troops were a common enemy for most Sufi brotherhoods and Vakhabites. Both were mobilizing the population against the federal government (most Chechen leaders identified themselves with Sufi brotherhoods to secure the support of their members; for example, President Dudayev declared that he belonged to the Kunta-Hadji brotherhood). Therefore, their differences were temporarily put aside. Moreover, the Vakhabites managed to strengthen their position in Chechnya. Money, armament and fighters provided by their radical counterparts from abroad were crucial to the Chechen resistance against the federal forces and enabled Vakhabites to become an influential group in the republic. The relations between Sufi brotherhoods and Vakhabites deteriorated dramatically after the end of the 1994-1996 campaign. Their religious differences spilled over into politics.

In the political realm, traditionalists and fundamentalists disagreed over how the Chechen state should be organized and what its policy toward Russia should look like. Sufi Muslims advocated a secular state that would preserve Chechnya's traditional social structure and its unique Islamic culture. Their position on the future of Russian-Chechen relations was not uniform and ranged from calls for independence to the development of a "special status" within the Russian Federation. There is no evidence that Sufi brotherhoods had any interest in protracting the conflict or extending it beyond Chechnya's borders. Vakhabites were determined to build a "pure" Muslim society which would be organized and regulated according to the Shariat law (as opposed to *adat* – traditional norms developed in Chechnya before the adoption of Islam). "Just Islamic orde,r" as they believe it had existed in the times of the Arabic khalifat, became the goal of Chechnya's religious extremists. Furthermore, they embraced the idea of creating a larger Islamic state in the Northern Caucasus which would include Daghestan, Ingushetia and possibly other Russian

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regions. Since those regions chose to stay in the Federation and their predominantly Muslim population did not sympathize with fundamentalism, the only means of achieving this objective was aggression against Russia and then *gazavat* (or jihad) – holy war – against non-believers (in Daghestan, since the early 1990s the population rejected the ideas of vakhabism and the leadership declared them "undesirable" in the republic. In June, 2000 all Vakhabite organizations were prohibited in Daghestan by an act of its parliament).

Thus, Vakhabites challenged the official Chechen leadership (President Maskhadov and its supporters) and posed a serious threat to the foundations of Chechen society. As a result, official Grozny was becoming more and more critical of vakhabism in its statements and declarations. However, Maskhadov took no decisive action, as he feared that would exacerbate the situation in the republic. Confrontation between traditionalists and radicals resulted in violence several times; for instance, as noted above, Vakhabites clashed with Sufi Muslims in May, 1998 in Gudermes and Urus-Martan and then again in Gudermes in July, 1998 (approximately 50 people were killed that day). Fearing that fundamentalists will destabilize the situation in the republic and attempt to rebel against Grozny, Maskhadov declared a state of emergency, dissolved and disarmed the Shariat Guards and Islamic regiment, and exiled the well-known warlord Khattab, a mercenary from Jordan who allegedly cooperated with radicals. On July 23, 1998 there was an attempt in Grozny to assassinate Maskhadov, an attempt probably organized by Vakhabites. Observers from Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Chechnya itself agreed that at that point the republic was on the brink of civil war.

Despite their relatively strong positions, Vakhabites were not able to assert their influence throughout the republic, much less impose their ideology in its entire territory. However, they went ahead with their plans to occupy neighboring Russian regions and invaded Daghestan in August, 1999. Although members of Sufi brotherhoods may have participated in the invasion as well, the idea and its implementation are blamed by the Russian government and the local population primarily on Vakhabites. Subsequent investigations and the fact that the officials in Grozny from the very beginning announced that they did not have anything to do with the events in Daghestan and condemned the aggression further convinced Moscow that fundamentalists had started their jihad and the situation in Chechnya

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was out of control. Vakhabites were perceived as a major threat to peace and stability in the Northern Caucasus and the territorial integrity of the Federation. The invasion of Daghestan and the Vakhabites' plans to wage a holy war against Russia until the creation of a "purely" Islamic state in its southern territories were the top reasons that prompted the federal government to start a military operation in Chechnya immediately after the defeat of those who attacked Daghestan.

As the federal troops advanced into Chechnya, however, they had to fight not only Islamic extremists but also the members of Sufi brotherhoods who, as in 1994-1996, opposed Russian control for various reasons. Unlike fundamentalists, Sufi Muslims do not fight for a religious cause and tend to have more reasonable positions on issues. Moreover, their dissatisfaction with the situation in the republic in the 1996-1999 period encouraged them to cooperate in a number of cases with the Russians. As a result, many of the Sufi communities engaged in negotiations with the federal representatives and avoided armed conflict. Some of them openly supported the military operation and organized volunteer troops to fight on the Russian side against both Sufi and Vakhabite rebels.

In brief, a certain Sufi community may or may not fight the Russians or Vakhabites depending on its traditions, history, kinship ties, religious idiosyncrasies and even geographic position (the population in the mountains is generally perceived as very militant and hostile even to fellow Chechens from the flatland, whereas the northern part of the republic has been loyal to Moscow).

On the other hand, Vakhabites are, almost by definition, inclined to resist the Russian military operation and subsequent restoration of peaceful life and order. Therefore, the Russian government, the military and the population at large view Vakhabites or any other radical Islamic movement as the biggest obstacle to the stabilization of the situation in Chechnya. Traditional Sufi groups are Moscow's most valuable partners in the struggle against extremism when they choose to cooperate, and therefore the federal government makes efforts to support traditional Chechen institutions mentioned above - teips, tukhums, virds and tarikats. There is a belief that they will help prevent the spread of extremism and facilitate the return to normal life.

The Vakhabite Perspective

We first need to emphasize a number of important points. First,

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Chechen society has a very complicated structure and is fragmented along the lines of kinship and religious identification. All politics is local and driven by narrowly defined interests of clans or brotherhoods. A nationwide movement, whether pro-Russian or anti-Russian, is not likely to emerge as long as the present tendencies persist. The roots of and the solutions for the Chechen crisis are in interactions among different factions of the society, not in national interests or aspirations of an ethnic group asserting itself. Second, Sufi brotherhoods play an important role in mobilizing public support either for or against the central government or any other authority; their decisions and actions are best explained individually on a case-by-case basis. Third, religious extremism does exist in Chechnya and for various reasons is accepted among a certain portion of the population. It calls for the redesign of Chechen society in accordance with the principles of fundamentalist Islam and the conquest of neighboring lands, thus antagonizing traditionalists within Chechnya and the federal government. The confrontation between them and the Sufi Muslims has been one of the most dramatic aspects of the Chechen crisis. Fourth, Vakhabites triggered the next round of violence, and the events in Daghestan became the reason the federal government responded with a military operation. Fifth, since Vakhabites are currently the biggest threat to Moscow's interests, the federal government has supported traditional Chechen institutions, including religious brotherhoods, in the assumption that they will effectively resist foreign radical ideas, although they also often deny Russian authority.

The perspective of the Vakhabites can be understood from the writings of Mr. Albert Avduev, a member of the Chechen diaspora who works as an oil engineer. While he privately describes himself as a "secret Vakhabite," he is very open in his efforts to promote a better understanding of the principles of those who wish to cleanse Islam of its alien characteristics.

Avduev claims that Russian historians have misrepresented Islam and the movement that seeks to reform Islamic practice. For Avduev, Russian colonization led to a situation in which both the Islamic faith and Islamic society were corrupted. The flight of Russian serfs from the oppressive Czarist administrators was a significant factor that enabled Russians to penetrate the Caucasus.

Avduev claims that Russian propaganda is driven by an extreme Russian prejudice against all people of the North Caucasus in general but against Chechens in particular. "Religious traitors" and Russians,

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he maintains, worked to distort the true Islamic faith. According to Avduev, a "holy war against non-believers" was the only option for devout Muslims. With the weakening of communist rule, the true believers of the North Caucasus were able to work to restore their legitimate rights. Russian authorities, Avduev insists, have undertaken a renewed genocidal campaign to prevent the restoration of a true Islamic society in the North Caucasus.

Conclusion

While Islam has been very important in the development of the North Caucasus region, the peoples living there do not identify with any single sect or doctrine. Historically, the Islam of this region was suffused with many pre-Islamic customs and traditions. In the nineteenth century a North Caucasian federation forged by Shamil, Imam of Daghestan, waged a holy war or *ghazavat* against the old ways in order to impose Islamic law throughout the Imanate and against the Russian Empire in order to preserve the independence of the Caucasus peoples. Shamil, a Sufi of the Naqshbandi order, demanded great sacrifices from his peoples but was eventually conquered by the Russians.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, another Sufi order took root in the North Caucasus. This was the more pacifistic Qadiri order founded by Kunta-Hadj Kishinev. The Qadiri participated along with the Naqshbandi in various insurrections and revolts during the twilight of the Russian Empire and throughout the Soviet period. By the time Chechnya unilaterally declared its independence in 1991, the Qadiri rite had become the dominant form of Sufism in Chechnya.

During the course of the 1990s, the fundamentalist Vakhabite movement became a major regional force despite efforts by the Qadiri Chechens to suppress its influence. Official suppression has resulted in the emergence of a clandestine Vakhabite network supported primarily from the Middle East and Afghanistan.

The Chechen diaspora, which has played a major supporting role in the modern Middle East, especially the former Ottoman Empire and successor states such as Iraq and Jordan, has provided aid and soldiers to support their Chechen cousins. The money, armaments, and mujahideen provided by radical Islamic groups from abroad have also played a major role in supporting Chechen resistance.

After the first Chechen war (1994-1996), religious differences between the Sufi movements and the Vakhabites began to have a

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deleterious political impact in the region. While Sufi Muslims called for the creation of a secular state that would preserve traditional social patterns, the Vakhabites have demanded a purification of Islam and the eradication of local customs that have tainted and undermined pure Islam.

Within Chechnya, a divided people are confronted by two polar choices: either to work within the Russian Federation and survive physically or to sacrifice the nation upon the altar of jihad. Other Caucasian peoples (Circassians, Balkars, Ingush, Avars and Kumyks, among others) have opted to stay within the Russian Federation. Only the Chechens seem unwilling to accept this compromise.

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The Christians of Lebanon in the Context of a Syrian-Israeli Political Relations

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The author details the findings of a significant opinion poll surveying the attitudes of Lebanese Christians to the relationship of Lebanon with Syria and Israel, and the possible impact on Lebanon of any peace agreement that could eventually be reached between Syria and Israel. The poll was conducted in 1999, but writing in August 2001 he endeavors to assess possible changes of opinion that may have taken place up to the present time.

Key Words: Arab/Israeli conflict, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Palestine, Palestinian refugees, Lebanese Christians, Maronites, Druze.

A comprehensive study of Lebanon's relationship to the Middle East peace process requires a fundamental canvas of the political opinions and sentiments of the diverse confessional groups making-up the country's shaky political structure. Primary to that structure has been the place of the Christians whose contribution to Lebanon 's political life has been essential. The Christians played a determining role in the formation of the modern state in the 1920s, in its independence in the 1940s, and in its renewal. Despite the large number of works dealing with the Lebanese Christians, and especially with its most important sub-group the Maronites, most of these works are historical and descriptive in method[2]. In fact most of these works are centered on internal group mechanism and communal political behavior. Hardly any attempt at investigating the basic political orientations ·of Lebanon's Christian groups – from a behavioral perspective – with regard to relations with Syria, Israel and views on

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[2] See for example Joseph Abou-Khalil, (1990) Kissat al-Mawarina fi al-Harb:Sirat Zatiat. (Beirut, Sharikat al-Matbouat li al-Tawsik wa al-Nashr); Walid Phares (1995) Lebanese Christian Nationalism: The Rise and Fall of an Ethnic Resistance (London: Boulder); Habib Malik (1997) is there Still a Lebanon? Middle East Quarterly, 1997,4/4,19-27.

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peace are found in the literature. This gloomy observation is not intended to obscure the value of some meritorious works namely Hilal Khashan's studies on Arab Attitudes Toward Israel[3]. In the former Khashan based his study on an empirical inquiry into Arab respondent's attitudes toward Israel and Peace in the period from March 1993 to April 1995.Although the study included few Christians, the bulk of the data came from highly religious Muslim interviewees. In the latter, the data for which was collected between February and March 1999, did not include Christian respondents in the sample.

Statement of Objective

Utilizing comprehensive survey data, this study attempts to examine Lebanese Christian respondents views on issues central to national politics and to the Middle East peace process. The present study differs from Khashan's in some respect: first, the respondents' religious affiliation; it is based solely on a cross-sectional survey of Christian participants while Khashan's sample was limited to Lebanese Muslim respondents. Second, the objective of the study; Khashan's aim was to test Arab general attitudes toward peace. Accordingly, views on issues pertaining to Lebanon's domestic and regional politics or the impact of peace on Lebanese Christians were not included. This study seeks to examine what average Lebanese Christians think about the ongoing conflict in South Lebanon, their country's relations with Syria and Israel and their views concerning the prospects of an eventual peace deal with the Jewish state. In part, the author intends to determine if Lebanese Christians register any significant attitudinal change with regard to the conflict with Israel since the opinion poll was conducted before the Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in May 2000[4]. Previous results have shown that Christian Lebanese respondents rather discouragingly expressed overall negative views about their government policy approach to peace with Israel. The majority opposed the coupling of the Syrian-Lebanese peace tracks; the continuation of Hizbullah military operations and the launching of Palestinian

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[3] Hilal Khashan, Partner or Pariah? Attitudes toward Israel in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan", The Washington Institute, Policy Papers, No.41, 1996 and "Arab Attitudes Toward Israel on the Eve of the Millennium ", The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, Vol.25, No.2, Summer 2000, pp.131-229.

[4] Simon Haddad, " Lebanese Christians Perceptions of Peace with Israel", Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.24, No.3, Spring 2001, pp.13-33.

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commando raid against Israeli targets and strongly supported the deployment of the Lebanese army to control the international border. Apart from revisiting the previous findings, the present study aspires to establish the likely impact of peace on the sizable Christian community of Lebanon.

Review of Literature

Syria and Lebanon: compulsory sisterhood

Lebanon's civil war came to an end in the autumn of 1990, when, with tacit approval from Washington, Syrian forces crushed the rebellion of General Michel Aoun who had resisted implementing the Ta'if Accord of 1989. The agreement was aimed at regulating the Lebanese political system and set out steps to impose the central government's sovereignty throughout all of Lebanon. Unfortunately, nearly ten years after the agreement to end the war was signed in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon is still racked by problems, especially because Lebanon continues to be a site for the Arab-Israeli conflict. Syria's influence on Lebanon has grown tremendously since the late 1980s. No major political decisions are made without consulting Damascus.

Ever since the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 – mostly from Syrian territory – Damascus has perceived her relations with the new political entity as special. After the independence of the two countries in 1943, Syria has consistently refused to exchange diplomatic missions with Lebanon, arguing that the populations of the two states constitute one people. Sentiment aside, Damascus has always had security grievances against Lebanon; plans for most of Syria's attempted or successful coups d'etat originated in Beirut.[5] For years, even before the Syrian army entered Lebanon in 1976, the ruling elite in Damascus sought influence in Lebanese politics. This issue is so important for Syrians to the extent that it enjoys national consensus, irrespective of who predominates politically in Syria. Since opportunity presented itself for the late President Asad to establish Syria as the major power broker in Lebanon, it has become the policy of Damascus to maintain sectarian and conflicting elites' balance in Lebanon. To the extent they succeed in maintaining the balance among Lebanon's sectarian groups and

[5] It needs to be noted here that successive Lebanese governments never took part in any scheming against Syria. It just happened that Syrian opposition groups and foreign collaborators took advantage of Lebanon's liberal social and political life to orchestrate their intentions against the regime in Damascus.

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centrifugal forces, Syrian ruling elite believe they can indefinitely preserve their predominance on the divided country. As a matter of fact, since 1991 Syria has apprehended Lebanon politically and diplomatically. A network of agreements and pacts tie the two countries and serve to legitimate Syrian meddling in Lebanese affairs. These range from a Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination and a Pact on Defense and Security, signed in 1991, to bilateral agreements on agriculture, social and economic affairs, health, and the movement of individuals and goods, signed in 1993. The common denominator is that each agreement has served to bring Lebanon closer to the hold of Syria.

Early in his tenure as prime minister, in February 1993, Rafiq al-Hariri outlined the parameters for negotiations with Israel:" Lebanon is willing to sign any agreement with Israel, short of a peace treaty, based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 425, the 1978 resolution that calls for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. Hariri rejected any association with Resolutions 242 and 338, which deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict and the principle of land for peace, since the occupation of southern Lebanon by Israel is unequivocally rejected in Resolution 425, and where, unlike Resolutions 242 and 338, there is no suggestion of a principle of territorial adjustment. Finally, he announced his refusal to wait for progress by other parties negotiating with Israel. Hariri's independent position did not survive the spring, and by October 1993 Lebanon announced a policy of total coordination with Syria. Lebanese officials unanimously echo the Syrian position on the symbiosis of the two countries peace tracks with Israel. They vividly remember former Lebanese president Amin Al-Jumayyil's botched program to seek a separate peace treaty with Israel, often referred to as the infamous 17 May 1983 Agreement. The Lebanese government has apparently understood the implications of concluding a peace treaty with Israel without Syrian consent. Syria punitive response at the time was to curtail the Lebanese government authority in most Lebanese regions. In view of the demise of the 17 May Agreement, it is probably safe to assert that cannot conclude a peace agreement with Israel without Syrian overlordship.[6]

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[6] The linkage between the Syrian and Lebanese tracks has been a constant in the position of Damascus and Beirut as suggested by Prime Minister Rafic Hariri who ruled out any step by his government to revive stalled Arab-Israeli negotiations, declaring that the Lebanese will never make peace with Israel until the Syrians do. Hariri made it clear

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The Role of the United States

Diplomatically, Lebanon has been relatively isolated on the international level since 1993, when it became clear that Beirut had tied its fate to Syria in the peace process. In the United States, it became increasingly common for officials to presume that Lebanon's "zip code" was the same as Syria's. The United States has continued to emphasize its continuing commitment to the territorial integrity of the country, to the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanese soil, and to the reestablishment of peace and security. Nonetheless, U.S. Middle East policy under President Bill Clinton was remarkably partial to Israeli perspectives, and especially so in southern Lebanon, where Washington often offered unconditional support for Israel's actions. This penchant was clearly demonstrated in April 1996, during Israel's "Grapes of Wrath" operation. Despite the fact that Israel's presence in the south was in clear violation of Resolution 425, which the United States sponsored, President Bill Clinton accepted Israel's assertions that it was acting only to protect its own security and took no action except to emphasize its support for Israel.

Syria's Negotiating Strategy

The absence of a well-articulated U.S. policy on Lebanon beyond general declarations of good intent has served to isolate Lebanon and arguably have further pushed Lebanon into Syria's brotherly embrace. This has become clearly understood by Israeli officials, who pulled-back their troops unilaterally from southern Lebanon in May 2000. That move is meant to deprive Syria of an important bargaining chip in negotiations with Israel. For the Syrians, Israel's withdrawal is interpreted as an indication of success. Even if Asad were entirely successful in peace efforts, Lebanon is still important for Syrian protection, and Asad will not abdicate Syrian influence there as part of a settlement with Israel. It is the special relationship between Damascus and Hizbullah that makes the former's position in Lebanon so overwhelming and encourages American acquiescence to Syrian over-lordship in Lebanon. Syria has helped Hizbullah become the preeminent military force in Lebanon, unsubmitting even to the

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that his government will follow where Syria leads, asserting that the differences between Israel and Syria must be addressed first because they "are much more important and much more strategic" than the issues that separate Lebanon and Israel: "Neither Syria nor Lebanon will sign a peace treaty with Israel without the other," Hariri said.

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national army. In fact, Syria has placed Hizbullah sympathizers in key positions in the Lebanese army, thus forestalling the possibility that the latter might turn against the former.[7] The end product of Syria's Hizbullah policy can be summarized in convincing the U.S. and Israel that the fate of this group, much-maligned to both of them, lies squarely in the hands of Damascus; hence, the need to treat her as a regional power. The Hizbullah card plays well into the hands of Syria by making a case for maintaining its military presence in Lebanon. In connection with Syrian policy, Hizbullah continue to target Israeli objectives under the banner that the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon in May 2000 left many unresolved issues in the border area between Israel, Lebanon and Syria. In reality, when Israel pulled out of Lebanon, it kept the tiny Shebaa farms area. The reasons behind this decision is that this small piece of land will help protect the Golan Heights, which Israel took from Syria in 1967 but has promised to return[8]. On two occasions, Israeli warplanes attacked Syrian military positions in Lebanon in retaliation for Hizbullah operations. After these attacks, the limited conflict in the Shebaa Farms has the potential to explode into an unwanted war between Syria and Israel and the specter of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict becoming a regional one is raised once more. In connection with Syrian strategy, Lebanese authorities are forced to acquiesce to an unabated Palestinian armed presence: Lebanon contains substantial Palestinian refugee camps whose members are anxious to become involved in the intifada. The Lebanese government has so far prevented them from participating, but that could end. Syria could also provide more support for Hizbullah to widen its area of operation.

Lebanon's Place in any Peace Process

The strength of the Syrian position in Lebanon has not masked crucial Lebanese concerns, which appear to solicit extensive public

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[7] The, Syrian army units position near the centers of decision-making in Lebanon: presidential palace, ministry of defense and other strategic establishments. The extent of Syrian military deployment in Lebanon has angered the Council of Maronite Bishops who, on 20 September 2000, issued an appeal condemning Syrian trespassing on the "symbols[s] of national unity." The text of the appeal is available at http://www.clao. com /artic119.html.

[8] For Lebanon's Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, Israel continues to violate UN Resolution 425 and illegitimately occupy the Shebaa Farms, which Syrian President Bashar Assad reaffirmed, was Lebanese territory (Daily Star 29/6/2001).

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support, primarily among members of Lebanon's Christian community. Simon Karam, former Lebanese ambassador in Washington, conveyed to the public the gist of private discussions in the local, political and economic circles on what they want for their country from peace with the Jewish state. First of all, the Lebanese insist that the internal balance of their country be restored to enable its competent business class to assume a vital role in the growing Middle Eastern economy commensurate with its capabilities. Apart from economics the Lebanese expect (1) full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory, (2) the consolidation of Lebanese independence by extending their sovereignty over the entire country-an allusion to Syria's control of most of it, (3) the release by Israel of 151 detainees (4) the recovery of Al-Wazzani and Al-Hasbani sources of water, two important tributaries to the Jordan river, and (5) opposition to the permanent settlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

As soon as Israel pulled out its troops from Southern Lebanon in May 2000,Lebanese leaders began to re-examine their agenda by voicing demands that enhance the Syrian negotiating position such as that Lebanese army will not be deployed in the occupied area, a decision part of Lebanese-Syrian coordination that refuses to grant Israel any security guarantees concerning its northern border[9]. They also added to their agenda new items. Initially, Lebanese Prime Minister Selim al-Hoss announced in December 1999, that seven villages on the other side of the 1949 demarcation line rightfully belonged to Lebanon and that there recovery "remains a Lebanese demand."[10] As Israel's preparations for a pullout continued unabated throughout the spring of 2000, the Syrians realized that a more viable pretext for the continuation of paramilitary attacks was now needed to discourage an Israeli withdrawal. This new territorial claim had never before even been mentioned by a representative of the Lebanese government: the Shebaa farms.[11]

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[9] The Lebanon Daily Star, July 6, 2000.

[10] However, it soon became clear that Israel was willing to settle for the mere cessation of hostilities. Since the seven villages mentioned above are internationally recognized as Israeli territory, Israeli officials were confident that the Syrians and Lebanese would not try to use this claim to legitimize continued Hizbollah attacks.

[11] Israeli forces seized a piece of Lebanese territory during the 1967 Six Day War called the Shebaa Farms, a 25 square kilometer area consisting of 14 farms located south of Shebaa, a Lebanese village on the western slopes of Mount Hermon.

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Lebanese scholar Joseph Maila concedes that the permanent settlement of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, the vast majorities of whom are Sunni Muslim, could be fatal to Lebanon's delicate social mosaic. The Palestinians could turn to become a new independent community, a development unprecedented in Lebanon. The kind of linkage between these Palestinians and the Palestinian Authority is likely to create tremendous problems for the Lebanese in the coming years[12]. The current negotiating process, which began in Madrid in 1991, addresses the Palestinian issue in two ways. First, because the matter affects all Arab states hosting Palestinians, one track of multilateral talks is devoted to the issue. Secondly, it was placed on the agenda of the "final status" negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and the Israelis. What most frightens Lebanon is the likelihood that its own Palestinian population will be neglected in both tracks of the negotiations. Beirut would like the various peace talks to provide for the Palestinians' departure, but it doubts that will happen and it lacks the leverage to accomplish its goal. For example, Lebanon has no presence in the talks between Israel and Syria that bode to reshape its neighborhood. Lebanon is absent from the multilateral talks' Refugee Working Group, chaired by Canada, since that group's main objective is to improve the conditions of Palestinian refugees without considering their repatriation, an approach also unacceptable to Syria, the main power broker in Lebanon. Syrian officials have argued that the multilateral talks, which deal with the environment, economic development, security, water, and the issue of refugees, serve to lend legitimacy to Israel, conferring the prizes of peace before Israel has earned them by withdrawing from occupied Arab territory. It also withdrew from the bilateral talks between itself and Israel when Israel's Prime Minister Ehud Barak ruled out the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees to Israel, suggesting instead "a solution for them should be found in the countries where they are now living[13]." Beirut similarly expressed its complete disagreement and has made the return of the refugees a precondition for peace with Israel.

At the time of the outbreak of war in 1975, which set the stage for Lebanon's current situation, Washington officially supported "the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Lebanon" and

[12] Al-Nahar, 25, February 2000.
[13] The Economist, August 28, 1999.

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even went so far as to call for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon's borders. But when Syria failed to live up to its repeated promises to comply, some American officials indicated their tacit acquiescence in the continued Syrian role in Lebanon[14].

While many Lebanese privately express their distaste for Lebanon's cheek to jowl relationship with Syria, others argue that Lebanon has little choice. Were Lebanon to try to make its own way, independent of Syria's wishes, it would not only provoke Syria, but would also be in a weaker position vis-à-vis Israel. Accordingly, both the United States and Israel have turned a blind eye to Syrian excesses in Lebanon in an attempt to seduce Syria into a peace treaty. Addressing Syrian hegemony in this context led Asad to hope that he might not only avoid reprisal but also win tangible gains such as Western economic aid, Israeli departure from the Golan Heights, recognition of his regime and possibly even acceptance of the Syrian presence in Lebanon. While addressing a special meeting of parliament, Israel's Prime Minister Ehud Barak appealed to Lebanese President Emile Lahoud to use the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon as a springboard for peace.[15]

Methodological Aspects of The Study

Research Variables

In the present study, conducted one year after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territories, a total of 30 items were included in the questionnaire, which were all actually used. In developing the instrument, an initial pool of items from relevant studies was constructed from two sources. Approximately half of the items were adapted from existing instruments[16] and the remaining items were

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[14] During a meeting in Cairo with Syria's foreign minister, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright did not raise the issue of Syria's occupation of Lebanon; in public, she praised it: "Syria has played a constructive role as far as Lebanon is concerned. We hope that they will continue to do so" although she did say that "all foreign forces should depart."

[15] The Jerusalem Post, July 22, 2001

[16] Simon Haddad. "Lebanese Christians Perceptions of Peace with Israel", Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.24, No.3, Spring 2001, pp.13-33. "; Khashan, H., Arab Attitudes Toward Israel on the Eve of the Millennium ", The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, Vol.25, No.2, Summer 2000, pp.131-229.David Pollock,"The Arab Street: Public Opinion in The Arab World", The Washington Institute, Policy Papers, No.32, 1992; Mark Tessler and Judy Nachtwey (1999) "Palestinian Political Attitudes: An Analysis of Survey Data from the West Bank and Gaza", Israel Studies, Vol.4, No.1, pp.22-43.

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Table 1

TABLE

Gender	**Male**	**62**	**Sect**	**Maronites**	**61**
	Female	38		Greek-Orthodox	16
Age	18-27 years	48		Greek- Catholic	18
	28-37 years	19		Armenians	5
	38-47 years	15			
	48 years-up	18		Eastern Beirut	85
Social status	Upper class	25	**Residence**[16]	Security belt	9
	Middle class	39		Other	6
	Working class	36			

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developed anew by the investigator. In order to examine Lebanese Christian views towards Israel and peace, the following variables were considered:

1) Attitudes toward the Lebanese government
2) Support for Hizbullah's operations against Israel
3) Support for Syrian–Lebanese coordination
4) Predisposition towards Peace and Desired Scope of Relations with Israel
5) Attitudes toward peace on the Lebanese-Israeli track
6) Position on the Palestinian refugees issue
7) The role of the United States in promoting peace
8) Expected impact of peace on Lebanon

The opinions reported in this study represented those of 1,000 Lebanese Christians. The breakdown of respondents (Table 1) does not constitute a ratio corresponding to the proportional demographic distribution of the Christian population in Lebanon. But, since representative sampling is a very complicated procedure, especially with the lack of statistical data and the absence of urban planning in Lebanon, quota sampling was preferred to random sampling. The sample included five sub-groups, selected on the basis of quota sampling necessitated by the fact that representative selection is not possible due to lack of accurate demographic data pertaining to the characteristics and the urban distribution of the population. The author sought to broaden the representativeness of the sample by including 20 professions which were regrouped into five sub-groups for reasons of data manageability: 1) professionals, proprietors, managers and officials; 2) semi-professionals, clerical and sales; 3) skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled; 4) college students; and 5) working, non-working (unemployed, retired, disabled, housewife, etc.).

Non-response rates did not exceed 8 per cent of all attempted interviews. Twenty-five well-trained students at the Notre-Dame University collected the data. They were told to be objective during the administration of the questions and not to attempt to influence the responses. The responses of the respondents were entered on the questionnaire forms by the interviewers themselves but sometimes the choice of a self-administered instrument was adopted due to various considerations. Lebanese people in general are cooperative but have deep concern about their security. They suspect that most of such

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surveys are conducted to serve government objectives or a deceitful political organization. In responding to questionnaires, they suspect that what they think or write could be used against them. Therefore, if the questionnaires are anonymous, frankness and honesty may be encouraged.

The author maintained close contact with the field workers during the entire period of data collection (including random reviews of completed questionnaires) and personally supervised the stage of data processing (coding and entry), including tabular preparation and presentation.

Given the precarious nature of survey research in a conflictive environment, three reliability test measures were imposed on the data: pre-testing, internal consistency and response bias. Consequently, proper additions, deletions, and adjustments were made on the final version. In general, respondents attested that the questions were easily understood and measures indicated they are highly reliable.

Analysis of the findings

In Lebanon, Civil society continues to distinguish the country from its Arab neighbors. Malek[17] attributes this to "the presence of a vibrant, creative, and relatively secure Christian community without which the country would quickly turn into a monochromatic version of Syria." Lebanon's pre-war state was not a Western-type democracy, but it enjoyed something close to it. Lebanese society was the freest in the Arab world. For freedom to flourish, both diversity and sovereignty had to be maintained in an atmosphere of tolerance and openness. But, however impressive, Lebanon's civil society is today under increasing pressure. Lebanon today lacks those attributes of a free society, a sovereign state, and a functioning democracy. Lebanon's delicate communal balance means that the political neutralization of one segment of society will undermine its very raison-d'etre in a neighborhood of authoritarian regimes and religious radicalism and intolerance. In a question on assessment of the performance of their government (Table 1), the overwhelming majority of respondents say they were unhappy about it.

Support for the political leadership is as low as 10%, as shown in

[17] Habib.C. Malik (1997) is there Still a Lebanon? Middle East Quarterly, 1997, 4/4, 19-27.

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Table 1. Khazen[18] holds that one of the most pressing problems for the Christians is the absence of a credible and effective political leadership. The power struggle, which took on various political and military forms among Christian leaders during the war years, was self-destructive. Today, politicians who either lack a power-base or who have no mainstream legitimacy represent Christians. Christian politicians in power in postwar Lebanon are, with few exceptions, restricted to those with close ties to Syria. Under different circumstances, some of the most visible Christian politicians would not be in office. Having cleared the stage of radical right-wing Christian leaders, more moderate Christian figures were promoted for leadership, such as Elias Hrawi, a seasoned Lebanese statesman, to the presidency in 1991. A Syrian loyalist to the end, Hrawi managed to keep the Lebanese scene under control. Striking a delicate balance between his Maronite origins and Syrian requirements, Hrawi appealed to the disgruntled Maronites as "one of them," while remaining loyal to the Syrian establishment[19]. Hrawi's successor, General Emile Lahoud, failed by all measures to match Hrawi's achievement. Lacking any power-base within the Maronite community, Lahoud was snubbed by his co-religionists from day one. Unlike Hrawi, whose political career dated back to the 1960s, Lahoud was a newcomer to the scene, and could play only by Syria's rules – thereby losing any form of legitimacy within radical Christian circles[20].

Nearly 84% of the respondents do not feel that their ruling elites work in the best interest of the people. As elsewhere in the Arab

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[18] Farid el-Khazen, Lebanon –Independent No More, Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2001 vol.8, issue 1 p.43.

[19] Sami Moubayed. Lebanon Dodges Bullets of Another Civil War. Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, May 2001 v.20 i4 p.21.

[20] Hariri's formation of his fourth cabinet subjected him to a barrage of criticisms, mainly from the Maronite opposition. This happened despite his extreme care in proportionately representing the main political forces—as displayed by their parliamentary seats—in the new cabinet. Even the outspoken patriarch Sfeir seemed generally satisfied with the Maronite slots. Parliamentary deputy Pierre Gemayel, son of former president Amin Gemayel, gave the new government a vote of no confidence. Fully cognizant of the political environment dictating Hariri's action, deputy Gemayel still insisted on describing the new cabinet as a "political disaster... and a national tragedy." Harith Shihab, chairman of the Maronite League's Executive Council, protested against excluding Maronites from key ministerial portfolios and charged "excluding Christians, and Maronites in particular, from political ministries, is something taking place for the first time since independence and an expression of persistence in following a policy of marginalization."

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World, palm-greasing and kickbacks are a way of life, and Lebanon is no exception; it is listed first among countries in terms of corruption. Accordingly, Paul Salem[21] identifies a number of problems in post-Taif Lebanon: the absence of self-government, given the wide Syrian influence on the political process in Lebanon; the lack of accountable elected officials, whereas in most cases former militia leaders and communal leaders are manufacturing support for themselves through pressure, influence and money; the lack of separation of public from private interests among top officials, given the deep involvement of key public servants in massive real estate deals, government contracts and the like; the absence of clean government whereas the reality in Lebanon is that, from the highest to the lowest levels of government, there is no serious program to combat it.

Rampant corruption and abuse of power caused General Emile Lahoud, who assumed the presidency in November 1998, to announce a major campaign against corruption and to pledge to reform the bloated and inefficient Lebanese bureaucracy. In response to the president's promise to cut off the hands of all corrupt bureaucrats, a disbelieving observer remarked befittingly: "If he [Lahoud] stuck to his pledge... no civil servant or politician would be able to applaud his diligence"[22].

Lebanese Christians' perceptions of their government is negative to the point where even less than 11% of the respondents accept the maintenance of the existing political system in its present form. In this regard, Khazen[23] remarks that: "Rather than broaden the base of Christian support for Ta'if, Lebanese government authorities opted for the opposite course of action: no national unity governments were formed, administrative decentralization stalled, many displaced persons did not return, and elections were neither free nor fair." As a result, Picard[24] maintains that "some Christian leaders who once supported

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[21] Paul Salem. "Democracy in Lebanon: Between Political Science and the Elections of 1996". The Parliamentary Elections of 1996 and the Crisis of Democracy in Lebanon. Beirut: Center for Lebanese Studies, 1998. pp. 521-522.

[22] The Economist, vol. 352, no. 8132, 14 August 1999, p. 37.

[23] Farid el-Khazen. Lebanon – Independent No More. Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2001 v.8 i1 p.43.

[24] Elizabeth Picard, "The Dynamics of the Lebanese Christians: From the Paradigm of the 'Ammiyyat to the Paradigm of Hwayyek," Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East, The Challenge of the Future, ed. Andrea Pacini (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 200-221.

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Ta'if are now critical of it and question its utility. Lebanon today is not a reassuring place for Christians. While disenchantment is widespread across all of Lebanese society, the most affected, and thus most vocal in expressing dissatisfaction, are the Christians." Resentment and frustration of the Christians with the role assigned to the community under the Taïf arrangement are not discrepant with reality. They feel politically underrepresented, alienated and excluded both from the government and from the Christian parties that have accepted the new order but dissented on details. They consider that none among the ruling elites, even the president, is a true representative of the community. Cabinet ministers are Syria's allies and militant leaders of the opposing faction are controlling the political institutions. Syria's military presence serves to maintain the actual balance of power, which does not allow Maronite past political supremacy.

Prior to Israel's pullout from Lebanon, Lebanese Christians were most of the time willing to acquiesce in Hizbullah's operations as long as they were under the banner of ridding the country of a foreign armed-presence, despite their damaging repercussions on Lebanon. In fact, Israel's massive military retaliation against civilian targets on Lebanese soil has created enmity. Israel's calculated strikes against power stations in late June 1999 and February 2000 in the Christian area of Mount Lebanon sent waves of shock and disapproval, not only against Israeli heavy-handedness but also against Syria's war-by-proxy approach as well. Hizbullah showed that the IDF withdrawal is not the end of the conflict with Israel, but the Shi'i movement's intentions are to take disputes over issues such as the Shebaa Farms, release of Lebanese detainees in Israel and the repatriation of Palestinian refugees as excuses for continued attacks against Israeli borders.[25]

However, being seen as a defender of Syrian military interests in Lebanon may yet backfire on Hizbullah's domestic popularity. The Shebaa Farms campaign does not enjoy the same support as the resistance to Israel's occupation of south Lebanon, with only 4% of the respondents calling for continuing operations against Israel. To the contrary, Hizbullah would find itself blamed by most Lebanese if its attacks against Israeli targets in retaliation for the destruction of Syrian military positions led to a wider conflict that set back Beirut's attempts to revive the moribund economy: "Hizbullah has committed itself to the

[25] The Lebanon Daily Star, June 30, 2000.

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liberation of this territory," says Augustus Richard Norton, a professor of anthropology at Boston University who has followed Hizbullah and Lebanon closely since the early 1980s. He says: "I am personally doubtful that this was a wise strategic step. To the contrary, I think the party has sacrificed some of its broader credibility in Lebanon, as well as significant segments of its domestic Shi'ite constituency."[26]

Hizbullah's premise for launching the Shebaa Farms campaign came unstuck with the Israeli air strikes in mid-April and June 2001 against Syrian radar bases in the Bekaa region. These attacks, which apparently took both Hizbullah and Syria by surprise, effectively introduced new rules to the conflict.

In agreement with Syria, Lebanon has resisted international pressure to deploy its troops along the Israeli border, leaving Hizbullah fighters in *de facto* control. As attested by the findings (Table 2), the majority of Christian respondents (94%) call for dispatching the army in Southern Lebanon. Lebanese authorities, prompted by Syrian tactics, promised that the government would only be present through UN Forces until Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights was completed. This official position was heavily criticized by Christian opposition leader General Aoun,[27] who lashed out at the government. The most expressive came from the Maronite Council of Bishops, who protested that the Lebanese government "has yet to secure its presence there and reassure citizens. It has left the matter to policemen who are unable to impose security;" meanwhile, armed political parties, who claimed they were providing security, entered people's homes and detained individuals "as if there were no state, rulers or anyone holding people accountable."[28]

The Christian respondents' opinion with regard to the issue of special and all-encompassing ties with Syria was surprising. In fact, there is some sympathy for Lebanese-Syrian special ties, but its extent is not commensurate with Syria's ubiquitous presence in Lebanon. Syrian military presence on Lebanese soil, as well as their manipulation of the country's political life and siphoning off of a significant portion of its meager economic resources has resulted in large-scale aversion among many Lebanese groups. Syria has consistently sought to preserve her interests in Lebanon by seeing to it that the country's divisions do

[26] The Lebanon Daily Star, 5 July 2001.
[27] The Lebanon Daily Star 27 May 2000.
[28] The Lebanon Daily Star July 6 2000.

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Table2: Support for the Lebanese Government

Q1: How would you deserib the overall performance of the Lebanese government? (N=990)	%	Q2: Essentially, ruling elites in Lebanon work in the best interest of the people: (N=997)	%	Q3: Do you support the Lebanese political leadership? :(N=996)	%	Q4: The Lebanese political system should be:(N=992)	%
Very good	1	Strongly agree	1	Strongly agree	2	Maintained in its present form	11
Good	3	Agree	5	Agree	8	Modestly reformed	20
Fair	18	Disagree	27	Disagree	45	Substantially reformed	68
Poor	78	Strongly disagree	58	Strongly disagree	46		
Unsure		Unsure	10	Unsure			

(*) Here and in all tables "N" represents the number of respondents; figures are in percentages and columns may not add up to 100 because results were rounded to the nearest whole number.

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not taper off. The opening salvo was on March 23, 2000, when Gebran Tueni, chairman of the board and managing director of the An-Nahar newspaper, wrote "An Open Letter to Dr. Bashshar Asad" in which he frankly informed the heir-apparent in Syria that "many Lebanese are neither at ease with the Syrian policy in Lebanon, nor the Syrian 'presence' in Lebanon" and then boldly declared, "We are not a Syrian province." Various religious figures spoke their minds. Patriarch Sfeir stated that if Lebanon "wants to control its future ... and for the Lebanese to regain their liberty, the Syrian troops must leave."[29]

More surprisingly, Archbishop Elias Audi of the usually docile Eastern Greek Orthodox Church spoke up on behalf of the student protestors to his congregation in a Palm Sunday sermon. In November, politically disaffected Druze leader Walid Junblat joined the Christian crusade to evict the Syrian army from Lebanon.

However, the acrimonious debate that raged during the spring of 2001 concerning the Syrian presence in Lebanon immediately polarized its already fragmented society, on yet another issue, along sharp sectarian lines. Muslims who suddenly felt threatened by Sfeir's pan-Christian tone began speaking out, defending Syria – or, more specifically, defending their own existence. To Lebanon's Muslim religious and political leaders, the only balancing force keeping the Christians at bay and preventing them from subordinating Muslims were the Syrians. Their departure would mean a return to a Maronite dominance of Lebanon. This point was explicitly raised by Sunni clerics such as Sheik Taha al-Sabounji, who spoke out against the Christian mobilization. "If there is need for Muslims to make their presence felt," he said, "they will do so and the Lebanese public will stand up to those who are determined to stir up sectarian conflict once again." Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah echoed Sabounji's claims, saying, "Those who are asking Syria to leave only represent themselves and not all of Lebanon." A staunch Syrian supporter, Nasrallah added, "If Syria decides to pull out of Lebanon, we will tell her that it is wrong." Nasrallah, by far Lebanon's most charismatic leader, appealed to his fellow Shi'i and launched a 300,000-man demonstration in Beirut defending Syria's stance. Other pro-Syrian factions, such as the Amal Party of parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri, the Future Youth of Prime Minister Rafiq al Harriri, and the pro-Damascus Syrian Social Nation-

[29] "We Are Not a Syrian Province". Middle East Quarterly, June 2000 v.7 i2 p.91-93.

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Table 3: Support for Hizbullah's Operations against Israel

Q5: After Israel has pulled out its troops from Lebanon, should Hizbullah: (N=991)	%	Q6: Should the Lebanese army control the international border? (N=971)	%
Continue its attacks against Israeli targets	4	Yes	94
Maintain status quo	32	No	6
Cease operations	64	Unsure	

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alist Party (SSNP), immediately supported Shi'i claims.[30]

For many Christians, special ties with Syria are interpreted to mean, as Daniel Pipes puts it, the permanent colonization of Lebanon and may incur damaging repercussions on Lebanon's Christian community:

> Perhaps most significant for the long-range future, the Asad regime has opened the doors for Syrians to move to Lebanon, seek work there, settle there, and sometimes bring other family members to join them there. With time, this emigration may profoundly alter Lebanon's population by increasing the proportion of peasants and Muslims. Such changes have the additional virtue, from the Damascene point of view, of making the Christian population, and especially the Maronites who are the heart of independent Lebanon, feel less welcome in their own homeland. Cardinal Nasrallah Butros Sfeir,[31] the Maronite patriarch, has accused the Syrians of attempting precisely this. Lebanese Christians already have a century's legacy of emigration; continued Syrianization of their country makes them prone to leave their ancestral home in ever-increasing numbers.

The Principal Positions

While the respondents' opinions on the issue of special relations with Syria are surprising, their response to the question of whether they approve of the coupling of the Syrian-Lebanese peace tracks is more surprising. Unexpectedly, almost one-third of the respondents support a united peace track in the Peace Process negotiations. The inseparability of the two tracks is a solid commitment that falls in the context of the non-negotiable. This point was made clear during the Arab summit in Amman when Syrian officials insisted that the final communiqué point out explicitly that "Syrian and Lebanese peace tracks are inseparable and they are linked with the Palestinian track." It is precisely Lebanon's absence from negotiations with Israel that

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[30] Sami Moubayed. Lebanon Dodges Bullets of Another Civil War, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, May 2001 v.20 i4 p.21.

[31] The Maronite Patriarch urged on many occasions the two countries to establish straightforward diplomatic relations like all sovereign and independent countries with free decisions because the current Syrian hegemony is causing Lebanon to fade away, little by little, from the international arena. Lebanon has no decision, no sovereignty and no independence. (The Lebanon Daily Star/14/11/2000)

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Table 4: Support for Syrian-Lebanese coordination

Q9: Do you approve of privileged ties between Lebanon and Syria? (N=975)	%
Strongly agree	6
Agree	46
Don't agree	26
Strongly don't agree	22
Unsure	_

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Table5: Principle position toward peace on the Syrian –Israeli peace tracks

Q17:In your opinion, the main obstacle to peace is: (N=983)	%	Q12: Should Lebanon sign a unilateral peace agreement with Israel? (N=971)	%
Lebanon	10	Yes	66
Syria	24	No	34
Israel	66		
Syria and Israel			
Q10: Do you approve of the coupling of the Lebanese and Syrian peace tracks? (N=983)	%	**Q11:If no, what do you prefer?** :(N=549)	%
Strongly agree	3	Separation of the tracks	90
Agree	28	Coordination between both countries	10
Don't agree	40		
Strongly don't agree	30		
Unsure			

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causes Lebanese Christians to think that Syria does not want Lebanon to be a sovereign country and that the price of its accepting a settlement with Israel is keeping Lebanon as a satellite country under its dominance. According to Gibran Tueini (2000), the owner of An-Nahar, Lebanon's leading newspaper:

> This is not acceptable and will not be accepted by our people after twenty years of war and sacrifices". This point is further reiterated by Simon Karam, former ambassador to the United States, who blamed Lebanon's non-participation in peace negotiations on the lack of internal agreement on significant issues among the actual political leadership: "Syria is behaving according to its national welfare, so let us, too, search for our benefit.

Lebanese officials unanimously echo the Syrian position on the symbiosis of the two countries' peace tracks with Israel. They vividly remember former Lebanese president Amin Al-Jumayyil's botched program to seek a separate peace treaty with Israel, often referred to as the "infamous 17 May 1983 Agreement." The Lebanese government has apparently understood the implications of concluding a peace treaty with Israel without Syrian consent. Syria'a punitive response at the time was to curtail the Lebanese government's authority in most Lebanese regions. In view of the demise of the 17 May Agreement, it is probably safe to assert that Lebanon cannot conclude a peace agreement with Israel without Syrian over-lordship. Farid Abboud, Lebanon's ambassador to the United States, explained his government's position on the matter of negotiating peace with Israel:

> Negotiations toward a settlement, as far as Lebanon is concerned, should be conducted in close coordination with Syria, which remains faithful to the same principles. Lebanon already embarked on a road to a separate deal with the Israelis in 1983, with catastrophic consequences for Lebanon and for Israel and will not take it again."[32]

The Madrid-track talks seemed to offer a chance for peace; but the talks stalled in February 1994. During the period 1991-94, Lebanese

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[32] Middle East Insight, September 1999.

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Table 6:Predisposition towards Peace and Desired Scope of relations with Israelis

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Personally, do you want peace with Israel? (N=983)	%	If you want peace with Israelis, what kind of relations would you like to see between them and the Lebanese? (870)	%
Yes	90	Close cooperation on a neighborly basis	26
No	10	Regular cooperation	56
Unsure	_	Little cooperation	6
		No cooperation	13

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and Israelis completed 18 rounds of talks before they came to an abrupt conclusion. But the most telling sign of Lebanon's lack of independent decision-making came in the opening session of direct talks with Israel when Syria's negotiating team arrived to begin their own session with Israeli delegates. Meekly, Lebanese diplomats filed out to make room for the Syrians so that the real business of the day could begin[33]. However, the Lebanese-Israeli issue was obviously resolvable, since Israeli negotiators told the Lebanese delegation they had no claim on Lebanese territory. The real issue for Israel has to do with security. That issue could be resolved, given a peace agreement with Syria. Ever since, the Syrians have been emphasizing the unity of the Lebanese and Syrian tracks as a strategic option. While technically there is a Lebanese track, peace negotiations that resumed in December 1999 between Syria and Israel left Lebanon out, assuming instead total coordination with Syria[34].

Conventional Arab thinking is that Arab publics continues to view with aversion the prospect of peace with the Hebrew state. Elias Saba[35] wrote that "Lebanon and any other Arab country should seek a peace with Israel that only ends the state of war." On several occasions, Lebanon refused to participate in the multilateral talks of the Middle East peace process designed to promote normal relations between the Arabs and Israel. Lebanon insisted that their territorial and political disputes with the Jewish state have to be settled first. But empirical evidence suggests that at that time less than one third of Arab respondents (and 30% of Lebanese Muslims who were interviewed) approve of peace.[36]

Against this backdrop, Lebanese Christian respondents reveal more than 90% in favor of peace with Israel. Certainly, Lebanon's internal problems and their repercussions on the sizable Christian community contribute to this attitude, as expressed by the following plea for peace issued by the Maronite Patriarch in May 2000:[37]

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[33] Robert Satloff " A Madrid Post-Mortem", Middle East Insight, Volume 8, No.3, January/February 1992,p.7.

[34] Richard Haas and Shibley Talhami" The Middle East After Barak's Election: Ripe for Peace?" A Brookings Press Briefing, July 13, 1999.

[35] Elias Saba, Lebanon and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Dar al-Jadid, 2000.

[36] Khashan, ibid. pp.176-177.

[37] The Lebanon Daily Star, May 5, 2000.

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Table 7: Economic Cooperation with Israel

What is your position on starting economic relations between Lebanon and Israel? (N=960)	%	Q30: Who would benefit more from economic relations between Lebanon and Israel? (N=990)	%
Support	76	Lebanon would benefit more	66
Oppose	18	Israel would benefit more	20
Unsure	7	Unsure	14

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> Alas, the peace process is on hold right now. But we hope the world community and instrumental decision makers will help reactivate the stagnant peace process. We need peace in order to ease our troubles and live in tranquility.

The Christians' responses to the far more stringent question in Table 6 on the kind of relations desired between Israel and Lebanon seem to indicate a positive attitude in favor of bilateral cooperation in the future. More than 80% of the respondents support substantial collaboration between Lebanon and Israel. Since 1975, high-level contacts started to take place between Israeli officials and Christian right-wing leaders. These contacts developed into full-scale cooperation following the Camp David Accords. Egypt's disengagement from the Arab-Israeli conflict and the inauguration of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel in 1979 have encouraged many Lebanese Christians to demand that similar arrangements be concluded between Lebanon and Israel to end the state of belligerency between the two countries.

Almost nine years after the Middle East peace process was launched, many Arabs believe that the process, though slow and stumbling, is the only way out of the age-old conflict; but many other Arabs express disbelief in the prospects for peace, at least on the economic level. They point to Israel's plans to extend economic hegemony over its Arab neighbors after its military territorial expansionism came to a halt as a result of the 1973 Middle East War. Elias Saba, a prominent Lebanese economist and politician, belongs to the latter group. The following excerpts summed up his ideas:[38] "Israel still adheres to its old goal: to extend its dominance and hegemony over the Arab world...but the means for realizing this goal have switched from staging wars to imposing economic normalization.... Should Lebanon's talks with Israel be resumed, the economic aspect will be the most important in the negotiations." These aspects are crucial for the future of the Lebanese economy and consequently for the economies of Syria and the Arab world in general.

In soliciting the respondents' personal reaction to an official inauguration of Lebanese-Israeli economic relations, three-fourths of them supported this possibility. These findings seem to concur with the

[38] Elias Saba, ibid.

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opinion of economist Michael Young:

> The Lebanese are not expected to be intransigent on the nature of peace, though domestic opposition to Israel remains high in some quarters. Most probably, Lebanon will be the main connecting point in the Syria-Israeli-Lebanese triangle, permitting controllable economic forays into Syria, while allowing the Syrians to deflect too much Israeli interest in developing bilateral relations. Lebanon would become a potentially lucrative safety valve.[39]

Since the 1973 war between Egypt and Syria in the one camp and Israel in the other, Young continues, "the myth of Israel's unbeatable army has been discredited." The Jewish state switched to a new policy to win collaboration from the Arab powers:

> By trying to convince the Arabs to swap occupied territories with normal economic relations, Israel is actually seeking to invade the Arab world economically... Arab countries should counter Israel's plots by boosting economic relations among each other... true peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved as long as Israel is economically superior to the Arabs.

As is clear from the table, two-thirds of the respondents expressed an opinion that economic cooperation will be more beneficial to Lebanese than to Israelis, and this is a renunciation to Saba's view. Saba describes Arab-Israeli peace agreements, whether already reached or expected to be forged in the near future, as "mere settlements that cannot lead to true peace as long as Middle Eastern economic factors remain in favor of Israel."

The stillborn security agreement reached between Lebanon and Israel in 1983, the popularly called May 17 Agreement, was "too dangerous" for Lebanon. The agreement, annulled after a successful uprising against the government of then-President Amin Gemayel, "was particularly perilous because it stipulated further economic normalization talks between Lebanon and Israel".

The fate of the Palestinian refugees residing in Lebanon since 1948 is the most stubborn negotiating item pertaining to the Lebanese track.

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[39] Michael Young, The Lebanon Daily Star, January 8, 2000.

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Of all the countries hosting Palestinians, Lebanon probably confronts the most sensitive and serious problems. Fearing that the Middle East peace process will try to implant Palestinians in Lebanon against the will of the Lebanese, Lebanese authorities continue to deny the Palestinians basic social and economic rights in order to discourage them from remaining there. As a result, Lebanon hosts the highest percentage of Palestinians living in camps[40] (55 percent or 200,000 people). Formally, Lebanese officials reject the prospect of permitting Palestinians to become naturalized Lebanese because this "would constitute a negation of the Palestinian right to return to their homeland."[41] The authorities constantly repeat the mantra of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, uttered in 1998, that "Lebanon will never, ever integrate Palestinians. They will not receive civic or economic rights or even work permits. Integration would take the Palestinians off the shoulders of the international agency which has supported them since 1948."[42]

But as indicated in Table 5, Lebanese Christians have other motives for resisting this prospect: they see citizenship for Palestinians, most of whom are Sunni Muslims, upsetting the delicate confessional balance in the country's political structure based on demographics. Reflecting the complete lack of popular support for Palestinian citizenship, Interior Minister Michel al-Murr recently announced that a new clause has been added to the naturalization draft law to prevent Palestinians from gaining citizenship.[43] Most Christians have always been hostile to the Palestinians, due mainly to Palestinian exploitation of the internal tensions of Lebanese society for their own ends, and blame them for providing the fuel for the civil war that laid waste to Lebanon from 1975 to 1990. Permanently settling Palestinians in the country would unhinge Lebanon's delicate sociopolitical balance, which is upset by even the slightest change of one of its components.

But then Lebanon's worries stem also from the continued presence of these armed Palestinians in the camps, because they represent a potential for instability, threatening to reenact the civil war days unless a solution for the Palestinians is found: "If Palestinian refugees in

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[40] Steven Edminster, "Trapped on All Sides," The Marginalization of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon (Washington D.C.: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1999), p. 14.

[41] The Lebanon Daily Star, November 27, 1999.

[42] International Herald Tribune, December 21, 1998.

[43] An-Nahar (Beirut), July 28, 1999.

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Lebanon were not given the right to return home, they will become a time bomb."[44] The permanent presence of Palestinians in Lebanon worries a substantial portion of the Lebanese population, especially Christians. The Lebanese government's involuntary acquiescence in the presence of armed Palestinians in the refugee camps exacerbates this view.[45] The pro-Arafat and Palestinian rejectionists refuse to hand over their weapons in the absence of a clear understanding with Lebanese authorities about the camps: "Weapons may be needed to cope with particular instances," says Shafiq al-Hut, the PLO's former representative in Beirut. Fear and a sense of equal treatment lead Christians likewise to hold on to arms. The net result: a high degree of expectation exists that the launching of Palestinian commando raids would have adverse effects on Lebanon and could mean a new civil war, as expressed by 55 percent of the respondents, or Israeli devastation of Lebanese territories.

The claim that foreign plots exist to impose the settlement of Palestinians on Lebanon has increased worries among Lebanese about the probability that Palestinian refugees may stay in the country indefinitely.[46] There is a widespread impression that the future of the Palestinians should be decided by the United States if ever Arab-Israeli peace process should reach a decisive stage. In fact, U.S. proposals to settle refugees in Arab states have so far proven unworkable. They were met with official rejection in the case of Jordan's King Abdullah: "Everybody wants to solve this problem but it will not be at the expense of Jordan."[47] The Gulf States also rejected the proposals as a potential danger to political stability.[48] As permanent status negotiations resumed, the Palestinian Authority has shown no enthusiasm for taking the Palestinians in Lebanon into a future Palestinian state. Like Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, the Palestinian Authority considers itself one of the countries hosting refugees.[49] Arafat seeks to keep pressure on Israel to allow the Palestinian refugees

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[44] President Emile Lahud, The Daily Star (Beirut), Apr. 26, 2000.

[45] Hilal Khashan and Simon Haddad, "The Coupling of the Syrian-Lebanese Tracks: Beirut's Options," Security Dialogue, Vol.31, No.2, June 2000, pp. 201-214.

[46] An-Nahar, November 9, 1999; International Herald Tribune, Dec. 13, 1999.

[47] The Scotsman (Edinburgh), Oct. 7, 1999.

[48] Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, January, 2000.

[49] As'ad Abd ar-Rahman, chairman of the PLO Refugee Department, news conference, Ramallah, Feb. 28, 1999.

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Table 8: Position on the refugees issue

Q20: Palestinian refugees residing in Lebanon are the responsibility of: (N=964)	%	Q22: Palestinian refugees in Lebanon should be :(N=983)	%	Q6: Should armed Palestinians conduct cross-border operations in order to affirm their right of return?: (N=972)	%	Q7:If no, why?: (N=681)	%
Lebanon	3	Granted citizenship	1	Yes	5	It will result in the resumption of the civil war	55
Arab states	31	Granted immigrant status and allowed to stay	6	No	96	Operations should be conducted from other Arab countries	6
Israel	18	Permitted to emigrate	93	Unsure	-	This issue will be settled through negotiations	39
International community	48						

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Table 10:Likely impact of peace

Q32: Do you think that peace will benefit Lebanon? (N=984)	%	Q33:If your answer is yes, how? (N=485)	%	Q21: if your answer is no, what are the issues that worries you the most? (N=457)	%
Yes	51	Restore Christian preponderance	59	The Palestinian refugee issue	28
No	30	Through regional cooperation	8	Regaining Sovereignty	48
Unsure	20	It will encourage Christian emigrants to return	32	Economic recovery	23

Table9: The Role of The US in promoting Peace

Q23: How do you see the role of the united states in promoting peace between Syria /Lebanon and the Israelis? (N=989)	%	Q24: Should the US continue to involve itself in the peace process? (N=990)	%	Q25:In your opinion, what should be the role of the US in the peace talks :(N=928)	%
The US performs as an honest mediator	8	The US should continue	88	Pressure Syria	13
The US is more on the side of Syria /Lebanon	3	The US should not continue	8	Pressure Israel	24
The US is more on the side of the Israelis	75	Unsure	4	Pressure both	63
Unsure	16				

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the right of return to their original homes in light of the economic obstacles facing those who want to relocate to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. An alternative solution has been proposed: that the Palestinian refugees should be resetled in Western countries. That would suit Israel and would probably also be a popular among the population at large. To date, Canada, amongst others, has offered to absorb 15,000 Palestinians.

The Lebanese know about America's interest in a secure and peaceful Israel. That interest derives from many factors, including historical ties dating back to America's early support for the creation of the state in 1948 and shared Judeo–Christian religious sensibilities. Israel enjoys the strong and emotional support of a large segment of the American population. This support extends beyond the influential U.S. Jewish community, although that community's ties with the Jewish state are especially close. When the respondents were asked to assess the role of the U.S. in mediating the peace talks between Syrian/Lebanese and Israelis, only eight percent said the U.S. performs as an honest broker, but with only three percent arguing that the U.S. is actually on the Syrian/Lebanese side.

Israel's long–term security requires a stable peace with its neighbors, rather than simply continued American military and technological support. The Oslo Accords enabled Jordan to sign a peace treaty with Israel, led to negotiations between Israel and Syria, and for a while emboldened Arab states in the Gulf and North Africa to forge closer ties with Israel. The deadlock in the peace process in the past year has halted any possible further normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab world and has intensified opposition to normalization by the general Arab public and its intellectual elites, putting strains even on the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan. Although Syria's own calculations about peace with Israel are primarily bilateral, the Syrian president's assessment of any agreement with Israel may well be affected by what happens in the Palestinian conflict.

The Syrian–Israeli track remains central to the establishment of a comprehensive peace in the region. Movement on this track, however, is not as urgent as on the Palestinian track, even though there is a low–level proxy war between Syria and Israel along the southern border of Lebanon. The Syrian–Israeli border is stable, and there are no imminent hardships looming for either side as a consequence of delay. The shape of a possible settlement is well known to both sides, and its absence is more a function of political will than effective bargaining.

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Both states have significant leverage to bring to bear on the negotiations for a final agreement.

The unfavorable assessment of the U.S. role has not convinced most respondents that Washington should cease to involve itself in the peace talks on the Syrian/Lebanese track. This remains essential for the establishment of a comprehensive peace in the region, according to Nassif Hitti.[50] The biggest concern on this track in the short term is an unintended conflict that might begin with a crisis in Lebanon. Israel and Hizbullah are painfully entangled in south Lebanon.

Achieving a peace deal between Lebanon and Israel has different implications for the Christians, as shown in Table 10. A weak majority sees various benefits ensuing to Lebanon from a successful conclusion of the process: increased pressure on Syria to leave, encouraging Christian emigrants to return home, and cooperation with neighboring countries. A second group, however, fears that a finalized Israeli-Syrian /Lebanese peace deal will definitely come at Lebanon's expense, in the sense that no one will care any more whether Syria leaves Lebanon after agreements have been signed. The permanent settling of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon worries a substantial number of respondents, besides Lebanon's economic problems.[51] Such an outcome of peace negotiations could only constitute a recipe for future insecurity and disorder as openly expressed by Maronite patriarch Cardinal Nasrullah Sfeir:

> The peace that is being promised may have adverse consequences. If the resettlement of Palestinians in vast underpopulated Arab countries is not acceptable, then the effect on a small-overpopulated country like Lebanon would be even more dire.[52]

Conclusion and Implications of the Study

The Arab-Israeli conflict antedates the fairly recent history of Lebanon, and throughout its existence Lebanon has struggled to contain the effects of its involuntary involvement in this protracted

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[50] Peace Negotiations: Across The Past and Towards The Future in The Independence of the Lebanese State and the Probable Peace Talks, The Cultural Movement Antelias (Lebanon), The Works of The National Congress in 17th and 18th of November, 1999,p. 26.

[51] It was deemed unnecessary by the author to go into a detailed analysis Lebanon's economic problems, which are outside the scope of this paper.

[52] Al-Hayat, March 13, 2000.

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conflict[53]. Lebanon's role in that conflict was determined primarily by its sectarian composition. Syria and Israel have influenced Lebanon's political system, and each continues to be inextricably involved in Lebanon's internal affairs. Much of the country's anguish lies in its inability to strike a delicate balance between its two powerful neighbors: Lebanon's dilemma lies in the fact that it cannot please one side without antagonizing the other. The new regional power configuration, in turn, accentuated divisions within Lebanese society and culminated in Syria's dominant presence in Lebanese politics, which persists even today.

A major repercussion of Syrian policy is that Lebanon's position on the peace process with Israel became more reflective of the Syrian line. Not only the Syrian-Lebanese peace tracks of negotiations with Israel are intertwined but also there is rather a single Syrian–Lebanese peace track involving simultaneous signature of peace treaties. Many Lebanese, and notable the Christians, feel that Syria intentionally tries to keep them busy with domestic turmoil to justify its continued presence in the country and even subsequent to a peace deal and to exclude the Lebanese from presenting their views in the talks[54]. During the first week of August 2001, Lebanese security forces rounded up more than 200 loyalists and senior leaders of exiled Christian rebel leader Michel Aoun and members of the banned Lebanese Forces[55]. Lebanon's highest Christian religious leader, Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir who has been leading the campaign to end Syria's stranglehold on Lebanon, said force would not make young Christians change their convictions[56]. Officially, the crackdown on anti-Syrian activists was justified under the pretext of Christian involvement in an Israeli conspiracy where Christian forces would take advantage of probable political changes linked to the peace process in the region[57].

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[53] Ghassan Salame, "Lebanon: How 'National' Is Independence?" Beirut Review 6 (Fall 1993): pp.1-5.

[54] Interview with Elie Kheir, researcher at The Institute for Social and Economic Studies in Paris, An-Nahar, February 25, 2000.

[55] Leaders of Lebanon's Maronite Christian community have been among the most vocal critics of Syria's presence in Lebanon, which still includes some 20,000 troops despite a June pullout from Beirut seen as a concession to Christian discontent.

[56] An-Nahar, August 8, 2001.

[57] Lebanese authorities banned two Christian groups opposed to Syria's role in Lebanon from any political activity Both have been campaigning to oust Syria's 20,000 troops and

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Figures from across Lebanon's political spectrum have denounced the security crackdown as a sign of creeping authoritarianism in what is generally viewed as one of the Arab world's most liberal countries.

The Christians of Lebanon remain unimpressed, and rather confused, by the political changes that any prospective peace deal with Israel could bring. They favour peace with Israel and support a privileged relation with Syria but are not reassured regarding Syrian policy in Lebanon. It is true that the future of the Lebanese will not solely depend on Syria and Israel, but coming to a comprehensive understanding with the Syrian leadership is vital to the future of the community and the country.

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end its political and military influence in Lebanon.

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The Ethos of Global Intervention

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Despite the presence in the world of a great many particularist movements that would split societies into smaller units, there is also a powerful drive toward consolidation, powered primarily by an international leadership that has adopted an ethos of global meliorism. In effect, the philosophy is that "everyone's business is our business." Important voices in the United States have expressed a desire for some constraints, but even these have called for a wide scope of world intervention. All of this is very much at odds with the traditional American foreign policy that prevailed until 1898. Now that the Cold War is over, the author says, it is time for a serious reexamination of the premises underlying both the new and the traditional policies.

Key Words: International affairs, American foreign policy, world intervention, global meliorism, Davos culture.

Powerful opposing forces – some centrifugal and others centripetal – are contending for preeminence in the world today.

In their recent book *Beyond Westphalia?: State Sovereignty and International Intervention*, Thomas Weiss and arat Chopra interpret this as a continuation of the anti-colonial breakup that followed World War II: "The decolonization process that began in Africa and Asia continues not only in the former Soviet empire but also within newly independent states, as ethnic particularism and subnationalism surface...."[1] They would almost certainly agree, however, that the fragmentation goes far beyond what can be attributed directly to the breakup of the earlier colonial system.

A centrifugal flying-apart into fragments occurs in movements that in many places passionately seek local autonomy, often even secession from the larger entity to which they have belonged. A short list of the areas in which local peoples are asserting themselves in a great many

[1] Thomas Weiss and Jarat Chopra in *Beyond Westphalia?: State Sovereignty and International Intervention*, Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, ed.s, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 92.

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parts of the world would include the United Kingsom, Spain, Corsica, Italy, the Balkans, the Russian Federation, Canada, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, southern Mexico, Indonesia, the Philippines and many parts of Africa.

The centripetal tendency, on the other hand, leads toward consolidation. It entails an all-encompassing outlook that is premised implicitly on the assumption that "everybody's business is the world's business," and presumes a proper role for global policing and social welfare. Historian David Callahan speaks of an "internationalist project as a whole" that is backed by "elite liberal internationalist opinion."[2] The past century has seen the growth – even though unevenly and with much interruption – of a "global community." It often holds definite opinions about what is right and wrong, and is willing to take action to mold the world, as best it can, in the direction it finds desirable.

Cultural historian Samuel P. Huntington says "the term 'universal civilization'" is used to speak of "the assumptions, values, and doctrines currently held by many people in Western civilization and by some people in other civilizations." He suggests that "this might be called the Davos Culture." The name comes from a very tangible presence: "Each year about a thousand businessmen, bankers, government officials, intellectuals, and journalists from scores of countries meet in the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland." Huntington tells how "Davos people control virtually all international institutions, many of the world's governments, and the bulk of the world's economic and military capabilities."[3]

The Davos meeting is, of course, just the most recent sign of a consensus that has long existed among the global elite (and here I use "elite" in a neutral sense that denotes those in the professional classes who hold the most prominent positions). The name "Davos Culture" is useful, but the consensus is much older and more expansive than could possibly be suggested from a single annual gathering. Even those who point to the influence of the Tri-Lateral Commission or the Council of Foreign Relations, which are essentially parts of what Huntington is referring to with his term, are speaking too narrowly. In his book *The Warrior's Honour*, Michael Ignatieff tells how the impulse toward universalism has been developing within Western civilization for

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[2] David Callahan, *Unwinnable Wars: American Power and Ethnic Conflict* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997), pp. 201 and 178.

[3] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone Books, 1996), p. 57.

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many centuries.

Ignatieff speaks of centuries during which "Europeans gradually came to believe in a myth of human universality... that human needs and pain are universally the same." Part of this was "the Christian promise of the universality of salvation," and it was reflected in "the jurisprudence developed by early modern natural law theorists [when they] sought to provide a universal natural law."

It is possible to speak of all this as a gradual "lowering of the threshold of human compassion," since more and more people have come to be included within the scope of benign sensibility. By no means should those who are critical of it think of it in limited, personalized terms. Such a broad-based change of sentiment among so many people of like mind, nurtured over the centuries, is hardly a "conspiracy."

Even though universalism has been the historic tendency, this doesn't mean that there is necessarily a popular consensus in Europe and America today in favor of a policy of global intervention and meliorism. Such a policy is a major leap from the more limited politics of the nation-state. Where it most finds favor is among those who hold strongly to what we now call "politically correct" thinking (a euphemism for ideological conformity).

Hedley Bull describes a "common intellectual culture" that exists "only at the elite level."[4] A fair summary of the consensus within this "world community" would be that it is

- "social democratic," but in a way that still allows it to be enthusiastically supportive of a global market economy;
- state interventionist in economic and social matters, despite its commitment to free trade;
- internationalist, increasingly subordinating national sovereignty;
- ready to see more and more issues as global rather than local;
- reformist;
- and action-oriented toward imposing its will where it can, despite many practical difficulties, double standards and blind spots.

[4] Bull is quoted by Huntington in *Clash of Civilizations*, p. 58.

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This community is by no means *laissez-faire* toward world problems. Among other things, it hopes to relieve humanitarian crises, address the chaos within "failed states," decide which secessionist movements deserve to succeed and which to fail (sometimes making a point out of "self-determination" and sometimes not), protect "human rights" as those have become generalized within an international code of conduct, act at least selectively against "war crimes," prevent genocides, protect the world's environment, foster arms control, "stop bloodshed" by ending conflicts, encourage "multiethnicity," maintain strategic balances of power, preserve "international stability," and operate through international rather than national agencies.

An overlapping ideological climate prevails in the United States, Great Britain and Western Europe. The outlook within these countries forms an important part of the "international consensus" among the world's elite. The cocoon of "politically correct" attitudes surrounds people in opinion-forming circles. The ideologically correct outlook is insisted upon for the great body of professionals and semi-professionals – in fact, conformity to it is declared obligatory for all members of society. A great many opposing opinions exist, but they find little effective expression and there is considerable social, economic (and sometimes legal) pressure against them in circles considered respectable.

This internationalist meliorism is conducting something that differs in significant ways from the long twentieth century struggle to contain Communist expansion as a militant totalitarian ideology. The vast global intervention and common effort that went into the decades-long effort toward "containment" were essentially defensive. A single people could hardly be expected to stand up effectively on their own against the subversion, the assassination squads, and the externally-armed and supplied fifth-column movements that emanated from the Soviet Union and Communist China. This matching of an enormous movement against individual nations meant that as the process continued the "Free World" would shrink and become surrounded, as Mao proposed, by a "countryside" of Communist states, each dedicated to the destruction of "bourgeois" civilization.

Writing in *The Mises Review*, David Gordon takes issue with the view I have just expressed. He asks, "given the weakness of socialism as a method of economic organization, were the Soviets in any position to maintain world hegemony?" and answers that "eventually, a socialist

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system must collapse into chaos."[5] The demise of the Soviet Union after seventy-plus years demonstrated, of course, the wisdom of Ludwig von Mises' insight into the economic unworkability of socialism,[6] although that insight needs to be combined with certain others, such as about the political difficulty of holding together widely disparate elements in a broad empire.

Gordon's point should give reason to pause before anyone worries about vast expansionist systems in the future, because they do indeed have Achilles heels. But to have relied on the premise that "the problem will take care of itself" as totalitarianism marched through all of the continents of the globe would have placed the non-Communist societies at ever-increasing risk. It is possible, of course, to look at it primarily from the vantage point of the United States, but that would be too narrow, since civilization everywhere was at issue. Anything less than containment would have surrendered much of the world and seriously threatened the rest.

This is not the situation today. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the intervention has – instead of being defensive – been geared toward, in effect, "minding everyone's business." This is why Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno find cause to ask, "Are we currently witnessing the emergence and recognition of a legitimate 'right' to intervene in the domestic affairs of member states in the name of community norms, values, or interests?"[7]

It is most accurate to see the meliorist effort as *resuming* its original thrust. There were serious moves in its direction before and even during the conflict with the totalitarian systems. It was a general world-improving spirit that inspired the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact that outlawed aggressive war, and later the creation of the United Nations at the end of World War II. President Jimmy Carter's policy toward black Africa was oddly enigmatic from an anti-Communist point of view, but becomes clear when we see it from

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[5] *The Mises Review*, Fall 2000, p. 15.

[6] Mises' critique was based on an inability of a socialist economy to "calculate" because of the absence of a free-market price system. He was wise in seeing the impermanence of socialism, but it is doubtful whether a "lack of calculation" was the reason. The lack of incentives, the consequent lack of inventive dynamism, and the eventual loss of morale all seem stronger candidates. As the text suggests, there are still other reasons that contributed to the collapse of the social and political structure.

[7] Lyons and Mastanduno, ed.s, *Beyond Westphalia?*, p. 3.

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a world-meliorist perspective.

The overall mindset that favors a universal policing and social servicing of the world has, however, been beset by considerable costs, frustrations and inadequacies. This has prompted important voices to call for restraint – although by no means for a general repeal of the mindset. This less-than-total universalism has become an important school of thought in itself. Here are some manifestations of it:

Caspar Weinberger, the U.S. Secretary of Defense under President Reagan, advocated applying certain preconditions to U.S. military involvement. There should, he said, be (a) vital interests at stake, (b) a clearly defined and feasible mission, (c) Congressional support, and (d) a viable exit strategy. It is worth noting, however, that Secretary of State George Schultz so heartily opposed these limits that he openly took issue with them in speeches even though he was a member of the same administration.

After the Gulf War with Iraq, U.S. General Colin Powell announced the "Powell doctrine." He wanted U.S. military involvement "only if victory is assured, if [the United States] is willing to use overwhelming force and if the fight has broad public support"[8].

In an answer to a question during the 2000 presidential campaign debates, George W. Bush seconded the need for an exit strategy and at the same time argued that the United States should have priorities that would treat the Balkans and Middle East, say, as more important than Rwanda when choosing where to intervene.

Insight magazine said about the two candidates, Bush and Gore, that they "agreed on four fundamentals that have to be met before deploying troops: (1) It must be in the national interest to do so; (2) the threat to be met must menace U.S. national security or important allies; (3) the objectives of the mission have to be clear and success assured; and (4) there has to be an exit strategy. The vice president added that the costs should be proportionate to the benefits."[9]

In an interview just before taking office, Bush expressed a

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[8] David Callahan recites the "Weinberger Doctrine" in his *Unwinnable Wars*, p. 42. He says that "Weinberger's views, however, never represented a consensus view in the American government. Secretary of State George Shultz even went so far as to dispute them in public speeches." The criteria set out by General Colin Powell after the Gulf War were somewhat different from Weinberger's, although similar in spirit. (The *Wichita Eagle*, article on "Intervention," June 20, 1999.)

[9] "Political Notebook" by Jamie Dettmer, *Insight* magazine, October 30, 2000, p. 13.

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restrained view toward aid to Russia:

> It's hard for America to fashion Russia... We don't want to be lending money and/or encourage the lending of money into a system in which the intention of the capital is never fulfilled. The intent of the capital was to encourage entrepreneurship and growth and markets.[10]

After the failure of the "nation building" intervention in Somalia, even U.N. secretary general Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote a supplement to his *An Agenda for Peace* that called for "scaled-down expectations and missions."[11]

These concerns exist alongside the broad philosophy of meliorism; and since the concerns are based on practical, reality-based factors, they are bound to put limits on it. The result is that "the Security Council's definition of what constitutes 'threats' to international peace is both *expanding to cover virtually any subject* and remaining *selective in application*," according to Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (emphasis added).[12]

Needless to say, there is considerable ambiguity in this restrained position. The principal thrust remains toward involvement in problems everywhere. In the early 1990s, a group of highly influential people – who included Senators John McCain, Sam Nunn, and Pat Roberts; Condoleezza Rice, later George W. Bush's National Security Advisor; Brent Scowcroft; David Gergen; and executive directors from Harvard University, the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, and the RAND Corporation - formed the private "Commission on America's National Interests." The Commission's Report represents a sort of "middle interventionist" position. Its constraint is evident in its desire to relate intervention to a particular country's national interest, in its desire to prioritize subjects of interest,[13] and in its moderating of the call for

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[10] *New York Times* report by David E. Sanger and Frank Bruni, *Wichita Eagle*, January 14, 2001.

[11] See Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, ed.s, *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 208, 211.

[12] Clarke and Herbst, eds., *Learning from Somalia*, p. 209.

[13] The prioritizing is apparent when it talks about preventing and, "if possible at reasonable cost, end[ing] major conflicts *in important geographical regions*" [emphasis added]. Elsewhere, it speaks of taking certain actions in "strategically important states."

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efforts to universalize democracy and human rights.[14] But the Report nevertheless calls for a vastly interventionist role for the United States. It is considered absolutely essential to "prevent the emergence of a hostile hegemon in Europe or Asia, and "extremely important" to "prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon in important regions, such as the Persian Gulf." Accordingly, the United States is charged with the responsibility of "managing the power balance" in East Asia, and with "preserving the independence of Ukraine and the Baltic states and protecting them from aggression, intimidation, and blackmail." The United States is to defend allies, prevent genocides, end conflicts, and assure the survival of Israel, among other endeavors. The moderation comes only in allowing selectivity and occasional decisions not to act.

To return to the main point of this article, however, it is well to keep in mind that there are many voices calling for an even more sweeping view. Thus, Steven W. Mosher, one of the United States' premier China experts, writes from the perspective of an "American global primacy." He is fully explicit about it: "We need make no apology for striving to maintain America's global primacy... America's continued preponderance over China, as well as other states, brings with it important advantages for Americans. The benign American order carries benefits for the wider world as well by promoting prosperity, political development, and international peace."[15] In like fashion, Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, in their book *The Coming Conflict With China*, speak of the "principles of Western-style liberal democracy" as having "become the global norm."[16] Mosher, Bernstein and Munro are, of course, just three voices out of a great many.

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[14] The Report's moderating of the call for universalizing democracy and human rights appears when, under "Less Important or Secondary" national interests, it lists "enlarging democracy elsewhere or for its own sake." It places in the "Just Important" category efforts to "discourage massive human rights violations in foreign countries as a matter of official government policy."

[15] Steven W. Mosher, *Hegemon: China's Plan to Dominate the World* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000), p. 183.

[16] Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict With China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), p. 101.

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The Issue of Legitimacy

Legitimacy for the meliorist project is thought to stem from the collective consensus that underlies it. "What appears to be required to justify intervention, increasingly, is what might be called collective legitimation,"[17] according to Lyons and Mastanduno. Those who identify with this "world community" feel that they are already in command of a sort of world government that uses the United Nations and a vast web of international organizations ("IOs"), even though it is not yet fully institutionalized as a government as such. They lay claim to the various features of government: jurisdiction, coercive power, and legitimacy.

The concept of legitimacy-through-collective-will calls for serious reflection. Ironically, it is precisely the basis upon which lynching – a phenomenon of frontier-like communities acting upon outraged public opinion and not feeling themselves accountable to anything outside themselves – could be said to be "legitimate." No enlightened person accepts that as morally supportable in a well-ordered society. The idea that a powerful group's consensus validates itself reminds us of what, according to Thucydides, the Athenians told the Melians: "In fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept."[18] In the absence of a universally-recognized sovereign power based upon a commonly-embraced moral and legal order, an international quasi-government is open to justifiable criticism by any given opponent on precisely the issue of legitimacy. This is, in fact, the view taken of it by many commentators in the non-European civilizations.

The will of the American elite is fully in evidence within the international meliorist project (and again I use "elite" in neither a favorable nor a pejorative sense). This is so even though "action by the world community" is hardly comparable to a well-oiled machine and the United States often acts on its own because of others' reluctance. Friedrich Kratochwil cites an author who points out that the rationales for intervention "usually coincide with the U.S. position on virtually any issue...."[19] In Somalia the initial U.S.-led intervention in late 1992 was replaced in May 1993 by the United Nations effort, but a recent book

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[17] Lyons and Mastanduno, ed.s., *Beyond Westphalia?*, p. 8.

[18] Thucydides is quoted in Lyons and Mastanduno, *Beyond Westphalia?*, p. 246, essay by Stephen D. Krasner.

[19] Friedrich Kratochwil in *Beyond Westphalia?*, p. 34.

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adds that "although the United States did hand over formal control of the operation..., it still determined the nature of the operation."[20]

The near-universal presence of the United States (its "primacy," to use Mosher's term) is attested to by the fact that, according to *Insight*, "as of July 1998 the United States had more than 200,000 troops stationed in 133 countries and territories and another 20,000 sailors and Marines on Navy ships." In late 1999 there were 6,000 in Bosnia and another 6,000 in Kosovo.[21]

This doesn't rule out involvement by others. Callahan speaks of "a consensus... emerging among the major democracies that a sustained collective effort must be made to deal with humanitarian crises and failed states."[22] On the world economic scene, action is taken through the major powers who have formed the Group of Eight.

As a moral oddity, the "world community" has sometimes thrown open its cloak to include even the totalitarian states, such as in quarantining white South Africa. Robert H. Jackson says the quarantine "was effective because the West and the Communist bloc cooperated to make it so."[23] In 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the unanimous vote of the General Assembly, which tells us that even the Communist members voted for it.[24] (All the while, Communism worldwide was producing a death toll that is estimated by responsible scholars at 85 to 100 million people.)[25] Recall that a Soviet judge sat on the Nuremberg tribunal. This participation by totalitarian governments necessarily suggests conceptual ambiguity and vast double standards.

Nor does the "world community," so called, rest easily upon its throne. The offsetting rise of ethnic, religious particularisms – the "centrifugal forces" I spoke of earlier – is only the tip of the iceberg. Huntington observes that nine highly diverse civilizations exist in the world. "The concept of a universal civilization is a distinctive product

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[20] Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst in the book they edited, *Learning From Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 241.

[21] *Insight* magazine, November 15, 1999, p. 17.

[22] Callahan, *Unwinnable Wars*, p. 46.

[23] Robert H. Jackson in *Beyond Westphalia?*, pp. 81, 82.

[24] Related by Jack Donnelly in *Beyond Westphalia?*, p. 123.

[25] Stephane Courtois, Nicolas Werth, Jean-Louis Panne, Andrzej Paczkowski, Karel Bartosek, Jean-Louis Margolin, *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression* (Cambridge, MA: The Harvard University Press, 1999), p. x.

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of Western civilization," he says, adding that "the idea of a universal civilization finds little support in other civilizations. The non-Wests see as Western what the West sees as universal."[26] Stephen D. Krasner points out that "there is not yet any compelling evidence that the polities of the major powers are infused with a full commitment to democracy and liberalism. The United States and Japan do not share the same social purpose. Much of the Islamic world utterly rejects the West. The political trajectory of Russia and the other republics that were part of the Soviet Union is uncertain."[27]

The Changed Mental Landscape of American Interventionism

From the beginning of American national existence until 1898, the United States was strongly committed to being a shining example of a free society while at the same time not intervening in Europe or other parts of the world. John Quincy Adams gave this its most eloquent expression in his Independence Day speech in 1821:

> Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been unfurled, there will [America's] heart, her benedictions, and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own... She well knows that, by once enlisting under other banners than her own... she would involve herself, beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue... She might become the dictatress of the world; she would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit.[28]

Seventy-six years later *The Nation* expressed the same outlook in an 1897 editorial that opposed annexing Hawaii:

> We are under the most solemn obligations to the civilized world not to diffuse our 'happiness' or our 'life' among other people in the old way. We have for one hundred years made known to all mankind... that when we spread we meant to spread... through

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[26] Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, p. 66.

[27] Stephen D. Krasner in *Beyond Westphalia?*, p. 249.

[28] Adams is quoted in Robert L. Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. ix.

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knowledge and trade, and law and liberty, and brotherly kindness.[29]

This agreed with Andrew Carnegie's comment two years earlier that "the man in America who should preach that the nation should interfere with distant races for their civilization, and for their good, would be voted either a fool or a hypocrite."[30]

There were, of course, dissenting voices. Walt Whitman wanted President Polk to send 60,000 troops to Mexico to establish and permanently guarantee a reformed government there.[31] During Europe's revolutionary years in 1848-9, enthusiasm existed in the United States, supported by Secretary of State Daniel Webster (but also strongly opposed by Senators Clay and Calhoun), for assisting Louis Kossuth's Hungarian independence movement against the Habsburg monarchy.[32] Thirty years earlier, Webster had urged the United States to intervene to support Greek independence from the Turks (but ran into opposition from John Quincy Adams).[33] In 1869, President Grant wanted to annex Santo Domingo, only to see the Senate reject the treaty of annexation.[34] Probably the most significant tendency toward an outlook of social-intervention (though its expression remained internal until the late nineteenth century) was what Murray Rothbard calls the "postmillennial pietist Protestantism that had conquered Yankee areas of northern Protestantism by the 1830s" and that wanted "to stamp out sin" within the United States.[35]

In 1898, what had been a minority position became the majority outlook, however. 1898 is thus a watershed year in the history of the United States. That year, the United States annexed Hawaii and went to war against Spain, prompted by the outcry over abuses in Cuba, thereby also taking on long-term involvements in Puerto Rico and the

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[29] *The Nation*, Vol. 65, editorial at p. 468 (1897).

[30] Carnegie is quoted in Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire*, p. 169.

[31] Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), p. 95.

[32] Patrick J. Buchanan, *A Republic, Not an Empire* (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1999), pp. 123-5.

[33] Buchanan, *A Republic, Not an Empire*, p. 125; McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, p. 173.

[34] Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire*, p. 22.

[35] Murray Rothbard in *The Costs of War: America's Pyrrhic Victories*, John V. Denson, ed. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997), p. 203.

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Philippines.

These actions were different in kind from the continental expansion of the United States to the Pacific Ocean. That was an expansion into what was perceived as empty space, despite the presence of the American Indian who was seen as hardly counting because of the Indians' nomadic way of life, thin population and vastly lower level of development. The actions of 1898 involved exercising power over indigenous peoples of very different ethnic and cultural origin, and were motivated by an internationalist spirit of meliorist responsibility. *The Nation* inveighed in vain against this sea-change in American opinion.[36]

Even though many Americans have continued to uphold the traditional view and even though the steps toward global intervention over the past century have often been halting and uncertain, the prevailing American assumption has been that almost anything that goes on in the world *is* Americans' business if only it is sufficiently dramatically brought to Americans' attention and appeals to their moral indignation. On May 27, 1916, President Woodrow Wilson told Americans that "we are participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our own also."[37] Historian Eric A. Nordlinger says that "[Wilson's] conflation of American power and morality was evident in urging intervention in Europe both to uphold our rights on the high seas and to 'make the world safe for democracy.' When the Navy bombarded and occupied Veracruz in 1914, Wilson maintained that 'the United States had gone to Mexico to serve Mankind.'"[38]

In 1943 while he was contemplating the formation of the United Nations, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt thought "the real decisions should be made by the United States, Great Britain, Russia and China, who would be the powers for many years to come and that would have to police the world."[39] Along the same lines, when Robert

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[36] See the editorials in *The Nation*: "The Momentous Decision" [about Hawaii], Vol. 65, p. 468 (1897); "After Intervention – What?," Vol. 66, p. 199 (1898); "National Hysteria," Vol. 66, p. 297; and at Vol. 66, p. 319.

[37] Quoted in Buchanan, *A Republic, Not an Empire*, p. 181.

[38] Eric A. Nordlinger, *Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 267.

[39] Roosevelt is quoted in Richard M. Ebeling, "Covering the Map of the World – The

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McNamara became director of the World Bank he "threw its resources behind 'a new world economic order' on the premise," Walter McDougall says, "that the rich 'have a responsibility to assist the less developed nations.'"[40]

McDougall observes that President Harry Truman's "Point Four, though modest at the start, amounted to a promise to extend the New Deal and Fair Deal to the world." And he tells how President Dwight Eisenhower became convinced of the need for a worldwide drive against poverty by "the birth of the non-aligned movement in 1955 and the Suez crisis of 1956," believing that "the freedom of nations can be menaced not only by guns but by the poverty that communism can exploit." Driven by the need to contain Communism, McDougall says, "Global Meliorism secured the bipartisan support needed to sustain grants, loans, and investments that would transfer, all told, some $2 trillion (in 1980s prices) from the First to the Third World by 1990."[41]

Between approximately 1947 and 1989, much of this was part of the strategy to contain Communism. The global-meliorist underpinning was never absent, however, and served as an underlay. But FDR was not thinking of containment in 1943 when he included the Soviet Union as one of the world's four policemen. Nor was Francis Fukuyama thinking of meliorism as having been limited to the needs of containment when after the disintegration of the Soviet Union he wrote about "the end of history" based on what he saw as the "final triumph of liberal market democracy."[42]

Conclusion

In this discussion we have noted the existence of a world-meliorist project and of American leadership within it. This is a project very different from American policy prior to 1898. Now that the Cold War is over, a reexamination of the premises underlying the opposing policies would seem to be appropriate.

Half Century Legacy of the Yalta Conference," *The Failure of America's Foreign Wars* (Fairfax, Va: Future of Freedom Foundation, 1996), p. 184.

[40] McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, p. 196.

[41] McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, p. 182.

[42] Fukuyama is cited in McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, p. 200.

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Changing the Face of Social Science
Richard Lynn, Preface by Harry F. Weyher
University Press of America, Lanham, MD.
ISBN 0-7618-2040-X, lxii + 581 pp. 2001

Genetic Science has advanced rapidly during the past few decades and the public at large is becoming increasingly aware of the important role played by heredity in shaping the individual's medical history; but the public is less aware of the role of heredity in shaping personality – which includes such important qualities as intelligence, and the ability to work toward long-term goals rather than simply seek instant gratification.

Surprisingly, far too many schoolteachers and university faculty who teach social sciences continue to believe that environmental factors determine human behavior and that genes are of little importance. *Changing the Face of Social Science* is a veritable mine of information on precisely this subject, outlining as it does the careers and discoveries of some three dozen scholars who have made major contributions to the interplay of genetics and human behavior. In it, author Lynn reveals the extent to which social scientists must in future take heredity into account when attempting to understand social problems and to engage in social engineering.

Detailing as it does the conclusions and contributions of so many scholars in this area, plus the vital work of a New York Foundation, the Pioneer Fund, any reviewer of *Changing the Face of Social Science* can best convey the contents of this 600 page publication by touching upon the careers of a representative selection of the scholars whose biographies are included within its covers.

One of the earliest of these was Henry E. Garrett, long-time chairman of the department of psychology at Columbia University and a former president of the American Psychological Association, who in numerous publications exposed the fallacies of what he called "the equalitarian dogma" and revealed the ineptness of post World War II social policies based on the warped Dewey-Boas creed of total human plasticity. But a major breakthrough came as a result of the work of Berkeley psychologist Arthur R. Jensen[1] who demonstrated beyond question the essentially genetic basis of intelligence. During the 1970s and 1980s, Thomas J. Bouchard and his colleagues of the University of Minnesota Twin Studies research program were able to determine that the heritability of intelligence was between 75 and 83%, with environment and life history playing only a minor role. At the University of Western Ontario in Canada, J. Philippe Rushton[2] introduced behavioral genetics into the study of evolution, and showed how this science was relevant to the contemporary world scene by collating a large number of studies carried out by scholars in countries around the world, thereby showing how genetic factors

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played an important role in widely diverse cultures, and how culture itself depended on a genetic base.

Lynn's Changing the Face of Social Science also describes the contributions of Stanford University professor, Nobel prizewinner William Shockley,[3] who had headed the team of physicists who developed the transistor, turned from research into physics to research into the social science when he became convinced that ignorance of the social importance of genes was responsible for ill-advised social policies which threatened mankind with devolution, as he termed it. Shockley warned that confusing the laudable concepts of human kindness, goodwill, charity and the principle of equality before the law with hazy notions of economic egality and a non-existent biological equality of all humans could spell disaster for modern societies. University of New York and New School of Social Research professor Ernest van den Haag similarly took up cudgels against false social theories which ran counter to biological reality, and the publications of the distinguished psychologist and Freud-killer Hans J. Eysenck[4] played a major role in persuading psychologists and psychiatrists to abandon antiquated theories concerning the workings of the human mind in favor of serious investigation into the biological realities behind human behavior. University of Northern Iowa professor Ralph Scott[5] demonstrated with statistics the devastating effect of the extreme egalitarianism of Dewey and Boas on the American educational system.

Unfortunately, as Richard Lynn[6] has pointed out in the course of his own research, human reproductive practices no longer follow the natural patterns which evolved in the course of our evolutionary history. The distortions of contemporary culture can lead to a decline in human ability. Similarly, as Garrett Hardin[7] has warned, unequal rates of reproduction around the world could lead not only to massive economic and social strains, but eventually to a breakdown of liberal society as we know it.

Only if the social sciences come into line with causal reality, and properly appreciate the need for human culture and ideologies to be in harmony with human biology, can there be any hope for the development of successful legal, political and social policies. This book not only details the lives and achievements of those who have played a major role in helping to direct the social sciences into more realistic channels based on a proper understanding o human biology, but it also provides the reader with vital and little publicized information about the genetic roots of human behavior.

Selected works of interest: [1]A.R. Jensen, *The g-factor*, Praeger 1998; [2]J. Philippe Rushton, *Race, Evolution & Behavior*, Transaction 2000; [3]*Shockley on Eugenics and Race*, Scott-Townsend 1922; [4]Hans J. Eysenck, *The Biological Basis of Personality*, Ablex, 1993; [5]R. Scott *Education and Ethnicity*, Council for Soc. & Econ. Stds., 1988; [6]R. Lynn, *Eugenics: A Reassessment*, U.P. of America, 2001; [7]G. Hardin, *Living within Limits*, OUP, 1993.

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The Future of the Gulf

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